Opinion
No. 12-16148 D.C. No. 5:11-cv-03707-RMW
02-19-2013
THEODORE C. SHOVE, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. M. MARTEL, Warden; et al., Defendants - Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MEMORANDUM
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Ronald M. Whyte, District Judge, Presiding
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Theodore C. Shove appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000), and whether Younger abstention is applicable, Gilbertson v. Albright, 384 F.3d 965, 982 n.19 (9th Cir. 2004)(en banc). We affirm.
The district court properly determined that abstention under Younger was appropriate because Shove's state habeas corpus proceeding, still pending before the California Supreme Court, raises similar issues as presented in his federal complaint, implicates important state interests, and provides an adequate opportunity to litigate his federal claims. See San Jose Silicon Valley Chamber of Commerce Political Action Comm. v. City of San Jose, 546 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing Younger factors).
The district court judge's recusal was not required because Shove has not demonstrated that the judge's impartiality might be reasonably questioned or that the judge had a plausible personal bias or prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 455; Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) ("[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion."); United States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1148 (9th Cir. 2010) (the fact that a district judge presided over the litigant's prior civil case was not a basis for recusal in a later proceeding).
AFFIRMED.