Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-10963 Trial Court No. 3PA-10-1166 MO No. 5957
06-26-2013
STEPHEN M. SHORTRIDGE, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Deborah Burlinski, Anchorage, for Appellant. John J. Novak, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE
Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND JUDGMENT
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Palmer, John W. Wolfe and David L. Zwink, Judges.
Appearances: Deborah Burlinski, Anchorage, for Appellant. John J. Novak, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Coats, Senior Judge.
Sitting by assignment made pursuant to article IV, section 11 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 23(a).
ALLARD, Judge.
Stephen M. Shortridge was convicted of speeding. On appeal, he claims the district court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the case based on the State's failure to provide discovery that Shortridge had requested. For the reasons set out below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Background
Alaska State Trooper Amy Bowen stopped Shortridge for speeding. When she did so, she was accompanied in her vehicle by two people who were making audio and video recordings to be used for the National Geographic Television Channel series "Alaska State Troopers." The two-person film crew worked for a private production company, PSG Films, which was located in Seattle, Washington.
Shortridge contested the speeding ticket and requested that the State provide information about the film crew, such as their names and contact information.
A captain from the State Troopers wrote to Shortridge and provided him with the names of the film crew, along with the mailing address for PSG Films. The captain also provided Shortridge with the name and the mailing address of the Seattle law firm that represented PSG Films. The captain's letter explained that "[a]ll video from that [traffic stop] are property of PSG Films and would require a written court order to obtain. We do not have access to the raw footage nor are we provided with the raw data from PSG Films."
Shortridge then moved to compel this discovery, and requested the following: (1) contact information for the film crew, (2) copies of all of their notes regarding his traffic stop, (3) copies of all recordings during and immediately preceding his traffic stop, (4) any background checks of the film crew, (5) copies of any correspondence between the State and the National Geographic Television Channel, (6) copies of any agreement between the State, PSG Films, and the National Geographic Television Channel regarding the "ride along," and (7) copies of any State policies in general regarding the Alaska State Troopers' "ride along" program.
District Court Judge John W. Wolfe granted the motion in part, and ordered the State to provide (1) the film crew's addresses and phone numbers, (2) any pertinent audio, video, or digital recordings in the State's possession, and (3) any pertinent written notes taken by the film crew in the State's possession. Judge Wolfe denied, without comment, the rest of Shortridge's requested discovery.
An attorney for the State responded to the court's order, and provided the names of the two film crew members, the mailing address for their employer, PSG Films, and the name, mailing address, and phone number of the Seattle law firm that represented PSG Films, all of which - except for the law firm's phone number - had been previously disclosed to Shortridge. The attorney also declared that the State was not in possession of any video, audio, or digital records of the PSG film crew, nor was it in possession of any of their written notes.
Shortridge did not initially challenge the adequacy of the State's response. Ten weeks later, the matter was tried in a bench trial before District Court Judge David L. Zwink in March 2011. Just before the trial started, Shortridge moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that the State had not provided the information ordered by the court, and that Judge Wolfe should have ordered the State to produce all of the discovery requested. Shortridge did not explain why a dismissal rather than a continuance was the appropriate remedy for this alleged discovery violation.
Shortridge argued that he had been unable to reach the film crew because the State had not provided direct telephone numbers for the film crew or in-state addresses. Shortridge's attorney stated that she had sent a letter to the law firm, but had never received a response. She acknowledged, however, that she had not followed up by calling the law firm in an effort to obtain any of the information she wanted.
Judge Zwink took the matter under advisement, and the trial went forward. Judge Zwink found Shortridge guilty of speeding and later issued a written decision denying the motion to dismiss. He found that the State had complied with all of its discovery obligations and that Shortridge's challenge to Judge Wolfe's earlier rulings could be raised on appeal but was otherwise untimely.
Shortridge appeals.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal
As a preliminary matter, the State challenges our jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The State contends that this Court does not have the authority to hear appeals arising from convictions for traffic infractions because our enabling statute only grants this Court the authority to review "a final decision of the district court in an action or proceeding involving criminal prosecution." The State argues that traffic infractions are "non-criminal" and therefore outside our jurisdiction.
AS 22.07.020(c). See also Appellate Rule 202(b) ("An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from a final judgment entered by the superior court or the district court in the circumstances specified in AS 22.07.020.").
In its briefing, the State cites incorrectly to AS 11.81.250 for its characterization of traffic infractions as non-criminal. AS 11.81.250 distinguishes between felony criminal offenses, misdemeanor criminal offenses, and non-criminal violations arising under Title 11; it is not directly applicable to traffic infractions, which arise under Title 28.
But the State's position is directly at odds with long-standing caselaw on this matter as well as clear legislative intent.
In State v. Clayton, for example, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that "a prosecution for a traffic infraction is a quasi-criminal proceeding to which certain criminal procedures ... are applicable." The supreme court found that the legislature intended to remove the criminal stigma from traffic offenses, "while keeping the enforcement of such offenses within the criminal system's procedures" and that "the legislature has created a class of quasi-criminal offenses which, while they are not serious, are to be disposed of within the criminal justice system."
584 P.2d 1111, 1113 (Alaska 1978).
Id. at 1113-14.
In 1980, the legislature acted to codify the Clayton holding. Alaska Statute 12.80.040 provided that, with the exception of the right to a jury trial and appointed counsel, "all laws of the state relating to misdemeanors apply to violations and infractions, including the powers of peace officers, the jurisdiction of courts, and the period's for commencing actions and for bringing a case to trial."
In State v. Dutch Harbor Seafoods, Ltd., the supreme court reaffirmed its prior holding in Clayton, noted the legislature's codification of that holding, and further held that strict liability non-criminal commercial fishing violations under Title 16 were likewise quasi-criminal proceedings to which criminal, and not civil, procedures applied. Most recently, in State v. Euteneier, this Court concluded that violations under Title 4 similarly belonged to the same "class of quasi-criminal offenses," that are designated as "non-criminal" but "are to be enforced and adjudicated using criminal procedures."
965 P.2d 738, 744-46 (Alaska 1998).
31 P.3d 111, 113 (Alaska App. 2001) (quoting Dutch Harbor Seafoods, Ltd., 965 P.2d at 746).
Based on the above authority, we conclude that the State's challenge to our jurisdiction is without merit and that we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
The district court did not err when it denied Shortridge's motion to dismiss
Shortridge raises eight claims of error on appeal, but they can be condensed into two basic claims: whether Judge Zwink should have dismissed the case based on the State's alleged failure to produce the discovery it had been ordered to provide, and whether Judge Wolfe should have fully granted Shortridge's original motion to compel.
On the day of trial, Shortridge moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the State had failed to comply with the court's discovery order. But Judge Zwink ultimately denied the motion because he found that the State had complied with the discovery order and that it had provided Shortridge with all of the ordered information it possessed.
Shortridge has not shown that this finding was clearly erroneous. Contrary to Shortridge's assertions, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the State had possession of any audio or video recordings from the film crew, nor is there anything to suggest that the film crew had in-state contact information that the State failed to produce. As Judge Zwink pointed out, people who live out of state will have out-of-state addresses.
Judge Zwink's finding that Shortridge was given adequate information with which to make contact with the film crew and obtain any additional discovery is also supported by the record. The record indicates that Shortridge did not exercise much diligence in trying to use the contact information he was provided. Moreover, to the extent that Shortridge was exercising proper diligence and still failing to make contact, the proper recourse would have been to move for a continuance or to seek the assistance of the court procedures, rather than to seek a dismissal on the day of trial
We conclude that the district court did not err in denying Shortridge's motion to dismiss.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by partially denying Shortridge's motion to compel
Shortridge argues that Judge Wolfe should have ordered the State to produce all of the information Shortridge requested in his motion to compel. He asserts that under Criminal Rule 16(b)(7), all of the information was discoverable because it was all related to investigating his case.
But Criminal Rule 16(b)(7) does not necessarily require production of any and all relevant information; rather, it provides that "[u]pon a reasonable request showing materiality to the preparation of the defense, the court in its discretion may require disclosure to defense counsel of relevant material and information."
Here, Judge Wolfe granted some of Shortridge's discovery requests but denied others. Specifically, Judge Wolfe denied Shortridge's request that the State be compelled to produce any agreement or correspondence between the State Troopers and the National Geographic Television Channel and PSG Films, any background checks on the film crew, and any written policies regarding the Troopers's "ride along" policy in general. Although Judge Wolfe gave no reason for his rulings, by denying the request he implicitly found that the information was not reasonably germane to Shortridge's case. Shortridge did not ask Judge Wolfe to explain his reasoning, nor did he move for reconsideration of Judge Wolfe's decision. (Nor does he on appeal take issue with Judge Wolfe's lack of an explanation.)
See Sawyer v. State, 244 P.3d 1130, 1133-34 (Alaska App. 2011).
Because this is the kind of discovery decision where reasonable judges, "given the same facts and applying the correct criteria, might come to differing conclusions," we review Judge Wolfe's decision for abuse of discretion. Under this standard, we will reverse only if the judge's ruling is "clearly untenable or unreasonable" or if we are left "with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred."
See Booth v. State, 251 P.3d 369, 373 (Alaska 2011).
Id. at 372 (quoting Gonzales v. State, 691 P.2d 285, 286 (Alaska App. 1984) and Lee v. State, 141 P.3d 342, 346-47 (Alaska 2006)).
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Shortridge fails to meet this standard on appeal. At trial, Judge Zwink gave Shortridge the opportunity to develop his record regarding whether the film crew's presence or the agreement with the National Geographic Television Channel somehow prompted Trooper Bowen to make an unlawful traffic stop or to otherwise violate Shortridge's rights. But nothing in the trial testimony suggested that the presence of the film crew, or any agreement between the State Troopers and the National Geographic Television Channel, motivated or altered Trooper Bowen's course of conduct.
Trooper Bowen's testimony showed that she was not aware of "anything specific[]" about the agreements between the State and the National Geographic Television Channel. All she knew was that "other people higher up than me had arranged ... for us to do it and we were just told what day to be there and pick them up." When asked if she had been given any other instructions "as far as how to proceed that day," Trooper Bowen responded, "[n]o, just pick them up and they were going to follow me on shift."
Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that this traffic stop was in any way unusual. According to the trial testimony, Trooper Bowen saw Shortridge's vehicle while on patrol and estimated that it was traveling at 60 miles per hour in a 45 mile-per-hour zone. When she used her radar device to confirm that estimate, it showed that Shortridge was traveling at 61 miles per hour. Trooper Bowen was certified to use the radar device, and its function tests showed that it was operating properly. Shortridge has not argued that he was not speeding or that the traffic stop was otherwise unlawful.
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the partial denial of Shortridge's motion to compel was not an abuse of discretion.
Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.