Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:04-CV-0693-Y.
February 1, 2005
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND NOTICE AND ORDER
This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The findings, conclusions and recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:
I. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a federal prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
B. PARTIES
Petitioner Michelle Shorthouse, Reg. No. 58129-065, is a federal prisoner who was confined in the Federal Medical Center-Carswell (FMC-Carswell) in Fort Worth, Texas, at the time the petition was filed.
The Federal Bureau of Prisons Inmate Locator reflects Shorthouse's current location as Seattle CCM, 915 Second Avenue, Room 3160, Seattle, Washington 98174. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons/Inmate Locator, available at http://www.bop.gov.
Respondent Ginny Van Buren is Warden of FMC-Carswell.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Shorthouse is serving a total of fifteen years' imprisonment for two 1992 criminal convictions in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. (Resp't Appendix at 3.) Her projected release date is April 2, 2005. ( Id. at 12.) On September 21, 2004, Shorthouse filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus in this division challenging the Bureau of Prison's calculation of good time credit under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). On December 6, 2004, Van Buren filed a response with supporting brief and documentary exhibits, to which Shorthouse has not timely replied.
Van Buren claims Shorthouse has not sufficiently exhausted her administrative remedies for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Resp't Response at 4-6.) Apparently, at the time Shorthouse filed this petition the Bureau had not yet responded to her BP-11. (Resp't Appendix at 40-48.) Although the record reflects the Bureau's response was due on December 11, 2004, neither party has provided a copy of the response to this court. ( Id. at 47.) Thus, Shorthouse's claim is addressed on the merits.
D. DISCUSSION
Shorthouse contends the Bureau of Prisons is calculating her good time credits in a manner that conflicts with 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b). The statutory provision provides, in relevant part:
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), a prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year other than a term of imprisonment for the duration of the prisoner's life, may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner's sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner's term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term, subject to determination by the Bureau of Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner has displayed exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations. Subject to paragraph (2), if the Bureau determines that, during that year, the prisoner has not satisfactorily complied with such institutional regulations, the prisoner shall receive no such credit toward service of the prisoner's sentence or shall receive such lesser credit as the Bureau determines to be appropriate. . . . Subject to paragraph (2), credit for the last year or portion of a year of the term of imprisonment shall be prorated and credited within the last six weeks of the sentence.
According to Shorthouse, under the Bureau's formula for calculating good time under § 3624(b), a prisoner receives only 47 days good time credit per year, instead of 54 days the prisoner is entitled to under the statute. Shorthouse contends that the good-time statute unambiguously entitles inmates to 54 days of credit for each year of the sentence imposed, rather than the time the inmate actually serves, minus any deductions for disciplinary violations. (Pet'r Memorandum at 1-5.) Under her computation, her "out date" should have been December 20, 2004. ( Id. at 4.)
The statute itself, however, makes clear that the computation of good time credit is an administrative matter within the authority of the Bureau. See Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 2001). Moreover, although the Fifth Circuit has not yet addressed the issue, other circuit courts have determined that the Bureau's interpretation of § 3624(b) as embodied in 28 C.F.R. § 523.20 and its Program Statement 5880.28 is reasonable and entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. V. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). Based upon these persuasive authorities, the Bureau's method of calculation of good-time credit is reasonable and entitled to deference. Thus, Shorthouse's challenge to the method of the Bureau's calculation of good time credits is without merit.
See Perez-Olivo v. Chavez, No. 04-1486, slip op., 2005 WL 31913, at * 2-6 (1st Cir. Jan. 7, 2005); White v. Scibana, 390 F.3d 997, 999-1003 (7th Cir. 2004); Pacheco-Camacho, 272 F.3d at 1268-72; Brown v. Hemingway, No. 02-1948, 2002 WL 31845147, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 2002) (not designated for publication); see also Williams v. Van Buren, No. 4:04-CV-525-Y, 2004 WL 3019446, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2004) (not designated for publication); Pollard v. Van Buren, No. 4:04-CV-642-A, slip op. 2004 WL 2645548, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2004) (not designated for publication); Belasco v. Bidden, No. 1:03-CV-165-C, slip order, 2004 WL 2381248, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2004).
Shorthouse's claim that judicial decisions on this issue impermissibly discriminate against him is equally without merit. In support of his claim, Shorthouse relies solely on the district court decision in White v. Scibana, 314 F. Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Wis. 2004), which was reversed on appeal. (Pet'r Reply at 7-8.) White v. Scibana, 390 F.3d 997, 999-1003 (7th Cir. 2004).
II. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Shorthouse's motion for class certification and his petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied.
III. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten (10) days after the party has been served with a copy of this document. The court is extending the deadline within which to file specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation until February 22, 2005. The United States District Judge need only make a de novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(B)(1). Failure to file by the date stated above a specific written objection to a proposed factual finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual finding or legal conclusion accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc op. on reh'g); Carter v. Collins, 918 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1990).
IV. ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is ORDERED that each party is granted until February 22, 2005, to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed and the opposing party chooses to file a response, a response shall be filed within seven (7) days of the filing date of the objections.It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, be and hereby is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.