Opinion
No. 54994-8-II
02-08-2022
Rick Cyrus SHORT, Respondent, v. Maggie Kay SCHRADER, Appellant.
Sharon Jean Blackford, Sharon Blackford PLLC, 600 Stewart St. Ste. 400 Seattle, WA, 98101-1217, for Appellant. Amber Jean Bighorse, Bighorse & Associates, PLLC, 1015 Pacific Ave. Ste. 301, Tacoma, WA, 98402-4460, Andrew Peterson Mazzeo, Harbor Appeals and Law, PLLC, 2401 Bristol Ct. Sw. Ste. C102, Olympia, WA, 98502-6037, for Respondent.
Sharon Jean Blackford, Sharon Blackford PLLC, 600 Stewart St. Ste. 400 Seattle, WA, 98101-1217, for Appellant.
Amber Jean Bighorse, Bighorse & Associates, PLLC, 1015 Pacific Ave. Ste. 301, Tacoma, WA, 98402-4460, Andrew Peterson Mazzeo, Harbor Appeals and Law, PLLC, 2401 Bristol Ct. Sw. Ste. C102, Olympia, WA, 98502-6037, for Respondent.
PART PUBLISHED OPINION
Glasgow, A.C.J.
¶1 Maggie Kay Schrader and Rick Cyrus Short are the parents of ES-S, who was born in 2016. A parenting plan entered when ES-S was 17 months old established that Schrader would be the primary residential parent.
¶2 When ES-S was three years old, Schrader sought to relocate with her son to Texas, and Short opposed relocation. Schrader's counsel failed to answer Short's requests for admission before the deadline in CR 36(a) because of extraordinary family circumstances. The trial court declined to accept Schrader's tardy answers because the court did not believe it had authority to do so. The trial court also concluded that the child relocation act, RCW 26.09.405 -.560, factors weighed against allowing relocation. Schrader appeals.
¶3 In the published portion of this opinion, we hold that on remand, the trial court must exercise discretion under CR 36 as to whether to accept the late answers to the requests for admission. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we resolve Schrader's challenges to the trial court's application of the child relocation act factors. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTS
¶4 During discovery, Short's counsel took Schrader's deposition. Short's counsel then sent Schrader's counsel requests for admission, and answers were due May 22, 2020. Several of the requests asked for admissions regarding an accusation that Schrader had scratched Short's truck while others addressed whether Schrader would obtain a financial benefit from moving to Texas. Schrader wrote her answers and returned them to her attorney within four days of receiving the requests. Her counsel failed to submit answers until the day of trial in July, well after the 30-day deadline provided in CR 36(a). Short did not file a motion to compel answers to the requests for admission before trial.
¶5 Just prior to trial, Short's counsel argued that because Schrader had not answered the requests for admission by the 30-day deadline in CR 36(a), the requests for admission should be deemed admitted. Schrader's counsel explained that the failure to answer was entirely her fault and the reasons for her mistake. Counsel's mother was seriously ill and died around the time the answers were due, her law practice was complicated further due to COVID-19, and she had a new assistant who was still being trained at that time. Schrader's counsel also argued that the requests were duplicative because many of the requests were answered in Schrader's deposition. The entire deposition transcript was eventually admitted as substantive evidence.
¶6 The trial court invited the parties to submit briefs regarding whether the late answers to the requests for admission should be accepted or whether the requests should be deemed admitted. The trial court said expressly that it would be considering Schrader's counsel's "statements about why they were not done," and explained that "the Court has discretion based on whether the Court finds ... a satisfactory reason as to why they weren't provided." 1 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) at 30. In her brief to the trial court on this issue, Schrader's counsel argued again the reasons why she failed to provide Short with Schrader's answers to the requests for admission. She also argued that the requests were duplicative of testimony given in the deposition and "exceeded the permitted purpose of [a]dmissions." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 237. She further argued, "Failure to timely respond to the [r]equests for [a]dmissions is not dispositive to prove any legal conclusion for the [r]elocation action." CP at 238.
¶7 The trial court deemed admitted several requests for admission, but rejected others. In its oral ruling, the trial court explained that it was doing so because Schrader's counsel "didn't bring a motion to the Court on that issue," and the trial court did not believe it had authority to accept the late answers absent a motion. 3 VRP at 258. The trial court rejected some requests for admission because they addressed legal conclusions and were not proper. The requests for admission that were deemed admitted related to the allegation Schrader scratched Short's truck and the lack of financial benefit that Schrader and ES-S would enjoy if they moved to Texas.
ANALYSIS
LATE RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION
¶8 Schrader argues the trial court erred when it concluded that it did not have authority to accept her late answers to Short's requests for admission because she did not file a motion asking the court to do so. We agree.
¶9 CR 36(a) provides that requests for admission are admitted unless the responding party answers within 30 days "or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow." Thus, the rule plainly allows the trial court to extend the allowable time for answering. Moreover, the trial court can extend the time limit even after the 30-day deadline has expired. Santos v. Dean , 96 Wash. App. 849, 858-59, 982 P.2d 632 (1999). The trial court must consider whether permitting the extension improves the presentation of the case on its merits and "whether the extension will prejudice the opposing party." Id. at 859, 982 P.2d 632. The prejudice inquiry involves the difficulty a party may have in proving its case in light of the sudden need to prove facts that would otherwise have been deemed admitted under the rule. Id. ¶10 We review a trial court's rulings applying CR 36 for abuse of discretion. See Peralta v. State , 187 Wash.2d 888, 895, 389 P.3d 596 (2017). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or it is based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. State v. Dye , 178 Wash.2d 541, 548, 309 P.3d 1192 (2013). A decision is based on an untenable reason if the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard " ‘or the facts do not meet the requirements of the correct standard.’ " Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Littlefield , 133 Wash.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997) ).
¶11 The trial court relied on a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, American Automobile Association (Inc.) v. AAA Legal Clinic of Jefferson Crooke, P.C. , 930 F.2d 1117 (1991), to find that Schrader never made a motion to withdraw the admissions and it therefore did not have authority to accept the late answers. There is some support for this conclusion in CR 36(b), which provides that any matter admitted under the rule is conclusively established unless the court, "on a motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission." But this provision does not expressly address the trial court's discretion to extend the time limit for responding under CR 36(a). Nothing in CR 36(a) indicates that the trial court must receive a formal motion before extending the time limit.
¶12 Moreover, the trial court indicated in its pretrial discussion of this issue with counsel that it intended to consider Schrader's counsel's "statements about why [the answers] were not done," and explained that "the Court has discretion based on whether the Court finds ... a satisfactory reason as to why they weren't provided." 1 VRP at 30. She asserted at the pretrial hearing that the failure to meet the CR 36(a) deadline was counsel's fault because she was experiencing family difficulties and staffing issues exacerbated by the pandemic. In light of the trial court's comments, it is understandable that Schrader's counsel would not believe she needed to bring a motion. In her brief to the trial court on this issue, Schrader's counsel argued again the reasons why she failed to provide Short with Schrader's answers to the requests for admission. Thus, it was clear that counsel was asking the trial court to permit the late submission of answers to the requests for admission.
¶13 The trial court declined to exercise the discretion granted to it under CR 36(a) because it believed it could not do so without a formal motion from Schrader. This misunderstanding of the legal constraints of its authority resulted in a failure to apply the correct legal standard. See CR 36(a). Moreover, Washington law requires judicial officers to make decisions under the child relocation act "based on the merits of the individual cases before them" whenever possible. RCW 26.09.003. It does not appear this preference for decisions on the merits was something the trial court considered. Failure to apply the correct legal standard was an abuse of discretion. On remand, the trial court must exercise its discretion under CR 36(a). In addition, lesser sanctions than deeming the requests admitted may be an alternative option.
CONCLUSION
¶14 Refusal to consider Schrader's late answers to the requests for admission based on a perceived lack of authority was an abuse of discretion in light of the discretion granted to the trial court under CR 36(a), its statement to the attorneys that it planned to exercise that discretion, and the statutory preference for decisions on the merits in child relocation cases. On remand, the trial court must exercise its discretion under CR 36(a).
¶15 A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder shall be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
We concur:
Worswick, J.
Price, J.