Opinion
Case No. 1:04-cv-0568-DFH-TAB.
July 12, 2004
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT NEFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Plaintiff Michael Short filed this action against defendants Susan Neff, Claims Coordinator for the City of Indianapolis, and attorney Aaron E. Haith. Plaintiff asserts claims under federal and state law regarding what he contends were false statements made when the City obtained a default judgment against him in the Marion Superior Court. The case is now before the court on Neff's uncontested motion to dismiss the claims against her for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim under Fed R. Civ. P 12(b)(6). As explained below, plaintiff's due process claim against Neff amounts to a collateral attack on a final judgment in the Indiana state courts. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over a claim that seeks, as a practical matter, what amounts to appellate review of a state court judgment. See Epps v. Creditnet, Inc., 320 F.3d 756, 760 (7th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the federal due process claim against Neff is granted for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the due process claim against Haith is also dismissed. The court also orders plaintiff Short to show cause no later than June 30, 2004, why the remaining claims against Haith and the state law claim against Neff should not also be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Neff has brought what amounts to a "facial" challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, basing her motion only on the allegations of Short's complaint. Accordingly, the court takes the well-pleaded allegations as true, giving plaintiff the benefit of reasonable inferences from those allegations. See, e.g., Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 554 (7th Cir. 1999); Capitol Leasing Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 999 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 1993); accord, Hay v. Indiana State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 312 F.3d 876, 879 n. 2 (7th Cir. 2002) (court may limit consideration to plaintiff's allegations or, if jurisdictional facts are in doubt, may take any appropriate steps to determine necessary facts); Bullock v. Credit Bureau of Greater Indianapolis, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 2d 780, 781 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (granting motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds).
Plaintiff alleges that on February 27, 2001, attorney Haith filed an action on behalf of the City of Indianapolis against plaintiff Short and Carol A. Hoskins in the Marion Superior Court. The action sought to recover money the City had spent demolishing a building owned by Short. Short alleges that the City attempted to serve him at his former residence where he had not lived for nearly a year, and that he never received notice of the state court action.
Short alleges that he does not know Hoskins, and she has no apparent involvement in this matter.
On July 8, 2002, Haith filed a motion for default judgment in the Marion Superior Court. Short alleges that the motion contained several false statements and mistakes, such as listing the wrong address for Short and stating that Short was represented by his attorney in this action, Clifford W. Shepard. As Claims Coordinator for the City, Neff filed an affidavit declaring that Short owed the City $14,178.64 plus costs and interest. This sum included $3,544.66 for Haith's attorney fees. Short alleges that the state court was misled by Haith's and Neff's false statements and mistakes, so that default judgment was granted in favor of the City on April 2, 2003 for $14,178.64 plus costs and interest.
On March 26, 2004, Short filed this action in federal court claiming that he incurred damages as result of defendant's actions in obtaining the default judgment. Short alleges that Haith's fees are excessive and that he failed to comply with Marion County Local Rule 55.1, which requires that the affidavit of debt containing attorney's fees list the number of hours worked and the hourly charge. Plaintiff contends that the supposedly excessive fee claim and false statements amount to a violation of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq., and an act of attorney deceit under Ind. Code § 33-21-1-8. Plaintiff further alleges that by Haith and Neff together committed statutory deception under Ind. Code § 35-43-5-3(a)(2) by signing and filing Neff's affidavit, so that Short should be entitled to damages under the Indiana Crime Victim's Relief Act. Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1. Finally, Short alleges that Haith and Neff deprived him of his property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is "a principle of jurisdiction that precludes the lower federal courts from applying appellate review to state court decisions. An action in federal court that alleges an injury `inextricably intertwined' with a state court decision, such that success in the federal court would require overturning the state court decision, is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine." Epps v. Creditnet, Inc., 320 F.3d 756, 759 (7th Cir. 2003); see generally District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Because the doctrine is jurisdictional, the court addresses it as a threshold issue and does not reach Neff's other arguments.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a person who claims that his federal rights were violated by a state court judgment must assert those rights through an appeal of the judgment in the state courts — not by an action in a federal district court. The only federal court review available would be before the Supreme Court of the United States. See, e.g., Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 92 F.3d 506, 509-10 (7th Cir. 1996); Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365-66 (7th Cir. 1996) ("the fundamental and appropriate question to ask is whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment").
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this court from exercising jurisdiction over Short's due process claims against Neff and Haith. Short alleges that he was injured by entry of the default judgment against him. He seeks to have this federal court declare that the state court's default judgment deprived him of his property without due process of law. That is exactly the sort of review that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine forbids. When the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, "the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction even if the state court judgment was erroneous or unconstitutional." Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 555 (7th Cir. 1999), quoting Centres, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, 148 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 1998). This court could not find a constitutional violation without determining that the state court erred. Any remedy for the due process violation alleged here would have to be found in state court. See Ind. Trial Rule 60(b).
The court takes no action at this time regarding Short's claim against Neff for statutory deception under Indiana law. But for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the claim could fall within the court's supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), but further action should await resolution of the Rooker-Feldman issue as applied to the remaining federal FDCPA claim against Haith.
Accordingly, defendant Neff's motion to dismiss is hereby granted to the extent that the due process claim against her and Haith is hereby dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court's reasoning on this issue also appears likely to apply to Short's claim against Haith under the FDCPA, as well as Short's claims arising under Indiana law. However, Haith has not raised the issue, nor has Short addressed the issue. The court hereby orders plaintiff Short to show cause no later than June 30, 2004, why the remaining claims against Haith and the state law claim against Neff should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). Haith and Neff may file a response no later than 21 days after plaintiff files his response.
So ordered.
ENTRY OF JULY 12, 2004, DISMISSING REMAINING CLAIMS
On May 28, 2004, the court granted in part defendant Neff's motion to dismiss and ordered plaintiff to show cause why his federal claim against defendant Haith should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not responded.
For the reasons stated in the May 28, 2004 entry, plaintiff's federal claims (statutory and constitutional) against defendant Haith are also barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In the absence of any federal claim within this court's subject matter jurisdiction, the court may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. Accordingly, the court will enter final judgment dismissing this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
So ordered.