It is plain that petitioner had such a "view". He made the sale before the realization of any "of the net income to be derived from such property", and there is no force in his contention that "the words `substantial part of the net income to be derived from such property' mean income already created (through construction by Eagle Mount in this case) before sale or liquidation — not that which remains to be created or earned afterwards", an interpretation inconsistent both with the language and the announced Congressional purpose. Cf. Spangler v. C.I.R., 278 F.2d 665, 671 (4 Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 825, 81 S.Ct. 63, 5 L.Ed.2d 54 (1960); Short v. C.I.R., 302 F.2d 120, 124 (4 Cir., 1962). It is equally plain that petitioner had the "view" at the time required by the Regulations, which say, Reg. § 39.117(m)-1(b)(4), that "a corporation is formed or availed of with a view to the action described in section 117(m)(2)(A) if the requisite view existed at any time during the manufacture, production, construction, or purchase referred to in that section." For, as we have held, Eagle Mount had been "availed of" principally for "construction" prior to the sale.

'" See also Mintz v. CIR, 284 F.2d 554, 559-560 (2d Cir. 1960); Short v. CIR, 302 F.2d 120, 124-125 (4th Cir. 1962). Appellants seek to rely for support for their position on Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.117(m)-1(c)(3) (ii) (1953) which provides in pertinent part:

On August 21, 2002, the Third Circuit vacated the judgment based on the denial of Peppers' pre-trial request to represent himself. United States v. Peppers, 302 F.2d 120, 137 (3d Cir. 2002). Peppers subsequently entered into a plea agreement pursuant to a one-count information charging him with violations of section 922(g)(1) and 924(e)(1).