Conflicting inferences of causation arising from the evidence carry the case to the [trier of fact]." Short v. Chapman, 261 N.C. 674, 680, 136 S.E.2d 40, 45 (1964) (citation omitted). Contrary to the implication in DOT's argument, proximate cause need not be proven to an absolute certainty. Id. at 682, 136 S.E.2d at 47 ("absolute certainty ... that [the injury] proximately resulted from the wrongful act need not be shown to support an instruction thereon") (citation omitted); Id. at 681, 136 S.E.2d at 46 ("if more than one legitimate inference can be drawn from the evidence, the question of proximate cause is to be determined by the [trier of fact]") (citation omitted).
Griffin v. Ward, 267 N.C. 296, 148 S.E.2d 133 (1966); Taney v. Brown, 262 N.C. 438. 137 S.E.2d 827 (1964), Short v. Chapman, 261 N.C. 674, 136 S.E.2d 40 (1964). The facts of the present case give rise to conflicting inferences of causation. From the evidence presented it is possible to infer that plaintiff's negligence in failing to equip the motorcycle with an adequate headlamp was a proximate cause of the collision.
To permit the jury, on this evidence, to award damages for "injuries * * * likely to occur in the future" is to inject pure speculation into the award. In Short v. Chapman, 261 N.C. 674, 682, 136 S.E.2d 40, Justice Parker, later Chief Justice, speaking for the Court, said: "Where there is evidence from which a conclusion of permanent injury proximately resulting from the wrongful act may properly be drawn, the court should charge the jury so as to permit its inclusion in an award of damages.
He assumed, negligently we think, they were still securely joined together. It was his duty, in view of the danger, to investigate and see if the clamps, or claws, still held the pin securely in place, or if the pin was out, or was hanging by a thread. Bennett v. Young, 266 N.C. 164, 145 S.E.2d 853; Short v. Chapman, 261 N.C. 674, 136 S.E.2d 40. Failure to set the emergency brakes on a motor vehicle parked on an incline, where its unattended movement may involve danger to persons or property, is or may be evidence of negligence, depending upon the circumstances.
See also, 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles, 288. Under the circumstances disclosed by the plaintiff's evidence, interpreted in the light most favorable to him, there is in the present record sufficient evidence of negligence by the defendant Draper, imputed to his employer, Futrell, which was a proximate cause of the injury to the plaintiff, to withstand the motion for judgment of nonsuit so far as the issue of the defendants' negligence is concerned. However, a nonsuit may properly be granted on the ground of the plaintiff's contributory negligence where his own evidence reasonably permits no other inference. Short v. Chapman, 261 N.C. 674, 136 S.E.2d 40; Cowan v. Transfer Co. and Carr v. Transfer Co., supra; Sheldon v. Childers, 240 N.C. 449, 82 S.E.2d 396; Lyerly v. Griffin, 237 N.C. 686, 75 S.E.2d 730. G.S. 20-154 (a) provides, "The driver of any vehicle upon a highway before * * * turning from a direct line shall first see that such movement can be made in safety."
Such being so, that issue was for the jury. Short v. Chapman, 261 N.C. 674, 136 S.E.2d 40; Rodgers v. Thompson, 256 N.C. 265, 123 S.E.2d 785. Judge Parker was correct in overruling motions for nonsuit.
Conflicting inferences of causation arising from the evidence carry the case to the jury." Short v. Chapman, 261 N.C. 674, 680, 136 S.E.2d 40, 45. There was evidence from which it may be inferred that Richard came to defendant's pool on a bicycle, wearing swim trunks, and that he either jumped or fell into an unfenced and unguarded pool where the water was ten feet deep and drowned. Under these circumstances, whether the violation of said ordinance, if such occurred, was a proximate cause of Richard's death is for determination by the jury.
This provision by its terms does not apply, however, when a motorist is operating his vehicle in excess of the maximum speed limits fixed by G.S. 20-141 (b). Rudd v. Stewart, 255 N.C. 90, 120 S.E.2d 601; Burchette v. Distributing Co., 243 N.C. 120, 90 S.E.2d 232; 35 N.C.L. Rev. 247 (1957). See Sharpe v. Hanline, 265 N.C. 502, 144 S.E.2d 574; Brown v. Hale, 263 N.C. 176, 139 S.E.2d 210; Short v. Chapman, 261 N.C. 674, 136 S.E.2d 40. Plaintiff's own evidence tended to show that headlights were required by G.S. 20-129 at the time of the collision, and a witness for defendants testified that plaintiff was traveling at 60-65 MPH just prior to the accident — a speed 5-10 MPH in excess of the legal limit.
A judgment of nonsuit may not be entered in an action for wrongful death on the ground of contributory negligence by the deceased, unless the plaintiff's evidence, considered in the light most favorable to him, establishes negligence by the deceased and that such negligence was one of the proximate causes of the collision so clearly as to admit of no other reasonable conclusion. Young v. R. R., 266 N.C. 458, 146 S.E.2d 441; Short v. Chapman, 261 N.C. 674, 136 S.E.2d 40; Pruett v. Inman, 252 N.C. 520, 114 S.E.2d 360. The record discloses that no witness saw the automobile of the deceased until it was within five feet of the end of the pole.
Pruett v. Inman, 252 N.C. 520, 114 S.E.2d 360. The uncontradicted evidence in the record before us shows that plaintiff was attempting with a broom to lean over and to sweep beneath the railing on the front porch as she was directed to do by the feme defendant, who at the time was acting as an agent for her husband; that the railing, because of its rotten condition, broke loose where it was fastened to the post at the west end of the front porch; that the rotten condition of the railing was covered over with paint so that plaintiff could not see it or could not know of it; and that when the railing broke loose plaintiff fell to the ground. Considering plaintiff's evidence in the light most favorable to her, Short v. Chapman, 261 N.C. 674, 136 S.E.2d 40, it cannot be said that it establishes as a matter of law that plaintiff failed to exercise ordinary care for her own safety and legal contributory negligence on her part so clearly that no other conclusion can be reasonably drawn therefrom. The judgment of compulsory nonsuit was improvidently entered, and is