Any attempt by a municipality to alter an employee's status without enabling legislation, including through personnel handbooks or policies, has no legal effect, and the municipality's employees will remain employed only at will.See Elmore, 399 F.3d at 283 (holding that even if municipality intended to confer "just cause" status on its office manager, it had no authority to do so under Pennsylvania law); Short v. Borough of Lawrenceville, 696 A.2d 1158, 1158 (Pa. 1997) (observing municipalities personnel policies "cannot contract away the right of summary dismissal"). This at-will status allows the municipality to terminate employment at any time and without notice.
Plaintiff raises a number of arguments in response to this position, none of which are persuasive. First, plaintiff argues that, even without professional employee status, he was still entitled to procedural due process protections under Pennsylvania's Local Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 551-555, which requires, inter alia, that employees of local agencies, including school districts, be provided with procedural due process protections before their employment is terminated. 2 Pa. C.S.A. § 553. Plaintiff's citation to the Local Agency Law does not advance his cause, however, because, as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held, an employee is only entitled to due process protections under that law if the employee can "establish a legitimate expectation of continued employment through either a contract or statute." Short v. Borough of Lawrenceville, 696 A.2d 1158, 1158 (Pa. 1997). In light of this principle, plaintiff's Local Agency Law argument brings plaintiff back to the starting point.
By opinion and order dated February 12, 2013, the trial court determined that because the removal of Appellants does not constitute an “adjudication” under section 553 of the Local Agency Law and section 101 of the Administrative Law and Procedure Act, Appellants are not entitled to court review of the Borough's decision. Relying on Short v. Borough of Lawrenceville, 548 Pa. 265, 696 A.2d 1158 (1997), and Pipkin v. Pennsylvania State Police, 548 Pa. 1, 693 A.2d 190 (1997), the trial court concluded that Appellants had no expectation of continued employment because no contract existed between Appellants and the Borough and no statute or ordinance conferred this expectation upon them. (R.R. at 339a–41a.).
By opinion and order dated February 12, 2013, the trial court determined that because the removal of Appellants does not constitute an "adjudication" under section 553 of the Local Agency Law and section 101 of the Administrative Law and Procedure Act, Appellants are not entitled to court review of the Borough's decision. Relying on Short v. Borough of Lawrenceville, 548 Pa. 265, 696 A.2d 1158 (1997), and Pipkin v. Pennsylvania State Police, 548 Pa. 1, 693 A.2d 190 (1997), the trial court concluded that Appellants had no expectation of continued employment because no contract existed between Appellants and the Borough and no statute or ordinance conferred this expectation upon them. (R.R. at 339a-41a.)
As the Commonwealth Court's decision in Short largely relied on Colban, it appears that the Supreme Court overruled Colban and Defrank by implication. 548 Pa. 265, 696 A.2d 1158, 1158 (1997) (per curiam). 683 A.2d 1272, 1273-74 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) rev'd by Short, 696 A.2d at 1158.
However, the bulk of cases cited by the Defendants concerns personnel manuals or handbooks, not a County legislative document. See, e.g., Short v. Borough of Lawrenceville, 696 A.2d 1158, 1159 (Pa. 1997) ("an employee handbook or personnel manual issued by a Commonwealth agency is not a legislative action in itself and cannot be considered a contract guaranteeing a property right in employment"); Raimondi v. Wyoming Cty., 2015 WL 1729377, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2015) (granting motion to dismiss on the Section 1983 claim and rejecting Plaintiff's argument that she should be allowed to conduct discovery into whether her "employment handbook" may establish "that she was not an at-will employee, but rather could be fired for 'just cause'"); Frederick v. Barbush, 2014 WL 840390, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2014) (finding no property interest because the "[Employee] Manual is not entitled to the force and effect of law"). Significantly, in Frederick, "[u]pon receipt of the Manual, Plaintiffs each signed an acknowledgment, stating that: [n]othing contained in the Manual ... should be interpreted or construed as conferring employment for a specific term or as an employment contract.
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has determined that any implied contractual provision in the personnel manual that called for "due process" in connection with the dismissal of any municipal employee does not create a property right under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Short v. Borough of Lawrenceville, 696 A.2d 1158 (1997) (per curiam) (stating that "Commonwealth authorities and agencies do not have the power to enter into contracts of employment that contract away the right of summary dismissal," nor can a "handbook or personnel manual issued by a Commonwealth agency [be considered] a legislative action in itself and cannot be considered a contract guaranteeing a property right in employment unless the legislature has so provided."). Furthermore, the fundamental property interest Raimondi claims-the right to continued employment-is similar to the intangible employment rights courts have consistently declined to extend substantive due process protection over.
See Elmore, 399 F.3d at 283 (holding that even if municipality intended to confer "just cause" status on its office manager, it had no authority to do so under Pennsylvania law). In Short v. Borough of Lawrenceville, 696 A.2d 1158 (Pa. 1997), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed the maxim that state agencies lack the power to alter the at-will status of their employees. The court opined:
entitled to procedural due process protections under Pennsylvania's Local Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 551-555, which requires, inter alia, that employees of local agencies, including school districts, be provided with procedural due process protections before their employment is terminated. 2 Pa. C.S.A. § 553. Plaintiff's citation to the Local Agency Law does not advance his cause, however, because, as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held, an employee is only entitled to due process protections under that law if the employee can "establish a legitimate expectation of continued employment through either a contract or statute." Short v. Borough of Lawrenceville, 548 Pa. 265, 696 A.2d 1158, 1158 (Pa. 1997). In light of this principle, plaintiff's Local Agency Law argument brings plaintiff back to the starting point.
plaintiff argues that, even without professional employee status, he was still entitled to procedural due process protections under Pennsylvania's Local Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 551- 555, which requires, inter alia, that employees of local agencies, including school districts, be provided with procedural due process protections before their employment is terminated. 2 Pa. C.S.A. § 553. Plaintiff's citation to the Local Agency Law does not advance his cause, however, because, as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held, an employee is only entitled to due process protections under that law if the employee can "establish a legitimate expectation of continued employment through either a contract or statute." Short v. Borough of Lawrenceville, 548 Pa. 265, 696 A.2d 1158, 1158 (Pa. 1997). In light of this principle, plaintiff's Local Agency Law argument brings plaintiff back to the starting point.