Where a trial court has reached the correct result, the judgment will not be disturbed on appeal even where a different reason is assigned to the decision. Shore v. Brown, 324 N.C. 427, 378 S.E.2d 778 (1989); Sanitary District v. Lenoir, 249 N.C. 96, 105 S.E.2d 411 (1958); Hayes v. Wilmington, 243 N.C. 525, 91 S.E.2d 673 (1956). In 1983, defendant Governor's Island, a limited partnership, filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina.
This Court sub silentio approved the entry of a judgment of abatement in an action in which the prior action was pending on appeal before this Court. In Shore v. Brown, 324 N.C. 427, 378 S.E.2d 778 (1989), this Court affirmed a summary judgment upon the theory that the second action was subject to a plea in abatement because of the pending of a prior action between the same parties involving the same subject matter. In Shore, a prior action had been instituted, Brown v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company, 90 N.C. App. 464, 369 S.E.2d 367, disc. rev. allowed, 323 N.C. 363, 373 S.E.2d 542 (1988), which alleged the same issue pending between the same parties in the Shore case.
Therefore, if just one of Plaintiff's claims is likely to succeed on the merits, the injunction must be affirmed. See generally Shore v. Brown , 324 N.C. 427, 428, 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989) ("If the correct result has been reached, the judgment will not be disturbed even though the trial court may not have assigned the correct reason for the judgment entered.")
Furthermore, if a grant of "summary judgment can be sustained on any grounds, it should be affirmed on appeal." Shore v. Brown , 324 N.C. 427, 428, 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989).B. "When Due"
If the correct result has been reached, the judgment will not be disturbed even though the trial court may not have assigned the correct reason for the judgment entered.” Shore v. Brown, 324 N.C. 427, 428, 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989). At the outset of our analysis, we note that “North Carolina is a ‘pure race’ jurisdiction, in which the first to record an interest in land holds an interest superior to all other[s]....” Rowe v. Walker, 114 N.C.App. 36, 39, 441 S.E.2d 156, 158 (1994); see alsoN.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 47–18 and –20 (2011).
In Shore v. Brown, our Supreme Court held that the third-party claim was abated because "[w]hen the third-party complaint was filed . . . that identical issue was already pending in a prior action between the same parties[.]" 324 N.C. 427, 429, 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989). Additionally, Rule 14 of our Rules of Civil Procedure addresses third-party actions and states that "any time after commencement of the action a defendant, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him."
Under the prior pending action doctrine, when courts of competent jurisdiction concurrently have before them actions between the same parties involving the same causes of action, there is a strong presumption in favor of the forum of the first-filed suit. Shore v. Brown, 324 N.C. 427, 429, 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989); New York v. Exxon Corp., 932 F.2d 1020, 1025 (2d Cir. 1991). In this case, the Merrell Defendants argue that the proposed amendments are barred because the same claims were brought by DCC as cross-claims in the Bank of America Suit.
In so contending, they rely on the principle previously recognized by this Court that "[w]here a trial court has reached the correct result, the judgment will not be disturbed on appeal even where a different reason is assigned to the decision." Eways v. Governor's Island , 326 N.C. 552, 554, 391 S.E.2d 182, 183 (1990) ; see alsoShore v. Brown , 324 N.C. 427, 428, 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989) ("If the correct result has been reached, the judgment will not be disturbed even though the trial court may not have assigned the correct reason for the judgment entered."). Thus, we must determine whether—as the Alliance Defendants contend—some other valid basis exists for the Business Court's dismissal of Nelson's crossclaims.
The Browns brought Lumbermens into that suit as a third-party defendant. In Shore v. Brown, 324 N.C. 427, 378 S.E.2d 778 (1989), we held that the third-party claim there abated because of the pendency of this action. Pursuant to the insurance contract, Lumbermens employed counsel to defend Hinson's suit against the Browns.
If the correct result has been reached, the judgment will not be disturbed even though the trial court may not have assigned the correct reason for the judgment entered." Shore v. Brown , 324 N.C. 427, 428, 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989) (citations omitted). We first consider whether the trial court's order should be affirmed because plaintiffs lack standing to pursue a claim for declaratory judgment under § 100-2.1.