¶ 12 Negligent entrustment of an automobile occurs when the automobile is supplied, directly or through a third person, for the use of another whom the supplier knows, or should know, because of youth, inexperience, or otherwise, is likely to use it in a manner involving unreasonable risk of bodily harm to others, with liability for the harm caused thereby. Green v. Harris, 2003 OK 55, n. 5, 70 P.3d 866, 868 n. 5.See also Shoemake v. Stich, 1975 OK 55, ¶ 13, 534 P.2d 667, 669–70. This Court has long held that intoxication and the “propensity for becoming intoxicated” can result in liability for the supplier of the automobile if the supplier knows or has reason to know of such intoxication or propensity for becoming intoxicated.
Such facts may be proved by circumstantial as well as positive or direct evidence.Shoemake v. Stich, 1975 OK 55, ¶ 13, 534 P.2d 667; Berg v.Bryant, 1956 OK 336, ¶ 5, 305 P.2d 517; Coker v. Moose, 1937 OK 67, ¶ 9, 68 P.2d 504; Waddle v. Stafford, 1924 OK 309, ¶ ___, 230 P. 855. Although this cause involves negligent entrustment of an automobile, we note that liability is not limited to only motor vehicles. See e.g., Sawyer v. Kelly, 1944 OK 256, ¶ 3, 153 P.2d 97 [Permitting child to ride horse.
The special exception in that case is Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 (master/servant exception) and the supporting policy was a jury instruction based on the predecessor to 47 O.S.2011 § 6-307. Accord , Shoemake v. Stich , 1975 OK 55, ¶ 13, 534 P.2d 667. ¶54 In Berg v. Bryant , 1956 OK 336, 305 P.2d 517, the defendant allowed a thirteen-year-old friend to drive his automobile.
Coker v. Moose, 180 Okla. 234, 68 P.2d 504 (1937); see also Bennett v. Morris Farrar Truck Co., 520 P.2d 705 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974). In Shoemake v. Stich, 534 P.2d 667, 669-70 (Okla. 1975), we explained that negligent entrustment occurs when an individual supplies a chattel for the use of another whom the supplier knows or should know is likely to use the chattel in a way dangerous and likely to cause harm to others. Although it is the direct action of a different individual that causes the injury, the negligence of the supplier can be actionable as well.
Although there was evidence contradicting much of appellee's testimony, such conflicting testimony and evidence is not properly considered by a trial court when ruling on a demurrer to the evidence. See e.g., Shoemake v. Stich, Okla., 534 P.2d 667 (1975). In Smith v. Davis, Okla., 430 P.2d 799 (1967), we held that the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a judgment in a law action will be determined in the light of the evidence tending to support the same, together with every reasonable inference deducible therefrom, rejecting all evidence adduced by the adverse party which conflicts with it.