English did not, however, allege why the product, as "thong sandals," was not safe to use in the shower. Cf. id. at 149 (noting allegations that the jogging track covered in astroturf was not safe for jogging due to certain characteristics of the astroturf); see also Martin v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 369 F.Supp.2d 887, 894 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (granting summary judgment to the defendant on a DTPA misrepresentation claim because plaintiffs failed to state that the defendant represented that the item had characteristics, uses, or benefits which it did not possess); Shkolnick v. Coastal Fumigators, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 100, 106 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (holding that plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine material fact issue that defendants misrepresented that their inspection services were in accordance with industry standards because plaintiffs failed to identify an industry standard that was not met). In other words, English did not allege, nor offer any argument on, what qualities are required for a shoe to actually serve as a "shower shoe" and why "thong sandals" does not meet that standard.

"The term 'grounds' refers to the reasons entitling the movant to summary judgment." Shkolnick v. Coastal Fumigators, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.). The grounds for summary judgment "may be stated concisely, without detail and argument.

Fair notice depends upon the specific facts of each case. The ultimate inquiry is whether the motion provided fair notice of the movant's basis for contending judgment is appropriate See Almanza v. Navar, No. 08-04-00093-CV, 2005 WL 1992494 (Tex.App.(El Paso 2005, no pet.); see also Shkolnick v. Coastal Fumigators, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 100, 103-04 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (motion for summary judgment that stated that the defendant had not committed a wrongful act was sufficient to address both of plaintiffs( DTPA claims). J.C. Penney's motion for summary judgment indicates that it did not appreciate the lack of a common-law fraud claim or the presence of two separate fraudulent inducement claims, but it clearly asserted that there was no evidence of any false representation and asked for a dismissal with prejudice. There is some question whether Hameed's second fraudulent inducement claim is actually a common-law fraud claim, but either would require proof of a material misstatement.