Shivers v. State

4 Citing cases

  1. Haines v. State

    623 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)   Cited 8 times
    Construing Penal Code enhancement provisions

    See Ex parte McAtee, 586 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979). By its wording, the new statutory provision has effectively changed the former general rule and overruled such cases as Ex parte Montgomery, supra, and Shivers v. State, 574 S.W.2d 147 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978). However, we need not discuss the applicability of Sec. 12.46 to this cause, for appellant's trial and conviction occurred prior to its passage.

  2. Ex Parte Mcatee

    586 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)   Cited 5 times
    In Ex parte McAtee, 586 S.W.2d 548 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979), the State argued that this Court should abandon its consistent rule that a conviction which had been used once to enhance punishment to a mandatory life term could not be used again for that purpose.

    Ex parte Montgomery, Tex.Cr.App., 571 S.W.2d 182; Ex parte Friday, Tex.Cr.App., 545 S.W.2d 182; Carvajal v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 529 S.W.2d 517; Mayo v. State, 166 Tex.Crim. R., 314 S.W.2d 834; Mooring v. State, 158 Tex.Crim. R., 256 S.W.2d 97; Hill v. State, 158 Tex.Crim. 313, 256 S.W.2d 93; Brown v. State, 150 Tex.Crim. 386, 196 S.W.2d 819; and Kinney v. State, 45 Tex.Crim. R., 79 S.W. 570. The State insists that said long-standing rule has been based upon the erroneous premise in Kinney v. State, supra, that to permit use of the same offense twice to enhance punishment would be violative of the principle of former jeopardy, and that the holdings in the above-cited decisions should be expressly overruled as advocated by the concurring opinion in Shivers v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 574 S.W.2d 147. This same argument was carefully considered, ably analyzed, and overruled in Carvajal v. State, supra, as follows: The State contends that the failure of the Legislature to prohibit the repeated use of the same prior convictions to enhance punishment manifests an intent that Kinney and its progeny be abandoned. It strikes us that the omission of any significant additional or different language in Sec. 12.42(d) cuts quite the other way. The Legislature was aware of the venerable Kinney rule, now seventy years old.

  3. State v. Medrano

    67 S.W.3d 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)   Cited 136 times
    Holding that the State may appeal an adverse pretrial ruling that seeks to exclude evidence as inadmissible rather than to suppress evidence as illegally obtained

    Lewis v. State, 58 Tex.Crim. 351, 362, 127 S.W. 808, 812 (1910) (emphasis added) (collecting English and American cases). 574 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978) (Dally, J., concurring). the legislative silence toward the rules stated in [a prior case] should not be interpreted as legislative acceptance of that decision.

  4. Ex Parte Blume

    618 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)   Cited 49 times
    Holding conviction for federal offense, which would not be a felony under Texas law, could be used to enhance sentence

    The Legislature's most recent omission to indicate a change is of major significance because we are here addressing a matter of statutory construction, not of judicially created rules of decision, as in evidentiary matters. Shivers v. State, 574 S.W.2d 147 (1978). It is evident from the above observations and this Court's past interpretations of our recidivist-enhancement statutes that Texas places a two-prong requirement on the use of a federal or foreign state conviction for enhancement of punishment: