Dixon v. MARTA , 242 Ga. App. 262, 266 (3), 529 S.E.2d 398 (2000). Andrews was "entitled to all favorable inferences and reasonable doubts which may arise from a fully developed record," Shipley v. Handicaps MobilitySystems , 222 Ga. App. 101, 102, 473 S.E.2d 533 (1996), and to that end, she should have been afforded an opportunity to develop proof giving rise to triable issues of fact regarding the ownership, operation, control, and management of Chatsworth Health Care Center, including an opportunity to depose Karschner, the affiant directly associated with the operations of Chatsworth LP and Blue Ridge HC. See id. at 102-103, 473 S.E.2d 533.
The plaintiff was entitled to have the presumption arise in his favor on summary judgment that defendant had actual knowledge of the spill or should have the inference of constructive knowledge. See Shipley v. Handicaps Mobility Systems, 222 Ga. App. 101 ( 473 S.E.2d 533) (1996). Therefore, the presumption raised a question of fact for the jury as to defendant Krystal's constructive knowledge, and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.
" It may be that Griffin was referring only to Plowman, Cone, and Barr. But we cannot make that assumption. Griffin, "as the non-moving party on summary judgment, is entitled to all favorable inferences and reasonable doubts which may arise from a fully developed record [once the parties have engaged in discovery]." Shipley v. Handicaps Mobility Systems , 222 Ga. App. 101, 102, 473 S.E.2d 533 (1996).Turner has not used the available discovery procedures to determine if there are any other customers and, if so, who they are. As the record now stands, there is no evidence that the three specified customers are the only ones at issue.
(Citation omitted.) Shipley v. Handicaps Mobility Sys., Inc., 222 Ga.App. 101, 102, 473 S.E.2d 533 (1996). Accordingly, the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Liberty Mutual was premature.
For the reasons stated herein, we vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Erickson v. Hodges, 257 Ga.App. 144, 146, 570 S.E.2d 420 (2002) (ruling on motion for summary judgment vacated as premature, given pending discovery); Shipley v. Handicaps Mobility Systems, 222 Ga.App. 101, 102, 473 S.E.2d 533 (1996) (summary judgment premature when entered before plaintiff was able to question two key defense witnesses “who avoided her discovery attempts and filed affidavits in support of defendant's motion for summary judgment”). Compare Smith v. U–Haul Company Georgia, 225 Ga.App. 356, 357(1), 484 S.E.2d 49 (1997) (trial court did not abuse its discretion denying plaintiff's supplemental discovery requests that were served over one year after discovery began and did not conform with OCGA § 9–11–34).