Opinion
1:23-CV-1131-RP
07-29-2024
ELIZABETH SHINE, Plaintiff, v. GOODWIN & COMPANY, Defendant.
ORDER
ROBERT PITMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Plaintiff Elizabeth Shine's (“Shine”) motion to remand to state court. (Dkt. 26). Defendant Goodwin & Company (“G&C”) has yet to appear in this action and has not filed a response to Shine's motion. (See Entry of Default, Dkt. 23). Having considered Shine's motion, the record, and the applicable law, the Court will remand this action to state court.
Now-terminated Defendant Transworld Systems, Inc. (“Transworld”) removed this action to federal court on September 21, 2023 on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. (Dkt. 1). Shine's amended state petition brought claims against Transworld under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 et seq., and the Texas Debt Collection Act, Tex. Fin. Code §§ 392 et seq. (Dkt. 1-2). It brought solely state claims against G&C of negligence and breach of contract, as well as a claim under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. (Id.). On February 23, 2024, Shine and Transworld filed a stipulation of dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), (Dkt. 17), and Transworld was terminated as a party, (Order, Dkt. 18). As of Transworld's termination, only Shine's state law claims against G&C remain in this action. (See Am. Pet., Dkt. 1-2).
In her motion to remand, Shine requests that the Court decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims and remand this action to state court. (Mot., Dkt. 26, at 2). 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides that a district court may “decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” where the court “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” In deciding whether to exercise its discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims under Section 1367 after all federal claims have been dismissed, a district court should be “guided by the statutory factors set forth in section 1367(c) as well as the common law factors of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Brookshire Bros. Holding v. Dayco Prod., Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 601-02 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). No single factor is necessarily dispositive. Id. In cases like this one “when all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial,” the Fifth Circuit has made clear that “[t]he general rule is that a court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims.” Id.; see also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 364 n.7 (1988) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”). This rule is “neither mandatory nor absolute,” Brookshire Bros., 554 F.3d at 601, but it is the default rule, see, e.g., Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 587 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that the “matter justified no departure from the usual rule that dismissal was required”).
Here, the Court finds no reason to depart from the default rule. Two of the three statutory factors under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) are met here. Section 1367(c)(2) is met as the federal claim upon which jurisdiction was based has been disposed of. Section 1367(c)(3) is met because as there are no more federal claims, the state claims predominate. See Enochs v. Lampasas Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 2011) (noting that these two factors were met because the “the district court dismissed all federal claims” and “Texas state law claims predominate over the non-existent federal claims”).
The common-law factors-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-also weigh in favor of remand. The Court has not expended significant resources in connection with the state- law claims. Id. at 149 (“[A]t the time the federal claims were deleted hardly any federal judicial resources, let alone a significant amount of resources, had been devoted to the district court's consideration of the Texas state law claims.”). A district court abuses its discretion when it declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state law claims and remanding an action only “after investing a significant amount of judicial resources.” Brookshire Bros., 554 F.3d at 602. In Brookshire Brothers, for example, a district court remanded a suit after the parties had litigated the action before the court for “more than three years, generating more than 1,300 entries” in the court docket. Id. at 598. In that time, the district court had “decided forty-one dispositive motions, fourteen Daubert motions, and seven other motions in limine.” Id. Here, the docket currently has 26 entries. The Court has entered a scheduling order and entered default against G&C. Judicial economy does not disfavor remand in this case.
Remand also will not cause inconvenience to the parties because here, as in Parker & Parsley, “[l]ittle new legal research would be necessary, as the surviving claims were governed by state law, in either forum,” Parker & Parsley, 972 F.2d at 587-88. Nor will remand prejudice either party. Enochs, 641 F.3d at 160 (“[I]t was certainly fair to have had the purely Texas state law claims heard in Texas state court, and there is nothing to indicate that either party would have been prejudiced by a remand to Texas state court.”). Finally, comity weighs in favor of remand. Federal courts “often are not as well equipped for determinations of state law as are state courts,” Parker & Parsley, 972 F.2d at 588-89.
Now that the Court has disposed of the only claim that gave it jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), “it may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.” Id. Taking into account the common law and statutory factors, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Shine's motion to remand, (Dkt. 26), is GRANTED.
This action is REMANDED to the Justice Court, Precinct 5 of Travis County, Texas.