This limit is commonly referred to as the "permanent rate." See Shilo Inn v. Multnomah County, 333 Or. 101, 36 P.3d 954, 958 (2001), modified by 334 Or. 11, 45 P.3d 107 (2002). The limits imposed by Measure 50, however, were subject to an exception for taxes submitted to and approved by the voters:

Ecumenical Ministries , 318 Or. at 560 n. 8, 871 P.2d 106. Examples of relevant sources include "materials that are included in the Voters’ Pamphlet, such as the ballot title, the explanatory statement, and the legislative argument in support." Shilo Inn v. MultnomahCounty , 333 Or. 101, 130, 36 P.3d 954 (2001), adh'd to as modified on recons , 334 Or. 11, 45 P.3d 107 (2002). We first examine the 1908 amendment of Article VII (Original), section 18, which arose after legislative changes permitted district attorneys to charge crimes by information rather than by grand jury indictment.

Ecumenical Ministries , 318 Or. at 560 n. 8, 871 P.2d 106 ; see also Shilo Inn v. Multnomah County , 333 Or. 101, 130, 36 P.3d 954 (2001), adh’d to as modified on recons. , 334 Or. 11, 45 P.3d 107 (2002) (describing the relevant history as including "materials that are included in the Voters’ Pamphlet, such as the ballot title, the explanatory statement, and the legislative argument in support"). But we also have recognized that

Defendant's response to the state's reliance on the statement of Representative Mannix is three-fold. First, he contends that, under this court's decision in Shilo Inn v. Multnomah County, 333 Or. 101, 36 P.3d 954 (2001), modified on recons. on other grounds, 334 Or. 11, 45 P.3d 107 (2002), such statements are not properly considered part of a measure's enactment history. Second, he argues that, even assuming the relevance of such history generally, Representative Mannix's statement—referring to multiple limitations that reflect a “bias” against consecutive sentencing in the guidelines—suggests that he was referring not just to the sole such limitation that existed at that time, but to other limitations that Mannix apparently was unaware had been eliminated; in other words, Mannix was mistaken.

If the voters' intent is unclear from the text and context of an initiated constitutional provision, we turn to the provision's history. See, e.g., Shilo Inn v. Multnomah County, 333 Or 101, 117, 36 P3d 954 (2001), modified on recons on other grounds, 334 Or 11, 45 P3d 107 (2002) (if doubt remains as to meaning of initiated or referred constitutional provision, "the court will consider the history * * * in an effort to resolve the matter"); Ecumenical Ministries, 318 Or at 560, 560 n 8 (noting that court will consider history "if legislative intent remains unclear after an examination of text and context"). In this case, we have considered the historical materials proffered by the parties.

We begin with the text of Article I, section 42. See Shilo Inn v. Multnomah County, 333 Or. 101, 116-17, 36 P.3d 954 (2001), modified on recons on other grounds, 334 Or. 11, 45 P.3d 107 (2002) (when interpreting referred constitutional provision, court's task is to discern intent of voters; best evidence of voters' intent is text of provision). It provides, in part:

This court, however, previously has stressed that it will not conclude lightly that the voters' intent is so clear from text and context of a provision that further inquiry is unnecessary. SeeShilo Inn v. MultnomahCounty, 333 Or. 101, 117, 36 P.3d 954 (2001), modified on recons on other grounds, 334 Or. 11, 45 P.3d 107 (2002) (so stating). Therefore, because there is some room for doubt, and because taxpayers argue that the history of Article XI, section 11b, supports their reading of Article XI, section 11b(2)(d)(iii), we also shall consider the history of Article XI, section 11b, before ending our inquiry.

" Shilo Inn v. Multnomah County, 333 Or. 101, 107 n 6, 36 P.3d 954 (2001),modified on recons, 334 Or. 11, 45 P.3d 107 (2002) (citations omitted). Measure 50 was superimposed on an ad valorem real-property tax system in the State of Oregon in which taxes were levied on a property's real market value.

We look to the materials included in the voters' pamphlet, including the ballot title and explanatory statement of the measure, to help us ascertain the voters' intention. Shilo Inn v. Multnomah County , 333 Or. 101, 129-30, 36 P.3d 954 (2001), modified on recons , 334 Or. 11, 45 P.3d 107 (2002). With respect to repeat DUII offenders, the ballot title summary provided, "Measure makes DUII a Class C felony if defendant [was] previously convicted of DUII, or statutory counterpart, at least twice in prior 10 years."

The voters' pamphlet typically includes the ballot title, the explanatory statement, and the legislative argument in support of the measure. Shilo Inn v. Multnomah County, 333 Or. 101, 130, 36 P.3d 954 (2001), modified on recons., 334 Or. 11, 45 P.3d 107 (2002). Here, we acknowledge those historical items because they confirm our interpretation based on the text and context.