Summary
In Shields, the First Department ruled that the existence of probable cause barred an abuse of process claim where "the plaintiffs point[ed] to no evidence that defendants were motivated by some collateral objective.") 35 N.Y.S.3d at 331.
Summary of this case from Cartelli v. Cnty. of SuffolkOpinion
07-05-2016
Tyrone SHIELDS, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants–Respondents.
Neil Wollerstein, Bronx (Mitchell Dranow of counsel), for appellants. Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Michael Pastor of counsel), for respondents.
Neil Wollerstein, Bronx (Mitchell Dranow of counsel), for appellants.
Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel, New York (Michael Pastor of counsel), for respondents.
SWEENY, J.P., ACOSTA, FEINMAN, KAPNICK, KAHN, JJ.
Opinion Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Ruben Franco, J.), entered on or about August 20, 2015, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and assault and battery at their apartment and while entering the police van, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Defendants made a prima facie showing of probable cause supporting the issuance of the search warrant for plaintiffs' apartment, and plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Delgado v. City of New York, 86 A.D.3d 502, 507, 928 N.Y.S.2d 487 [1st Dept.2011] ). The search warrant was issued as the result of an investigation during which a registered confidential informant made three confirmatory purchases of marijuana in plaintiffs' apartment during the week before the issuance of the warrant. A detective and an assistant district attorney submitted affidavits explaining why a search warrant was needed, and the confidential informant gave sworn testimony before the Magistrate that issued the warrant. Under these circumstances, there was no need to satisfy the Aguilar–Spinelli test (see id. ).
Defendants also made a prima facie showing of probable cause for plaintiffs' arrest, by submitting evidence, including documentary evidence, showing that a total of 37 bags of marijuana were recovered from plaintiffs' bedrooms during the search (see People v. Baker, 20 N.Y.3d 354, 359, 960 N.Y.S.2d 704, 984 N.E.2d 902 [2013] ). Plaintiffs' conclusory denials do not suffice to raise triable issues of fact (see Silver v. Silver, 17 A.D.3d 281, 281, 792 N.Y.S.2d 900 [1st Dept.2005] ). The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to plaintiffs' causes of action for false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution (see Lawson v. City of New York, 83 A.D.3d 609, 609, 922 N.Y.S.2d 54 [1st Dept.2011], lv. dismissed 19 N.Y.3d 952, 950 N.Y.S.2d 99, 973 N.E.2d 197 [2012] ). Since plaintiffs point to no evidence that defendants were motivated by some collateral objective, the existence of probable cause likewise constitutes a defense to plaintiffs' cause of action for abuse of process (see Rosen v. Hanrahan, 2 A.D.3d 352, 353, 768 N.Y.S.2d 818 [1st Dept.2003], lv. denied 3 N.Y.3d 60, 785 N.Y.S.2d 21, 818 N.E.2d 6635 [2004] ).
Plaintiffs have shown that there are triable issues of fact as to whether assault and battery was committed by the defendants when they conducted strip searches of the plaintiffs. The mere fact that someone has been arrested and taken into custody “does not justify police intrusion into a person's body” (People v. Hall, 10 N.Y.3d 303, 307, 856 N.Y.S.2d 540, 886 N.E.2d 162 [2008], citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769–770, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 [1966] ). A strip search of an arrestee charged with a misdemeanor or other minor offense violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution unless there is a reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing weapons or contraband (Huck v. City of Newburgh, 275 A.D.2d 343, 344, 712 N.Y.S.2d 149 [2d Dept.2000], lv. dismissed, 95 N.Y.2d 929, 721 N.Y.S.2d 603, 744 N.E.2d 139 [2000] ). As there is no showing of concealment of weapons or contraband by the plaintiffs in this case, the court below correctly denied the defendants' motion as to the third and tenth causes of action alleging assault and battery. As the plaintiffs have failed to show the existence of questions of fact as to their claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the sixth and thirteenth causes of action were properly dismissed by the court below.
We have considered plaintiffs' remaining contentions and find them unavailing.