Opinion
H050903
09-13-2024
SHERRY CHUANG, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MEI HAW CHUANG, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 19CV356261
Wilson, J.
This appeal arises from an action filed by plaintiff Sherry Chuang against her mother Mei Haw Chuang regarding the ownership of a condominium located at Sheridan Avenue in Palo Alto (Sheridan property). Sherry claimed that she and her late father, Ying Cheh Chuang, agreed that Sherry would hold a partial ownership interest in the Sheridan property, along with Ying and Mei, in exchange for her contribution towards the purchase price. Mei challenged the existence and validity of this agreement. The trial court granted Sherry's motion for summary adjudication on her cause of action for partition by sale, and subsequently issued an interlocutory judgment for partition by sale of the Sheridan property.
As the parties share the same last name, we shall refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion.
Although Sherry titled her motion as one for summary judgment, the trial court indicated in its final order that it was actually a motion for summary adjudication as she was only seeking to adjudicate one of the causes of action in her complaint. For consistency and clarity, we shall therefore refer to it as a motion for summary adjudication throughout the opinion.
On appeal, Mei claims that the trial court erred in granting Sherry's motion for summary adjudication because Sherry failed to demonstrate clear and convincing evidence of her ownership interest in the Sheridan property, and there were multiple issues of material fact requiring a trial on the merits.
For the reasons stated below, we find that Sherry failed to meet her burden of proof of her ownership interest, thus creating a triable issue of material fact as to the parties' respective interests in the Sheridan property. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order granting summary adjudication and the interlocutory judgment for partition by sale.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
"We draw the facts recited here from the parties' separate statements of undisputed material facts, evidence admitted in conjunction with the motion for summary judgment, and admissions in the parties' appellate briefs. [Citation.]" (Kim v. County of Monterey (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 312, 316 (Kim).)
With respect to the various e-mail exchanges described infra that allegedly occurred between Sherry and Ying, Mei disputed the veracity of all the e-mails sent, as copies were not located in Ying's outbox, and Sherry did not produce native copies.
In June 2008, Ying allegedly e-mailed Sherry asking if she would be willing to invest and co-own a condominium in Palo Alto with him and Mei, which Ying intended to purchase using funds from another property he had sold in Michigan. Sherry agreed, stating that she would do it "because [she] like[d] investment property," and indicated she would be willing to help find renters and "share profits together." In an e-mail response thanking Sherry, Ying also indicated that "Mommy [Mei] says [Chinese characters,]" which Mei subsequently translated as saying "Thank you for your investment funds."
Between June and July 2008, Sherry withdrew a total of $200,000 from her bank accounts, which she claims were contributed towards the purchase of the Sheridan property. Mei claims she was not aware of any money being transferred to Ying from Sherry, as he never informed her of any such transaction and the escrow account for the Sheridan property did not reflect any transfers from Sherry. On July 18, 2008, Mei and Ying purchased the Sheridan property for a total of $453,973.12, which reflected a purchase price of $449,000 plus additional fees for taxes, homeowner's association dues, and other related escrow fees. On July 15, 2008, Sherry claims that she and Ying executed an agreement for joint real estate ownership of the Sheridan property (Sheridan agreement), which indicated that Sherry had contributed $200,000 towards the $449,000 purchase price of the Sheridan property and would jointly own the property with Ying. The Sheridan agreement noted that while title would be taken in the name of the "Ying Cheh Chuang and Mei Haw Chuang Revocable Trust dated May 1998," Sherry would continue to maintain an equivalent equity share of "$200,000 of $449,000 or final purchase contract price, until title is changed to properly reflect [Sherry's] ownership percentage." Because the Sheridan agreement was only signed by Ying and Sherry, not Mei, and Mei had allegedly never seen it prior to 2020, Mei disputed the validity, enforceability, and authenticity of the agreement.
In a written declaration, Mei indicated that she and Ying had created this revocable trust in May 1998, and that they were both settlors and trustees for the trust.
On July 16, 2008, Sherry allegedly e-mailed Ying indicating that she would give Mei a copy of the Sheridan agreement so that Mei could "see what is going on with [Sherry's]investment money in Sheridan." Sherry received a response from Ying's email account in Chinese which Mei later translated as follows, "Ling, thank you for helping us sell the Michigan property. I agree with what your father is doing. Your $200,000 investment is okay. We will split the income with you because you have interest of in this condo. Mommy."
On July 18, 2008, a grant deed was recorded for the Sheridan property, which transferred title to Ying and Mei in their capacities as trustees for their revocable trust.
According to Sherry, she and Ying repeatedly reaffirmed the terms of the Sheridan agreement at various times after the Sheridan property was purchased in 2008. For example, on May 31, 2011, Sherry allegedly sent the following e-mail to Ying: "Dear Papi [] Here is short renewal for our 2008 Sheridan joint real estate agreement. No changes, so it is optional since agreement is actively working." Ying responded that he remembered Sherry's $200,000 investment that helped him and Mei to "get out of Michigan." He confirmed that the Sheridan property was still profitable and indicated that Sherry could "take title and profit distribution at any time." Similarly, on October 14, 2016, Sherry e-mailed Ying a copy of the Sheridan agreement and indicated there was "[n]o change to Sheridan 2008 agreements. We continue as working active documents." In response, Ying stated that Sherry was correct, and that "Mommy [Mei] says OK too. Keep doing same, it is in effect. We will share profit and title when you are ready." Finally, in December 2016, Ying purportedly gave Sherry a copy of the Sheridan agreement, which contained the same terms as the original agreement but bore both Ying and Mei's signatures on the final page, with a signing date of December 7, 2016. Mei again disputed the veracity of this agreement. Sherry maintained that from the time of purchase until 2017, she and Ying jointly handled the Sheridan property as co-owners, including locating tenants, negotiating and signing leases, managing repairs, attending HOA meetings, and collecting rent.
Ying passed away on April 16, 2017. Approximately one year later on May 29, 2018, Sherry's attorney sent Mei and Mei's trust administrator a letter, indicating his belief that Mei "and the rest of [her] family" were in agreement regarding Sherry's $200,000 contribution towards the purchase of the Sheridan property. Sherry's attorney indicated that according to his calculations, Sherry's investment resulted in her having a 44 percent equity interest; he therefore offered to prepare a deed transferring this interest directly to Sherry.
On January 7, 2019, a grant deed was recorded transferring ownership of the Sheridan property from "[g]rantor Mei Haw Chuang, as trustee of the Ying Cheh Chuang and Mei Haw Chuang Revocable Trust dated May 10, 1998 as to an undivided 100% interest" to "Mei Haw Chuang, as trustee of the Mei Haw Chuang Survivors Trust, a trust created by the Ying Cheh Chuang and Mei Haw Chuang Revocable Trust dated May 10, 1998 as to an undivided 100% interest."
B. Procedural Background 1. Complaint and Answer
On November 12, 2019, Sherry initiated the instant action against Mei in Santa Clara County Superior Court. In her verified first amended complaint, Sherry asserted five causes of action against Mei, which were all based on Sherry's claim that she had a 44.5 percent ownership interest in the Sheridan property, as follows: (1) quiet title to the Sheridan property; (2) establishment of a resulting trust; (3) partition by sale of the Sheridan property; (4) restitution for Mei's unjust enrichment from Sherry's investment in the Sheridan property; and (5) breach of contract for Mei's failure to place Sherry on record title for the Sheridan property, as contemplated by the Sheridan agreement.
A resulting trust occurs "[w]hen a transfer of real property is made to one person, and the consideration therefor is paid by or for another." (In re Marriage of Ruelas (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 339, 342 (Ruelas).)
In her answer to the first amended complaint, Mei denied the existence and validity of the Sheridan agreement, and denied ever signing any agreement related to the ownership of the Sheridan property.
2. Summary Adjudication Proceedings a. Summary Adjudication Motion
On June 27, 2022, Sherry filed a motion for summary adjudication on her cause of action for partition by sale. Sherry argued that the only possible contested issue was whether she held an ownership interest in the Sheridan property, which she had demonstrated to be true from the various documents provided, including the signed Sheridan agreement and the multiple e-mail conversations between Sherry and Ying reaffirming the agreement. Sherry further contended that Mei's testimony from her deposition did not create any triable issues of material fact as to Sherry's ownership interest because Mei: (1) admitted to having no knowledge of whether Sherry had contributed $200,000 towards the purchase of the Sheridan property; (2) had no recollection of seeing the Sheridan agreement or other documents reflecting Sheridan's ownership interest; and (3) acknowledged that it was Ying, not Mei, that had complete control over the family's financial dealings. Sherry therefore requested that the court adjudicate Sherry's ownership interest in the Sheridan property as 44.5 percent, based on her contribution to the purchase price and the signed Sheridan agreement, and issue an interlocutory judgment for partition of the Sheridan property by sale.
b. Mei's Opposition
Mei argued that Sherry did not meet her burden to establish clear and convincing evidence of her ownership interest in the Sheridan property. Mei further contended that there were triable issues of material fact regarding the validity and enforceability of the Sheridan agreement based on challenges raised by Mei's expert witness, a forensic document examiner, regarding the authenticity of the agreement and signatures therein, as well as "other similar documents produced by Sherry."
According to Mei, she and Ying had been fully responsible for paying all expenses related to the property, collecting rent, and claiming it on their tax returns from the time of purchase until Ying's passing, and Sherry had only assisted them on occasion with collecting and delivering rent, but never acted as though she was a co-owner. After Ying passed away, Mei fully assumed these responsibilities with no assistance from Sherry. Mei additionally disputed the validity of Sherry's documentation demonstrating she had withdrawn $200,000 in funds to assist in purchasing the Sheridan property. Mei noted that: (1) there was no record of this money being deposited into escrow or otherwise being used specifically for the purchase; and (2) Ying, who had always kept Mei fully informed on their finances and real property investments, never told her that Sherry had contributed any funds towards the purchase price or owned any interest in the Sheridan property.
Mei also raised questions regarding Sherry's credibility. To this effect, Mei stated in 2017, Sherry had misappropriated over $480,000 in funds from Mei's and Ying's accounts for her own personal use. While Sherry had repaid some of these funds both before and after Ying's passing, she stopped making any further payments after May 2018. As a result, Mei chose to disinherit Sherry from her survivor's trust.
Finally, Mei claimed that the purported Sheridan agreements were not valid, enforceable, or genuine. Mei first noted that because the Sheridan property was held by Mei and Ying jointly as co-trustees, Ying did not have authority to enter into the agreement unilaterally without Mei's consent or approval. Mei also provided a report from forensic document examiner Lloyd Cunningham, whom she had retained as an expert witness to review various documents, including the two versions of the purported Sheridan agreement provided by Sherry in support of her claim: the original version signed by Sherry and Ying in 2008, and the second copy signed by Ying and Mei in 2016. According to Cunningham, the two documents were extremely poor quality, and represented examples of "multi-generational copying," which he identified as a common methodology used by individuals to mask typical features of fraudulent signatures or writing. In comparing the signatures on the agreements to examples of Ying's signature, Cunningham could not conclude whether Ying's signature on the original 2008 agreement was genuine or false because of the poor quality of the copy provided. As to the second agreement purportedly bearing Ying's and Mei's signatures in 2016, Cunningham noted that there were some indications that the signatures were genuine, and it could not be determined if the signatures were fabricated. However, Cunningham also observed shadowy areas around the signatures that did not appear in the original 2008 agreement and indicated that this could be indicative of physical or electronic "cut and paste" where the signatures were taken from a different, legitimate document and transposed onto the agreement. Accordingly, Mei argued that Cunningham's findings created, at a minimum, an inference that the purported agreements were not genuine such that Sherry's motion should be denied.
In his report, Cunningham also examined three other documents relating to Sherry's ownership claims regarding another property purportedly co-owned by Sherry, her husband, Mei, and Ying, and concluded that it was "highly probable" that Ying's and Mei's signatures on those documents were not their "normal or genuine signatures."
c. Sherry's Reply
Sherry argued that in demonstrating her ownership interest in the property, she simply needed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that she had furnished" '[t]he precise amount or proportion of consideration.. .towards the purchase price.'" Sherry therefore claimed that Mei had not presented any triable issues of material fact because: (1) it remained undisputed that Sherry and Ying executed the Sheridan agreement, which specifically stated that Sherry had invested $200,000 towards the joint ownership of the property; (2) Sherry had provided receipts confirming her withdrawal of $200,000 in funds; (3) Mei confirmed she had no knowledge of whether Sherry contributed these funds to Ying to use towards the Sheridan property purchase; and (4) Mei could not produce any documents reflecting the source of funds used to pay the Sheridan property. Sherry further argued that Cunningham had actually opined that the Sheridan agreement "might" be genuine, thus defeating any possibility that Cunningham's report raised a triable issue of material fact as to the agreement's authenticity. Sherry also claimed that Mei's suspicions regarding the veracity of the emails and Sheridan agreement were merely speculation and reflected Mei's attempts to "evoke emotional bias" and "muddy the waters."
With respect to Mei's challenges to the authenticity of the original Sheridan agreement and the 2016 version, Sherry claimed that these arguments only went to the weight of the documents, not their admissibility. As Sherry was able to authenticate the agreements and signatures therein through her own declaration, she claimed that the proper foundation had been met to admit the agreements into evidence and satisfy her burden of proof for her ownership claim.
d. Hearing, Trial Court Decision, and Interlocutory Judgment
On October 27, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Sherry's motion. At the outset of the hearing, the trial court indicated it had issued a tentative ruling, which Mei contested. Mei again argued that there was sufficient evidence and facts presented to establish triable issues of material fact, including but not limited to the following: (1) Cunningham's report, which suggested that the two copies of the Sheridan agreement were not valid; (2) Mei's inability to locate the Sheridan agreement in any of Ying's records, despite him being very detailed and meticulous in his record-keeping; (3) no record of Sherry's and Ying's purported e-mails regarding the Sheridan property and Sheridan agreement in Ying's e-mail account; and (4) the lack of any evidence reflecting Sherry's involvement in the maintenance of the Sheridan property after its purchase.
A copy of the tentative ruling was not included in appellant's appendices; however, based on the trial court's statements at the hearing, it appears that the court's tentative ruling was to grant Sherry's motion.
After taking the matter under submission, the trial court issued an order on January 17, 2023, granting Sherry's motion for summary adjudication. In a lengthy, detailed discussion, the trial court determined that Sherry had established her 44.5 percent interest in the Sheridan property by clear and convincing evidence, which included: (1) the 2008 Sheridan agreement bearing Sherry's and Ying's signatures; (2) Sherry's withdrawals of funds totaling the $200,000 investment as reflected in the Sheridan agreement; and (3) Mei's deposition testimony indicating that she did not know whether Sherry had contributed $200,000 to Ying in 2008 for the purchase of the Sheridan property.
Furthermore, the trial court found that Mei failed to demonstrate there were any triable issues of material fact. Regarding Mei's claim that Sherry did not demonstrate her withdrawals totaling $200,000 were used towards the Sheridan property purchase, the trial court noted that this was solely based on Mei's assertion that Ying never told her about this contribution, which was insufficient to establish that the contribution never happened. The trial court also rejected Mei's argument that the Sheridan agreement was unenforceable on the basis that Ying did not have the authority to unilaterally enter into a binding agreement involving property owned by the trust. The trial court noted that at the time Ying entered in the Sheridan agreement, the Sheridan property was not owned by the trust; moreover, Mei had not identified any language in the relevant trust documents indicating that her signature was required to render the Sheridan agreement enforceable. Finally, the trial court did not find that Cunningham's opinions on the validity of the Sheridan agreement were sufficient to establish the existence of a triable issue of material fact. Specifically, the trial court noted that Cunningham's opinions regarding the three other documents presented to him did not bear on the instant matter, as those documents pertained to a different property entirely. Moreover, Cunningham did not render an opinion on the veracity of the signatures in the original 2008 Sheridan agreement, and ultimately stated that he "could not determine" if the 2016 version signed by both Ying and Mei was fabricated, instead noting that there were some indications that the signatures were genuine. The trial court therefore concluded that Cunningham's opinions were mostly speculative and not substantial evidence of forgery.
The trial court also did not accept Mei's argument that Cunningham's conclusions regarding the other three documents he reviewed - which he found to be not normal or genuine - were sufficient to raise an inference that the two versions of the Sheridan agreement were also not normal or genuine.
On March 8, 2023, based on the order granting summary adjudication, a different trial court judge issued an interlocutory judgment for partition by sale of the Sheridan property.
Mei filed an appeal on March 16, 2023, from the order granting summary adjudication but later filed a second appeal on May 4, 2023, from the interlocutory judgment for partition by sale. This court subsequently issued an order deeming Mei's first appeal as taken from the interlocutory judgment, and dismissed Mei's second appeal as duplicative.
II. Discussion
Mei contends that the trial court erred in granting Sherry's motion for summary adjudication. First, Mei argues that Sherry failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that she had an ownership interest in the Sheridan property despite not being on legal title. Second, Mei claims that there was substantial conflicting evidence presented regarding the authenticity of the agreement such that the trial court erred in finding there were no triable issues of material fact.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
A party may move for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication of specific claims. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (f)(1) &(2), (t)(5).) A motion for summary adjudication "proceed[s] in all procedural respects as a motion for summary judgment." (§ 437c, subd. (t)(5).) A party is entitled to summary judgment only if there is no triable issue of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (§ 437c, subd. (c).)
Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
A plaintiff moving for summary adjudication "bears the burden of persuasion that 'each element of" the "cause of action" in question has been "proved," and hence that "there is no defense" thereto. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) "Once the plaintiff ... has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant ... to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto." (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1).) "There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.' [Citation.]" (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850, fn. omitted).)
"In ruling on the motion, the court must 'consider all of the evidence' and 'all' of the 'inferences' reasonably drawn therefrom [citation]." (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) In considering the parties' evidence in connection with a motion for summary adjudication, the court "strictly scrutinize[es]" the declarations submitted by the moving party and "liberally constru[es]" those offered by the opposing party, and it "resolv[es] any evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in [the opposing party's] favor." (Saelzler v. Advanced Auto Group 400 (2001), 25 Cal.4th 763, 768; see also Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)
Since summary adjudication motions involve pure questions of law, we review independently the granting of summary adjudication of the claim at issue to ascertain whether there is a triable issue of material fact justifying the reinstatement of the action. (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1142.) In doing so, we "consider[] all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports. [Citation.]" (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.) In addition, like the trial court, in undertaking our independent review," '[w]e examine (1) the pleadings to determine the elements of the claim, (2) the motion to determine if it establishes facts justifying judgment in the moving party's favor, and (3) the opposition-assuming movant has met its initial burden-to "decide whether the opposing party has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material fact issue." '" (Kim, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th at p. 323, quoting Oakland Raiders v. National Football League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 630.) We need not defer to the trial court and are not bound by the reasons in its summary judgment or adjudication ruling; we review the ruling of the trial court, not its rationale. (Kids' Universe v. In2Labs (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 870, 878.)
B. Cause of Action for Partition by Sale
A co-owner of real or personal property may bring an action for partition. (§ 872.210.)" 'The primary purpose of a partition suit is ... to partition the property, that is, to sever the unity of possession. [Citations.]' [Citation.]" (LEG Investments v. Boxler (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 484, 493 (LEG Investments); see also 14859 Moorpark Homeowner's Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396, 1404-1405 [noting that" 'partition'" is" 'the procedure for segregating and terminating common interests in the same parcel of property' "].)" 'Partition is a remedy much favored by the law. The original purpose of partition was to permit cotenants to avoid the inconvenience and dissension arising from sharing joint possession of land. An additional reason to favor partition is the policy of facilitating transmission of title, thereby avoiding unreasonable restraints on the use and enjoyment of property.' [Citation]." (LEG Investments, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at p. 493.)
Once a court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to partition "it shall make an interlocutory judgment that determines the interests of the parties in the property and orders the partition of the property and, unless it is to be later determined, the manner of partition." (§ 872.720, subd. (a).) Accordingly, because a partition action necessarily requires the determination of the interests of the parties in the property, any interest of a party in the property may be put in issue, tried, and determined. (§ 872.610.) Further, if there are any other issues affecting such a determination, the court must resolve them. (§ 872.620.)
Under Evidence Code section 662,"' "[t]he owner of the legal title to property is presumed to be the owner of the full beneficial title." The section 662 presumption is designed to promote the public policy favoring the stability of titles to property. In the absence of any contrary showing, the status declared by the deed through which the parties acquired title is controlling. (In re Marriage of Brooks &Robinson (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 176, 185.) "The presumption can be overcome only by evidence of an agreement or understanding between the parties that the title reflected in the deed is not what the parties intended." (Id. at pp. 189-190.) The presumption cannot be overcome solely by tracing the funds used to purchase the property, by evidence that title was taken in a particular manner merely to obtain a loan, or by evidence of an intention not disclosed to the grantee when the deed was executed. (Id. at p. 190.)
To overcome this title presumption, evidence of a contrary agreement or understanding must be "clear and convincing." (Evid. Code, § 662.) Clear and convincing proof requires a finding a high probability, meaning that the evidence should be"' "so clear as to leave no substantial doubt;" sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind."' [Citation.]" (In Re Angelica P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 919; see also Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal. 5th 989, 998-999.)
C. Sherry Failed to Provide Clear and Convincing Evidence That She Paid Consideration in Exchange for an Ownership Interest in the Sheridan Property
As it is undisputed that Sherry was not on legal title for the Sheridan property, she has the initial burden to provide clear and convincing evidence that she owned a 44.5 percent ownership interest therein. The record reflects that Sherry offered three items of evidence to demonstrate her ownership interest: (1) deposit slips reflecting her withdrawal of $200,000 in funds at or near the time of the Sheridan property purchase; (2) e-mail correspondence sent between Sherry and Ying both prior to and after the purchase, reflecting their joint intention to co-own the property and abide by the terms of the Sheridan agreement; and (3) a copy of the original Sheridan agreement allegedly signed in 2008 by Ying and Sherry. In reviewing all of these items as a whole in the light most favorable to Mei, we find that because Sherry did not clearly demonstrate that she used her withdrawn funds towards the purchase of the property, she failed to establish her ownership interest in the Sheridan property by clear and convincing evidence.
Neither party disputes that Sherry's deposit slips reflect that she withdrew a total of $200,000 from her accounts on June 26, 2008, and July 15, 2008. However, in arguing that this evidence failed to meet Sherry's burden of proof, Mei contends that Sherry provided no evidence demonstrating that the withdrawn funds were actually used for the purchase, either via transfers to Ying or deposits directly into escrow. Mei also cites her deposition testimony under oath that she and Ying paid for the Sheridan property purchase "from our cash," with no reference to any contributions from Sherry. Moreover, Mei points to the final buyer's settler statement for the Sheridan property, which reflects four deposits into escrow by Mei and Ying, Ying, First American Exchange Company, and "Chuang," but no deposits from Sherry. Mei therefore claims that because Sherry's declaration that she gave the withdrawn funds to Ying for the Sheridan property purchase is entirely self-serving, the withdrawal slips do not meet Sherry's burden of proof regarding ownership.
We agree. As Mei notes, the withdrawal slips simply indicate that Sherry withdrew a total of $200,000 in funds at or near the time Ying and Mei purchased the Sheridan property in 2008. The record provides no indication of what was done with those funds after the withdrawal. While Sherry claims that she gave these funds to Ying to use towards the purchase of the property, section 437c, subdivision (e) provides that "summary judgment may be denied in the discretion of the court if the only proof of a material fact offered in support of the summary judgment is an affidavit or declaration made by an individual who was the sole witness to that fact." While the trial court was not required to deny Sherry's motion on this basis, we are not bound by that decision on de novo review. Because Sherry's declaration is the only proof that she provided the funds to Ying after withdrawing them, and considering the conflicting evidence from Mei, we do not find that this demonstrates clear and convincing evidence of Sherry's ownership interest. (See, e.g., Burkle v. Burkle (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1029, 1036-1037 [finding that father's declaration that he intended to loan, not gift, funds to his daughter, without any other evidence reflecting the terms of the loan or repayment obligation, was insufficient to demonstrate there was no triable issue of material fact whether his advance of funds was a gift or a loan].)
Even considering the alleged email exchanges and the Sheridan agreement, Sherry's ownership interest in the Sheridan property was expressly conditioned on her financial contribution. As we are required to consider all evidence, including the direct and circumstantial evidence presented by Mei which contradicts Sherry's claim that she invested $200,000 in funds, we do not find Sherry has met the heightened clear and convincing evidence standard - that is evidence of an ownership interest"' "so clear as to leave no substantial doubt"; 'sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind." '" (In Re Angelica P., supra, 28 Cal.3d 908, 919.) As explained above, the withdrawal slips only demonstrate that she withdrew $200,000 in funds, not that these funds were actually used towards the purchase, either from Sherry giving the funds to Ying directly or transferred into escrow.
Further, we reject Sherry's argument that the $200,000 in withdrawals established the existence of a resulting trust. "When a transfer of real property is made to one person, and the consideration therefor is paid by or for another, a trust is presumed to result in favor of the person by or for whom such payment is made. 'The trust that is "presumed to result" from this situation is termed a "resulting trust"' [Citation.]" (Ruelas, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th 339, 342; see also 12 Miller &Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2008) § 34:121, p. 34-407 ["[a]lthough the resulting trust arises in various circumstances, the most common situation relevant to real property" is the purchase money resulting trust].) Sherry claims that in order to establish that a resulting trust was created in her favor, she simply was required to demonstrate "the precise amount or proportion of the consideration" that she paid towards the purchase price, citing Lloyds Bank California v. Wells Fargo Bank (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1038 (Lloyd) in support. However, the party seeking to establish the trust must "clearly establish the amount of money contributed by him [or her] or the proportion of his [or her] contribution to the whole purchase price. [Citations.]." (Lloyd, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 1044, quoting Laing v. Laubach (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 511, 517.) The withdrawal slips fail to meet this requirement, because, as discussed above, they simply reflect that Sherry withdrew this money from her accounts and provide no indication that the funds were actually used towards the purchase. (See Neusted v. Skernswell (1945) 69 Cal.App.2d 361, 368 [to establish a resulting trust upon only a portion of property, "[i]t is essential that the court find the amounts actually paid or agreed to be paid by the respective parties with certainty in order to determine the respective interest of each"].)
In conclusion, we find that because Sherry did not demonstrate that she actually contributed the $200,000 towards the Sheridan property purchase, she did not meet her burden of proving her ownership interest by clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding Sherry had proven each element of the partition for sale cause of action. (Aguilar, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p. 850.)
D. Even Assuming Sherry Met Her Burden, Mei Presented Sufficient Evidence To Raise a Triable Issue of Fact As to Sherry's Ownership Interest
1. Validity and Authenticity of the 2008 Sheridan Agreement
Mei contends that the authenticity and validity of the Sheridan agreement is "severely undermined" by a wealth of evidence, including but not limited to: (1) the poor quality of the document and minimal legibility; (2) Cunningham's opinion that the quality of the report was indicative of "multigenerational copying," a technique commonly used to conceal forgery; (3) the fact that Sherry did not include the agreement in her demand letter or original complaint filed in 2019, but only produced the agreement in March 2020 in response to a discovery request; (4) a copy of the agreement was not located in Ying's financial files or records, which he generally kept in an organized fashion; (5) Ying never discussed the agreement or Sherry's investment with Mei; (6) the agreement was typewritten, which was uncharacteristic of most documents Ying prepared; and (7) the grant deed did not reflect Sherry's name or ownership interest in any manner. In response, Sherry appears to claim that because the trial court accepted the agreement into evidence, it determined that the agreement had been sufficiently authenticated by the evidence offered by Sherry.
As a preliminary matter, Mei submitted written objections to the admission of the 2008 Sheridan agreement, the various e-mail exchanges between Sherry and Ying, and the 2016 copy of the Sheridan agreement on the basis that all these items: (1) violated the best evidence rule: (2) lacked sufficient foundation; and (3) required improper oral testimony to prove their content in violation of Evidence Code section 1523. While Mei challenged the authenticity of the Sheridan agreement in her separate statement, she did not specifically object to the agreement on those grounds in her written objections. The trial court did not rule on these (or any other) evidentiary objections. We therefore presume that the trial court overruled the objections and considered the disputed evidence in making its ruling on the summary adjudication motion. (See Gray v. LaSalle (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 932, 969, fn. 22, quoting Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 534.) Under these circumstances, "[t]he overruled objections may be raised on appeal, but the burden is on the objecting party to renew any relevant objection by arguing the issue in its brief; citation to the record alone is insufficient. [Citations.]" (Ghazarian v. Magellan Health, Inc. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 171, 183.) The party making the evidentiary objection at the trial level forfeits it by not renewing it on appeal. (Ibid.) Mei did not assert or argue the same evidentiary objections in her brief, and, accordingly, has forfeited them.
With that said, the court was still required to assess the authenticity of the agreement because it was offered by Sherry to demonstrate the existence of a preliminary fact. (See Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (a)(3).) Authentication is defined as "the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is" or "the establishment of such facts by any other means provided by law." (Evid. Code, § 1400.) "The purpose of the evidence will determine what must be shown for authentication, which may vary from case to case. [Citation.]" (People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 267.)" 'As long as the evidence would support a finding of authenticity, the writing is admissible. The fact conflicting inferences can be drawn regarding authenticity goes to the document's weight as evidence, not its admissibility.'" (Ibid.)
As noted above, while the trial court did not explicitly make any evidentiary rulings regarding the authenticity and admissibility of the Sheridan agreement, it clearly considered the agreement on the merits in making its final decision, thus implying that court found the agreement to be authentic and, therefore, admissible. However, based on the factors cited by Mei, we agree that there was sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue regarding the validity and authenticity of the agreement such that summary adjudication was not appropriate.
One such example is Cunningham's report and final opinions regarding the veracity of the original Sheridan agreement, as well as the other written documents regarding another property in which Sherry claimed a partial ownership interest (known as the Pomona property). While Cunningham stated that "no conclusion can be reached" as to whether the signatures on the original Sheridan agreement were genuine or not genuine because of the poor quality of the document, he concluded that the other documents submitted by Sherry to prove her ownership claims to the Pomona property did not contain Ying's or Mei's normal or genuine signatures. Viewing this opinion in conjunction with other facts, particularly, Sherry's alleged misappropriation of funds from Ying and Mei prior to Ying's passing and Sherry's alleged history of fabricating other documents, we find such evidence gives rise to a reasonable inference that the Sheridan agreement may have been fabricated, thus creating a triable issue of material fact. (Cf. Sangster v. Paetkau (1998), 68 Cal.App.4th 151,166 [indicating there must be more than a "bare assertion" that the moving party "fabricated evidence" to establish a triable issue of material fact].)
Sherry argues that Mei's allegations regarding possible fabrication of the Sheridan Agreement speaks to her credibility, which is not a valid basis for denial of summary judgment or adjudication. (See § 437c, subd. (e) ["[i]f a party is otherwise entitled to summary judgment pursuant to this section, summary judgment shall not be denied on grounds of credibility"].) However, as the statute expressly states, credibility cannot be the sole basis for denying summary judgment when a party otherwise demonstrates he or she is entitled to it. As discussed infra, there were other triable issues of material fact presented by Mei apart from Sherry's credibility that would justify a denial of summary adjudication.
Additionally, because the only parties to the alleged 2008 Sheridan agreement were Sherry and Ying, who is now deceased, Sherry's declaration that both parties executed the agreement is the only proof that: (1) the agreement was what it purported to be; and (2) the agreement was signed by Ying. As stated above, when the only proof of a material fact offered in support of the summary judgment or adjudication is a declaration made by an individual who was the sole witness to that fact, summary judgment may be denied. (See § 437c, subd. (e).) We therefore find that Mei presented sufficient evidence of a triable issue of material fact as to the validity and authenticity of the Sheridan agreement.
2. E-mail Exchanges between Sherry and Ying
Mei questions the authenticity of the e-mail exchanges sent between Sherry and Ying in July 2008 where they allegedly discussed the purchase, as well as the correspondence sent in 2011 and 2016 that purportedly confirmed the existence of the Sheridan agreement. Mei claims that Sherry did not produce these e-mails until "well into the litigation," and also points out that only printouts were produced, not "native forms" of the e-mails. In addition, these e-mails were not found in Ying's sent mail or outbox, even though the most recent one was allegedly sent only two years before Sherry first asserted her ownership claim.
As stated above, although Mei's evidentiary objections to the e-mails, as raised in the trial court, were waived, the court was still required to assess the authenticity of the emails as a preliminary fact. (See Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (a)(3).) As the record does not reflect the trial court made a ruling regarding the authenticity of the e-mail exchanges, let alone discussed this issue, it appears the trial court accepted them as genuine. However, the only evidence on the record to confirm the authenticity of the e-mails is Sherry's declaration claiming that these e-mails were exchanged between Ying and Sherry. As stated above, when the only proof of a material fact offered in support of the summary judgment is a declaration made by an individual who was the sole witness to that fact, summary judgment may be denied. (See § 437c, subd. (e); see also Trujillo v. First American Registry, Inc. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 628, 636 [indicating that only uncontradicted self-serving declarations can provide the basis for summary judgment].) Further, the e-mails are printouts, not the original native copies, and contain no selfauthenticating logos or other indicia of authenticity. (Cf. Hooked Media Group, Inc. v. Apple Inc. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 323, 338 [noting that e-mails can be authenticated only if they contain "clear indicia" that they are what they claim to be].) In addition, as noted by Mei, no copies of the e-mails were located in Ying's outbox, despite the most recent email only being two years old. Therefore, while the content of the e-mails purport to establish that Ying and Sherry had discussed and were in agreement that Sherry would have ownership interest in the Sheridan property, Mei presented sufficient evidence demonstrating that a triable issue of material fact existed as to the authenticity of the emails.
In her opening brief, Mei also claims that Sherry had "ready access" to Ying's cellphone and e-mail account during the time the alleged e-mails were sent, and therefore had "every motivation" to fabricate evidence proving her ownership claim. However, as noted by Sherry, Mei did not make the same claim in the trial court in her declaration opposing summary adjudication, her separate statement of material facts, or her counsel's argument before the court. As we may only consider evidence presented in the moving and opposition papers (see Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 761), we will not consider this fact in our analysis.
In summary, even if we were to find that Sherry met her initial burden of proof demonstrating her ownership interest, Mei met her burden of proof that there were triable issues of material fact regarding the Sheridan agreement and the e-mail exchanges between Sherry and Ying. Consequently, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that Sherry has an ownership interest in the Sheridan property and summary adjudication is warranted for the partition by sale cause of action.
III. Disposition
The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. The trial court is instructed to enter an order denying Sherry's motion for summary adjudication. Mei is entitled to her costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: Greenwood, P. J. Bamattre-Manoukian, J.