Sherman State Bank v. Smith

8 Citing cases

  1. Crawford v. Turner

    48 N.E.2d 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 1943)

    In Woodlawn Trust Savings Bank v. Donaho, 239 Ill. App. 158, the third division of this court, in a case where plaintiff had taken title through a forged indorsement, analyzing section 59, pointed out that the last sentence constitutes an exception to an exception and held that since the defendant was liable on the instrument prior to the acquisition of the defective title the defense could not be interposed. See also Sherman State Bank v. Smith, 244 Ill. App. 171. Consistent with these cases is Clarke v. Newton, 235 Ill. 530. Defendants rely on Bell v. McDonald, 308 Ill. 329. That case is distinguishable by the fact that the fraud there was in obtaining the execution of the note sued on and the exception to the exception in section 59 was therefore not applicable. As a matter of fact, this section was not there considered.

  2. O'Connor v. Central Nat. Bank Trust Co.

    28 N.E.2d 755 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940)   Cited 1 times

    Ordinarily, he cannot keep the proceeds of the Act without at the same time being bound by the means by which the property was acquired." To the like affect is Sherman State Bank v. Smith, 244 Ill. App. 171; First Nat. Bank of Monmouth v. Dunbar, 118 Ill. 625. In Queenan v. Mays, 90 F.2d 525, it is stated: "It is a well settled general rule that notice to, or knowledge of, an agent while acting within the scope of his authority and in reference to a matter over which his authority extends, is notice to, or knowledge of, his principal.

  3. Swesnik Loan Co., Inc. v. Courtney

    10 N.E.2d 512 (Ill. App. Ct. 1937)   Cited 1 times

    On the other side, plaintiff contends that the word "property" mentioned in the section does not include negotiable instruments, because one may obtain a good title to a negotiable instrument from the thief, and the case of City of Chicago v. Hulbert, 118 Ill. 632, is cited. It has long been firmly established that an innocent holder for value of a negotiable paper is protected though the one from whom he received such paper may have stolen it from the true owner, and this rule is founded upon principles of commercial policy. Sherman v. Smith, 244 Ill. App. 171; Pflueger v. Broadway Trust Sav. Bank, 265 Ill. App. 569. City of Chicago v. Hulbert ( 118 Ill. 632) was a proceeding brought in the criminal court against Hulbert to recover the penalty for failure to take out a license as a pawnbroker, as required by the city ordinance.

  4. Montgomery v. Commercial Trust Sav. Bank

    3 N.E.2d 139 (Ill. App. Ct. 1936)   Cited 2 times

    Chicago Bank of Commerce v. Kraft, 269 Ill. App. 295; Elgin Nat. Bank v. Goecke, 295 Ill. 403; Zollman v. Jackson Trust Savings Bank, 238 Ill. 290. Even where negotiable paper has been stolen and a bank takes it without notice of infirmities and before maturity it is a holder in due course. Pflueger v. Broadway Trust Sav. Bank, 351 Ill. 170; Graham v. White-Phillips Co., Inc., 56 Sup. Ct. 21; Sherman State Bank v. Smith, 244 Ill. App. 171, affirmed 330 Ill. 373. The bank had the right to assume that Hahn, Inc., which deposited the collateral, was the sole owner of the papers. Plaintiff's contention is that Hahn, as president of defendant bank, knew that the trust deed and note did not belong to Hahn, Inc., but belonged to plaintiff, and that this knowledge must be imputed to the bank.

  5. Whitely v. Bartlett

    270 Ill. App. 602 (Ill. App. Ct. 1933)

    " In Sherman State Bank v. Smith, 244 Ill. App. 171, the owner of a note and mortgage (upon what was afterwards alleged to have been a false representation) delivered them indorsed in blank, to a real estate dealer with whom the owner had had business relations. The real estate agent sold the note and mortgage to a bank.

  6. In re Estate of Wedelius

    266 Ill. App. 69 (Ill. App. Ct. 1932)   Cited 1 times

    We are of the opinion that the contention is a sound one, applicable to the undisputed facts of the present case. (See sections 52, 55 and 56, Illinois Neg. Inst. Law, Cahill's St. 1931, ch. 98, ¶¶ 72,75,76, p. 1954; Higgins v. Lansingh, 154 Ill. 301, 387-8; Seaverns v. Presbyterian Hospital, 173 Ill. 414, 421; Home Savings State Bank v. Peoria Agricultural Trotting Society, 206 Ill. 9, 13-14; Allmon v. Salem Building Loan Ass'n, 275 Ill. 336, 344; Metcalf v. Draper, 98 Ill. App. 399, 405-6; Mutual Investment Co. v. Wildman, 182 Ill. App. 137, 144; Sherman State Bank v. Smith, 244 Ill. App. 171, 175-6.) In the present case Lykke, who was at the times of the transactions mentioned a director of the Savings Bank, did not act for the bank therein but in his own interest and adversely to the bank.

  7. Pflueger v. Broadway Trust Savings Bank

    265 Ill. App. 569 (Ill. App. Ct. 1931)   Cited 7 times
    In Pflueger v. Broadway Trust Savings Bank, 265 Ill. App. 569 -581, is presented the view that such a provision is so contrary and repugnant to the essence of the instrument that it is void, citing a large number of supporting cases.

    Two controlling questions arise upon the record: (1) Are the debentures, which are the subject matter of this suit, negotiable? (2) Assuming negotiability, were the same overdue when received by defendant in the transaction in Chicago? If the same were not negotiable or overdue at that time, then defendant would take the same subject to infirmities, not being a holder in due course; but if they were negotiable and not due, even a thief could give good title to one taking for value and in good faith. Sherman State Bank v. Smith, 244 Ill. App. 171. Preliminary questions arise.

  8. Willard v. Bristol

    251 Ill. App. 234 (Ill. App. Ct. 1929)   Cited 1 times

    No attempt was made by defendants to prove any such defects. Cahill's St. ch. 98, ¶ 77; Sherman State Bank v. Smith, 244 Ill. App. 171. It is the law that payment of a note by the maker to the payee is no defense in an action against the maker by a holder in due course who received the note by indorsement from the payee. If the defendants did pay, as they claim, the note in suit to the Lind Realty Company before maturity, and while the note was in the possession of plaintiffs, and without procuring a surrender of the same, defendants made such payment at their own risk. Such conduct between the payee and the maker of the note does not affect the title of a bona fide holder in due course under the Negotiable Instruments Act, Cahill's St. ch. 98. Defendants can only avail of the payment of the note to the maker by proof that defendants paid the note to the payee, Lind Realty Company, before plaintiffs received the note from the Lind Realty Company. There was neither evidence nor available pleading to that purport.