Opinion
Case No. 02-2399-JAR
September 10, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND SUA SPONTE ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff Ali Sherkat filed this action, pro se, against Johnson County District Court on August 28, 2002. In the Complaint, Plaintiff states that the Court has jurisdiction under "Article XIV, Section 1" and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, for violation of his civil rights. In a "Statement of Claim" attached to the Complaint, Plaintiff states in pertinent part:
Judge James F. Vano found the plaintiff, Ali Sherkat, guilty of abuse, at the Johnson County District Court with no proof or evidence meeting the definitions or requirements of the statutes regarding "abuse" were presented . . . The plaintiff attempted to appeal the decision but found that no record of the verbal goings, or transcripts of the hearing has been kept and that the appeal was only possible to a district court as a retrial.
In an attachment entitled "Relief," Plaintiff states that he seeks relief, including:
1. That the judgement and orders of the Johnson County District Court be dismissed and the plaintiff's rights, in particular his parenting rights, be restored and his name and legal background be void of this accusation.
2. That the United States District Court of Kansas reverse and correct any consequences of the use of these orders in other Courts of law and other places in Kansas and other states. Also, for the United States District Court of Kansas to prohibit the continued use of these orders against the plaintiff.
3. That the Johnson County District Court be found guilty of violating the plaintiffs Constitutional rights and ignoring the statutes and requirements of the State of Kansas and the United States, in particular and including, keeping of records, or verbal on-goings, at hearings and trials leading to depriving of people from their liberty and property.
4. That plaintiff's request for money damages be granted.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, able to adjudicate only those cases which the Constitution and Congress authorize. Federal judicial power derives from and is absolutely limited by Article III, § 2 of the Constitution. There are essentially three bases for federal jurisdiction: federal question; diversity; or as expressed in Article III, § 2, and 28 U.S.C. § 1345-1346, cases in which the United States is a party. The absence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised by the court sua sponte.
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 695-697 (1992).
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
Mansfield, C. L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884); Williams v. Life Sav. and Loan, 802 F.2d 1200, 1202 (10th Cir. 1986). See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
The Court has very limited subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin state court proceedings. Moreover, prospective injunctive relief against a state court is barred for lack of a case or controversy, as well as by the Eleventh Amendment and the special sovereign interests of the State in its own judiciary. Furthermore, the court has no jurisdiction of domestic relations cases concerning divorce, alimony or child custody.
The Anti-Injunction Act provides that, subject to the exceptions noted below, federal courts "may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The Act sets forth three exceptions to the general prohibition, and federal court can enjoin a state court proceeding as follows:
1) "as expressly authorized by Act of Congress;"
2) "where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction," or
3) "to protect or effectuate its judgments."
Id.
U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 2, cl. 1.
Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 693-695. Cf. Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozco), 226 F.3d 1103, 1111 (10th Cir. 2000)[claim that state adoption statute unconstitutionally deprived natural father of notice and opportunity to be heard not barred by domestic relations exception].
Nor does the court have jurisdiction to reverse, overturn or "correct" the final decisions of its brethren state courts. Federal trial courts do not have the power to hear what are essentially appeals from a state court decision. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars "a party losing in state court . . . from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States [trial] court." Generally, a federal district court cannot review matters actually decided by a state court, nor can it issue "any declaratory relief that is inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment." "A claim is inextricably intertwined if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it." In addition to the statutory appellate-original jurisdiction dichotomy underlying the doctrine, courts have found other policies served by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It maintains respect for state courts, provides a measure of finality, and prevents multiple bites at the apple.
See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).
Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)).
Kiowa Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1169 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotations and citations omitted).
Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
Johnson v. State of Kansas, 888 F. Supp. 1073, 1079 (D.Kan. 1995), aff'd 81 F.3d 172 (10th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1079-80.
For all of these reasons, this action is DISMISSED with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.