Opinion
Civil Action 1:20-cv-03373-CMA-SKC
08-10-2021
CRAIG SCOT SHEPPARD, Plaintiff, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE DETENTION FACILITY, and JEFF SHRADER, Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: JEFFERSON COUNTY DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [#30]
S. KATO CREWS, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This Recommendation addresses Defendants Jefferson County Sheriff's Office Detention Facility (“Jail”) and Sheriff Jeff Shrader's (“Sheriff”) (collectively, “Jefferson County Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”). [#30.] Judge Arguello referred the Motion to the Magistrate Judge. [#32.] The Court has considered the Motion and the related briefing. No hearing is necessary. For the reasons stated herein, the Court recommends the Motion be GRANTED.
The Court uses “[#]” to refer to entries in the CM/ECF court filing system.
The Court accepts the following well-pleaded facts as true and views the allegations in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2010). Moreover, Plaintiff appears pro se. Accordingly, the Court construes the Complaint and Plaintiff's pleadings liberally but without acting as his advocate. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
When Plaintiff Craig Scot Sheppard was booked into the Jefferson County Detention Center (“Jail”) on July 25, 2020, it was at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. [#1, p.5.] Upon entering, Plaintiff was asked if he had any COVID-19 symptoms, which he denied. [Id.] Plaintiff was provided a cloth mask, and then placed in a holding cell with several other inmates. [Id.] He alleges the holding cell was “unsanitary” and contained several other inmates that “may have had or been exposed to COVID-19.” [Id.] Plaintiff was subsequently moved to another cell but alleges it had not been cleaned before his arrival, and that he was not given cleaning and/or sanitizing supplies. [Id.] Plaintiff was housed in that cell for over two weeks and during that time he was “locked” in and unable to leave. [Id.]
Plaintiff was again moved, this time to be housed with another inmate. [Id.] He alleges the new unit contained several inmates whose COVID-19 status was unknown, and the unit was not regularly cleaned. [Id.] He asserts the Sheriff's office was “incompetent” in placing him in close quarters with others, thereby putting him at risk for COVID-19 infection. [Id.] Plaintiff also alleges that during his time at the Jail, he was served small food portions that provided insufficient nutritional value and he lost a “substantial” (20 pounds) amount of weight as a result. [#34, p.1.]
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. [#1, pp.1-3, 6.] The Complaint alleges the conditions at the Jail equated to cruel and unusual punishment and violated Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [Id. pp.5-6.] It also alleges the conditions at the Jail violated his rights as stated in the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office Handbook, which guarantees “safe, clean, and sanitary living conditions, physical safety, medical care, and a balanced diet.” [Id. p.6.]
The Jefferson County Defendants filed the Motion seeking dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). [#30.] They argue the Complaint should be dismissed “because (1) the [Jefferson County Sheriff's Office Detention Facility] is not a suable entity; and (2) Plaintiff has failed to state a constitutional claim against the Sheriff in his official or individual capacities.” [Id. p.2.]
B. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
1. 12(b)(6)
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard requires that courts take a two-prong approach to evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007).
The first prong requires the court to identify which allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” because, for example, they state legal conclusions or are mere “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The second prong requires the court to assume the truth of the well-pleaded factual allegations “and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “Accordingly, in examining a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), [courts] will disregard conclusory statements and look only to whether the remaining, factual allegations plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012).
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard requires more than the sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. If the allegations “are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1252 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The standard is a liberal one, and “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Dias v. City & Cty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009).
2. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields “government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quotation omitted). Qualified immunity is “immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability [and] it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity is a legal question. Wilder v. Turner, 490 F.3d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 2007).
In resolving a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, this Court must consider “whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged . . . make out a violation of a constitutional right, ” and “whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of defendant's alleged misconduct.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. The plaintiff bears the burden of showing, with particularity, facts and law establishing the inference that the defendant violated a clearly established federal constitutional or statutory right. Walter v. Morton, 33 F.3d 1240, 1242 (10th Cir. 1994). If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either prong, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Leverington v. City of Colorado Springs, 643 F.3d 719, 734 (10th Cir. 2011) The court has the discretion to consider these prongs in any order it chooses. Id. at 733.
As to the first prong, “[i]f no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, ” the inquiry is at an end. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The second prong - whether the right was clearly established - must be considered “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Id. An official's conduct “violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘the contours of a right are sufficiently clear' that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing is violating that right.'” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). To be clearly established, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id.
C. ANALYSIS
1. Jefferson County Sheriff's Detention Center
The Jefferson County Defendants argue that the Jail is not a proper defendant in this suit because it is not a separate legal entity that may be sued. [#30, pp.2-3.] The Court agrees. In Colorado, the Sheriff employs and controls the deputy sheriffs. See Tunget v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Delta Cty., 992 P.2d 650, 652 (Colo.App. 1999) (“The sheriff is the appropriate governing entity to deal with a claim against a deputy sheriff.”) Likewise, the Sheriff is a separately elected official and statutorily responsible for the day-to-day operations of the Jail. Sisneros v. Cty. of Pueblo, Civ. No. 09-cv-1646-PAB-MJW, 2010 WL 1782017, at *3 (D. Colo. May 2, 2010). Here, the Complaint fails to identify any particular individual and only vaguely alleges the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office (or its detention facility) as the entity responsible for the conditions at the Jail. [See #1, p.5 (“Jefferson County Sheriff's Office is being incompetent in the procedures to safely handle this pandemic.”)] And in his response, Plaintiff asserts “it is Jeff Shrader's job and duty to be aware of the actions and environment of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office officials and the Facility in wich (sic) individuals are being housed.” [#34, p.1.] Considering these statements and the above-referenced case law, the Court concludes the Sheriff, and not the Jail, is the proper defendant and RECOMMENDS the Motion be GRANTED as it relates to the Jail's dismissal.
2. Individual Capacity Claim
In order to maintain an individual capacity claim under Section 1983, a Plaintiff must establish a defendant's personal or supervisory liability. Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1163 (10th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff asserts the conditions at the Jail violated his Eighth Amendment rights, and Shrader (as the Sheriff) was aware of the actions of Jail officials and the Jail's unsafe conditions. [Id.] The Court liberally construes this as a supervisory liability claim against the Sheriff and analyzes the claim under that rubric.
Plaintiff has pleaded he was a convicted and sentenced state prisoner, but the Jefferson County Defendants' Motion suggests he was a pretrial detainee [Compare #1, p.2 with #30, p.2.] Because the Court takes the well-pleaded facts in the Complaint as true, the Court analyzes his claims under the Eighth Amendment. Garcia v. Salt Lake Cty., 768 F.2d 303, 307 (10th Cir. 1985) (Eighth Amendment applies after adjudication of guilt). Regardless, the conditions of confinement analyses for pretrial detainees (Fourteenth Amendment) and convicted prisoners (Eighth Amendment) are identical. Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303, 307 (10th Cir. 1985).
There are simply no allegations in the Complaint that could sustain a claim of personal liability against Shrader.
“‘In prison-conditions cases [the culpable] state of mind is one of deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.'” Grissom v. Roberts, 902 F.3d 1162, 1174 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). The test for deliberate indifference contains both objective and subjective components. Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006). First, the plaintiff must show that objectively, the harm he complains of is “sufficiently serious” to merit constitutional protection. Id. Second, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was subjectively aware of the substantial risk to the plaintiff's health or safety and acted in purposeful disregard of that risk. Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1089 (10th Cir. 2009). Mere negligence, however, is not sufficient. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Rather, “[t]he subjective component is akin to ‘recklessness in the criminal law,' where, to act recklessly, a ‘person must “consciously disregard” a substantial risk of serious harm.'” Self v. Crum, 439 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 839). “Given the difficulty in proving an official's state of mind, the subjective component may be proven through circumstantial evidence, and courts ‘may infer the existence of this subjective state of mind from the fact that the risk of harm is obvious.'” Peoples v. Long, 20-cv-02116-RBJ-NYW, 2020 WL 9076288, at *10 (D. Colo. Dec. 16, 2020) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002), recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1085424 (Mar. 22, 2021).
a. COVID-19
In its Motion, the Jefferson County Defendants argue Plaintiff's alleged exposure to COVID-19 is not sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective component. As alleged in the Complaint, the Court agrees. The two-page Complaint alleges, in short and conclusory fashion, Plaintiff was housed with other inmates who “may have had or been exposed” to COVID-19. But this allegation is imprecise and lacks corresponding factual allegations to plausibly allege Plaintiff was forced to have contact with inmates who contracted COVID-19.
Similarly, Plaintiff alleges no facts that his potential exposure to COVID-19 is “sufficiently serious” to merit constitutional protection. For example, he alleges no facts indicating he has any underlying medical conditions putting him at a higher risk for grave injury or death based on possible exposure to COVID-19. Indeed, the Complaint does not allege facts indicating anyone was infected at the Jail. As pleaded, it is just as plausible to infer from the Complaint that no one was infected at the Jail despite being housed in tight quarters. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the objective component.
By contrast, a survey of COVID-19 cases in this district where the objective component was met finds plaintiffs in those cases plausibly alleged facts showing they were at a higher risk for grave illness or death from COVID-19 because of their underlying medical conditions. See Carranza, 2020 WL 2320174, at *1, 8 (defendant conceding the objective factor was met where COVID-19 presented a heightened risk of harm to plaintiff class members, which included individuals age 55 or older, or with chronic health conditions including cancer, chronic lung disease, hypertension, heart failure, diabetes, and cardiovascular disease); Peoples, 2020 WL 9076288, at *2, 8 (defendant not challenging the sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint as to the objective element where plaintiff alleged he was medically vulnerable to COVID-19 because of his age (66), and his underlying medical conditions including asthma, heart disease, diabetes, epilepsy, hypertension, and vision impairment); but see Faircloth v. CDOC, 20-cv-3202-RM-STV, 2020 WL 7055448, at *4 (D. Colo. Dec. 12, 2020) (denying plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order for failing to establish likelihood of success on the merits because his underlying medical conditions meant he “might be at an increased risk” for COVID-19 and thus he was not a high-risk individual).
Even if the Court were to assume Plaintiff's alleged exposure to COVID-19 was sufficiently serious, his allegations as to the subjective component also fall short. Specifically, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing the Sheriff acted “in purposeful disregard” to COVID-19. Instead, Plaintiff alleges he was given a cloth mask upon his entry at the Jail and was restricted to his cell, ostensibly to reduce mingling in general population between inmates. These factual allegations undermine any conclusory averments that Defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff's health and safety. See Nellson v. Barnhart, 454 F.Supp.3d 1087, 1095 (D. Colo. 2020) (“A lack of social distancing in the law library and communal restrooms . . . does not demonstrate that defendants have disregarded the risk of COVID-19”); Simmermaker v. Trump, No. 20-cv-01671-KMT, 2021 WL 915985, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 10, 2021) (the inability to maintain social distancing while using computer terminals or telephones or when interacting with their cellmates does not demonstrate defendants disregarded the risk of COVID-19); Grinis v. Spaulding, 459 F.Supp.3d 289, 292 (D. Mass. 2020) (“These affirmative steps may or may not be the best possible response to the threat of COVID-19 within the institution, but they undermine an argument that the respondents have been actionably deliberately indifferent to the health risks of inmates.”); Chunn v. Edge, 465 F.Supp.3d 168, 203 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (a prison's measures to combat COVID-19 “indicate that prison officials are trying, very hard, to protect inmates against the virus and to treat those who have contracted it, and belie any suggestion that prison officials have turned the kind of blind eye and deaf ear to a known problem that would indicate deliberate indifference.”)
Because Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a constitutional violation regarding his alleged exposure to COVID-19, the Court concludes the Sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity as it relates to this claim. See Hesse v. Town of Jackson, Wyo., 541 F.3d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 2008) (“If the court concludes no constitutional right has been violated, no further inquiry is necessary and the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity.”)
b. Inadequate Nutrition
Plaintiff also alleges he lost 20 pounds while at the Jail because its food portions were “not of nutritional size.” [#1, p.5 and #34, p.1.] Prison officials must ensure “inmates receive the basic necessities of [nutritionally] adequate food ....” Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832-33; see also Thompson v. Gibson, 289 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2002). “A substantial deprivation of food may be sufficiently serious to state a conditions of confinement claim under the Eighth Amendment, ” where prison officials demonstrate “deliberate indifference.” Thompson, 289 F.3d at 1222; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).
Here again the Complaint is too vague and conclusory to plausibly allege the objective component. For example, the Complaint alleges no facts to reveal the “nutritional size” of the food served Plaintiff or facts establishing an appropriate “nutritional size” to draw a comparison to plausibly infer a sufficiently serious harm to merit constitutional protection. Further, there are no allegations regarding the frequency by which Plaintiff is served inadequately-sized food or facts to plausibly infer that his alleged weight loss is attributable to the small food portions.
The Complaint also fails to plausibly allege the subjective component. Again, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts indicating the Sheriff intended to deprive him of “nutritionally-sized” food. While the Complaint only generally alleges Plaintiff filed grievances pertaining to the food that were ignored, without more, these allegations do nothing to move the claim from sheer possibility to plausibility. For these reasons, the Court concludes Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a constitutional violation. Accordingly, the Court recommends the Jefferson County Defendants' Motion be GRANTED as it pertains to the Sheriff's supervisory liability claim.
3. Official Capacity
As explained in the section above, the Complaint fails to plausibly allege a constitutional violation. Therefore, the Court also recommends the Jefferson County Defendants' Motion regarding Plaintiff's Monell claim also be GRANTED. See Lindsey v. Hyler, 918 F.3d 1109, 1117 (10th Cir. 2019) (“[a] municipality may not be held liable for the actions of its employees if those actions do not constitute a violation of a plaintiff's constitutional rights.”) (citation omitted).
D. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends the Motion be GRANTED.
Be advised that all parties shall have fourteen (14) days after service hereof to serve and file any written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is assigned. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive or general objections. A party's failure to file such written objections to proposed findings and recommendations contained in this report may bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Judge of the proposed findings and recommendations. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676-83 (1980); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Additionally, the failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy may bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted or adopted by the District Court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).