Opinion
Civil Action 1:20-cv-03373-CMA-SKC
07-14-2021
Magistrate Judge S. Kato Crews CRAIG SCOT SHEPPARD, Plaintiff, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE DETENTION FACILITY, WELLPATH, and JEFF SHRADER, Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION OF U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE RE: WELLPATH'S MOTION TO DISMISS [#26]
S. Kato Crews, U.S. Magistrate Judge.
This Recommendation addresses Defendant Wellpath's Motion to Dismiss (“Motion”). [#26.] Judge Arguello referred the Motion to the Magistrate Judge. [#27.] The Court has considered the Motion and the related briefing. No. hearing is necessary. For the reasons stated herein, the Court recommends granting the Motion.
The Court uses “[#]” to refer to entries in the CM/ECF court filing system.
Plaintiff did not file a response to this Motion, but he did file a response to Defendant Jefferson County's Motion to Dismiss. The Court construes his latter response as responding to both motions.
The Court accepts the following well-pleaded facts as true and views the allegations in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (10th Cir. 2010). Moreover, Plaintiff appears pro se. Accordingly, the Court construes the Complaint and Plaintiff's pleadings liberally but without acting as his advocate. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
When Craig Scot Sheppard (“Plaintiff”) was booked into the Jefferson County Detention Center (“Jail”) on July 25, 2020, it was at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. [#1, p.5.] Upon entering, Plaintiff was asked if he had any COVID-19 symptoms, which he denied. [Id.] Plaintiff was provided a cloth mask, and then placed in a holding cell with several other inmates. [Id.] He alleges the holding cell was “unsanitary” and contained several other inmates that “may have had or been exposed to COVID-19.” [Id.] Plaintiff was subsequently moved to another cell but alleges it had not been cleaned before his arrival, and that he was not given cleaning and/or sanitizing supplies. [Id.] Plaintiff was housed in that cell for over two weeks, and during that time, he was “locked” in and unable to leave. [Id.]
Plaintiff was again moved, this time to be housed with another inmate. [Id.] He alleges the new unit contained several inmates whose COVID-19 status was unknown, and the unit was not regularly cleaned. [Id.] He asserts the Sheriff's office was “incompetent” in placing him in close quarters with others, thereby putting him at risk for COVID-19 infection. [Id.] Plaintiff also alleges that during his time at the Jail, he was served small food portions that provided insufficient nutritional value and he lost a “substantial” (20 pounds) amount of weight as a result. [Id.]
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office Detention Facility, Jeff Shrader (the Jefferson County Sheriff), and Wellpath. [Id. pp.1-3, 6.] The Complaint alleges conditions at the Jail equated to cruel and unusual punishment and violated Plaintiff's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [Id. pp.5-6.] It also alleges the Jail conditions violated Plaintiff's rights provided in the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office Handbook, which guarantees “safe, clean, and sanitary living conditions, physical safety, medical care, and a balanced diet.” [Id. p.6.] Wellpath filed the Motion seeking dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). It argues the Complaint “does not allege any wrongdoing or misconduct for which Wellpath may be held liable.” [#26, p.2.]
B. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Twombly-Iqbal pleading standard requires that courts take a two-prong approach to evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007).
The first prong requires the court to identify which allegations “are not entitled to the assumption of truth” because, for example, they state legal conclusions or are mere “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The second prong requires the court to assume the truth of the well-pleaded factual allegations “and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “Accordingly, in examining a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), [courts] will disregard conclusory statements and look only to whether the remaining, factual allegations plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012).
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted). This standard requires more than the sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. If the allegations “are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1252 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The standard is a liberal one, however, and “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Dias v. City & Cty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff has pleaded he was a convicted and sentenced state prisoner, but the Jefferson County Defendants' Motion suggests he was a pretrial detainee [#30, p.2.] Because the Court takes the well-pleaded facts in the Complaint as true, the Court analyzes his claims under the Eighth Amendment. Garcia v. Salt Lake Cty., 768 F.2d 303, 307 (10th Cir. 1985) (Eighth Amendment applies after adjudication of guilt). Regardless, the conditions of confinement analysis for pretrial detainees (Fourteenth Amendment) and convicted prisoners (Eighth Amendment) are identical. Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Garcia v. Salt Lake County, 768 F.2d 303, 307 (10th Cir. 1985).
“The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment imposes a duty on prison officials to provide humane conditions of confinement, including adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and reasonable safety from bodily harm.” Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). To state a claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must allege prison officials, “with deliberate indifference, ” exposed him to conditions that “pose[d] an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health.” Graham v. Gunter, No. 93-B-129, 1995 WL 447908, at *3 (10th Cir. July 25, 1995) (citing Helling, et al. v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)).
The test for deliberate indifference contains both objective and subjective components. Callahan v. Poppell, 471 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2006). First, the plaintiff must show that objectively, the harm complained of is “sufficiently serious” to merit constitutional protection. Id. Second, the plaintiff must establish the defendants were subjectively aware of the substantial risk to the plaintiff's health or safety and that they acted in purposeful disregard of that risk. Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1089 (10th Cir. 2009). The subjective component requires an “inquiry into a prison official's state of mind when it is claimed that the official has inflicted cruel and unusual punishment.” Kikumura v. Osagie, 461 F.3d 1269, 1293 (10th Cir. 2006), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1246, (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994)). In the Tenth Circuit, a plaintiff must show “a prison official [] disregard[ed] the specific risk of harm claimed by the prisoner, not a more general risk.” Whiteman v. El Paso Criminal Justice Ctr., No.10-cv-02430-WYD-KLM, 2011 WL 2610202, at *4 (D. Colo. July 1, 2011).
Further, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to the plaintiff; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed the plaintiff; and what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated. Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, at Arapahoe Cty. Just. Ctr., 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). And it is axiomatic that in order for liability to arise under Section 1983, a defendant's direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional right must be established. See Olson v. Stotts, 9 F.3d 1475, 1477 (10th Cir.1993) (affirming district court's dismissal where “plaintiff failed to allege personal participation of the defendants”); Coleman v. Turpen, 697 F.2d 1341, 1346 n.7 (10th Cir.1982) (defendants cannot be liable under Section 1983 unless personally involved in the deprivation).
Here, the Complaint lacks factual allegations to plausibly allege Wellpath was personally responsible for the conditions of Plaintiff's confinement. Plaintiff's two-page Statement of Claims, which contains his factual allegations, do not reference Wellpath at all. [#1, pp.5-6]. The only specific references to Wellpath in the Complaint are found in the case caption and its identification of Wellpath as “Defendant 2” on the Prisoner Complaint form. The Complaint alleges no facts concerning Wellpath's acts or omissions directed at Plaintiff; when Wellpath committed those acts, or failed to act; or how its acts or omissions harmed Plaintiff. Nasious, 492 F.3d at 1163. For example, there are no allegations to establish Wellpath or its employees were responsible for Plaintiff's housing placement, cleaning and sanitizing his living quarters, restricting him to his cell, or determining the amount of food he received. Nor does the Complaint allege facts to plausibly infer Wellpath's subjective awareness of any substantial risks to Plaintiff, or its purposeful disregard of the same. Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1089. The allegations in the Complaint are simply too general and unspecific to plausibly allege an Eighth Amendment claim against Wellpath, even when giving the Complaint liberal construction. Nothing in the Complaint indicates personal participation by Wellpath in determining the conditions of his confinement.
D. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the above, the Court recommends Wellpath's Motion be GRANTED.
Wellpath argues that any attempt to amend the Complaint would be futile because they are immune from liability under the PREP Act. [#26, pp.5-6.] But this argument is woefully underdeveloped, and notably, Wellpath did not argue immunity as a basis for dismissal.
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Be advised that all parties shall have fourteen (14) days after service hereof to serve and file any written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is assigned. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). The party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which the objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive or general objections. A party's failure to file such written objections to proposed findings and recommendations contained in this report may bar the party from a de novo determination by the District Judge of the proposed findings and recommendations. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676-83 (1980); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Additionally, the failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy may bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted or adopted by the District Court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).