Sheppard v. A.C. and S. Co., Inc.

8 Citing cases

  1. Davis v. Celotex Corp.

    187 W. Va. 566 (W. Va. 1992)   Cited 36 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Accepting comment e but declining to consider "overkill" argument because record was insufficiently developed

    "This court notes that courts in both Delaware and Florida, two states with an interest in applying their merger and contract laws over Celotex, have ruled that Celotex is liable for punitive damages. Celotex Corp. v. Pickett, 490 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1986); Sheppard v. A.C. S. Co., 484 A.2d 521 (Del.Super. 1984). As this court finds Hawaii law to be consistent, there is no need to determine which law `best serves the states and parties.' All law points to the imposition of punitive damage liability.

  2. Estate of Mitchell v. Allen Family Foods, Inc.

    C.A. No. 10C-06-005-JOH (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 1, 2013)   Cited 1 times
    Discussing potential effect of comparative negligence by decedent

    In support of its argument, defendant cites to a case in the Northern District of California, a decision in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, and a decision the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, all of which were cited in Sheppard. 484 A.2d 521 (Del. Super. 1984). Lastly, Plaintiffs' indicate it seeks to introduce six OSHA violations related to the June 4, 2008 incident and states which specific violations are alleged. Defendant has not filed a submission regarding the admissibility of the OSHA violations and indicated it does not oppose the admissibility of the violations.

  3. Aguirre v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.

    901 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1990)   Cited 9 times
    In Aguirre v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 901 F.2d 1256, 1258 (5th Cir. 1990) we rejected the argument because Celotex failed to raise the issue in the district court.

    Other courts which have had the opportunity to review Celotex's corporate history have similarly concluded that Panacon was merged into Celotex. See Wall v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 602 F. Supp. 252, 255 (N.D.Tex. 1985); Hanlon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 599 F. Supp. 376, 378 (N.D.Iowa 1984); Sheppard v. A.C. S. Co., 484 A.2d 521, 524 (Del.Super.Ct. 1984); Celotex Corp. v. Pickett, 490 So.2d 35, 36-37 (Fla. 1986); Brotherton v. Celotex Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 148, 493 A.2d 1337, 1339 (1985). Cf.

  4. Mendy v. Larson

    2:22-cv-01426-LK (W.D. Wash. Jun. 14, 2024)

    This is not to say that punitive damages will ultimately be appropriate in this case, even if Mendy prevails on his Fair Housing Act claim; the Court holds only that ASP's financial information is discoverable at this stage of the litigation, when not all potentially pertinent facts regarding the merger are available to the Court. See Sheppard v. A.C. & S. Co., 484 A.2d 521, 525-26 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984) (discussing differing views regarding assessing punitive damages against successor corporations and concluding that โ€œeach case of successor liability must turn on its particular factsโ€).

  5. Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co.

    882 F. Supp. 836 (S.D. Iowa 1994)   Cited 9 times
    Discussing the Iowa punitive damages standard in detail

    nce of a mathematical relationship or reasonable ratio between the punitive and actual damages awarded. The following states still consider the reasonable ratio between actual damages and punitive damages to be, at a minimum, a factor to be considered in evaluating the excessiveness of a punitive damages award: See Cameron v. Beard, 864 P.2d 538, 551 (Alaska 1993) (holding a reasonable ratio between actual damages and punitive damages is a factor to be equally considered with the magnitude of the offense, importance of the policy violated, and the defendant's wealth); Viking Ins. Co. of Wisconsin v. Jester, 310 Ark. 317, 836 S.W.2d 371, 379 (1992) (holding a ratio between actual damages and punitive damages is one factor to consider); Kenly v. Ukegawa, 16 Cal.App.4th 49, 19 Cal. Rptr.2d 771, 776 n. 5 (1993) (holding a ratio between actual damages and punitive damages is one factor to be considered, along with the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct and the defendant's wealth); Sheppard v. A.C. S. Co., 484 A.2d 521, 524 (Del.Super.Ct. 1984) (holding punitive damages must not be disproportionate to compensatory damages); Edmark Motors v. Twin Cities Toyota, 111 Idaho 846, 727 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Ct.App. 1986) (holding a ratio between actual damages and compensatory damages is a factor to be considered); Hockenberg Equip. Co. v. Hockenberg's Equip. Supply Co. of Des Moines, 510 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Iowa 1993) (rejecting an approach to punitive damages "that concentrates entirely on the relationship between actual and punitive damages . . ."); Pringle Tax Serv., Inc. v. Knoblauch, 282 N.W.2d 151, 154 (Iowa 1979) (holding punitive damages should be reasonably proportionate to the actual damage as shown); Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546, 1560 (10th Cir. 1991) (applying Kansas law, and holding a ratio between actual damages and compensatory damages is a factor to be considered); Hanks v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 493 N.W.2d 302, 311 (Minn.Ct.App. 1992) (holding a ratio between actual damages and compensatory damages is a fact

  6. Man v. Raymark Industries

    728 F. Supp. 1461 (D. Haw. 1989)   Cited 10 times
    Construing federal due process and Hawaii law

    This court notes that courts in both Delaware and Florida, two states with an interest in applying their merger and contract laws over Celotex, have ruled that Celotex is liable for punitive damages. Celotex Corp. v. Pickett, 490 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1986); Sheppard v. A.C. S. Co., 484 A.2d 521 (Del.Super. 1984). As this court finds that Hawaii law to be consistent, there is no need to determine which law "best serves the states and parties."

  7. Krull v. Celotex Corp.

    611 F. Supp. 146 (N.D. Ill. 1985)   Cited 17 times
    Interpreting substantially similar state law

    Contrary to Celotex's representation, numerous decisions in other jurisdictions have held Celotex liable in asbestos cases for punitive damages occasioned by the conduct of its merged-out predecessors. See Hanlon, 599 F. Supp. at 378-79; Sheppard v. A.C. and S. Co., 484 A.2d 521, 524-26 (Del.Super.Ct. 1984) and cases there cited. As n. 3 reflects, Delaware (where Sheppard was decided) is the controlling jurisdiction for these purposes.

  8. Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes

    523 A.2d 518 (Del. 1987)   Cited 271 times
    Holding "[c]rimmal negligence as defined in 11 Del. C. ยง 231(d) is the functional equivalent of gross negligence as that term is applied as a basis for the recovery of damages for civil wrongs. Grossnegligence, though criticized as a nebulous concept, signifies more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention. It is nevertheless a degree of negligence, while recklessness connotes a different type of conduct akin to the intentional infliction of harm."

    In recent times, apart from the application of punitive damage standards as a recovery threshold under the automobile and premises guest statutes, the imposition of punitive damages has been sanctioned only in situations where the defendant's conduct, though unintentional, has been particularly reprehensible, i.e. reckless, or motivated by malice or fraud. Thus, the imposition of punitive damages is sustainable for persistent distribution of an inherently dangerous product with knowledge of its injury-causing effect among the consuming public, Cloroben Chemical Corp. v. Comegys, 464 A.2d at 891-892; Sheppard v. A.C. and S., Inc., Del.Super., 484 A.2d 521, 526-27 (1984), for intentional torts such as wrongful eviction, Malcolm v. Little, 295 A.2d at 714, for acts accompanied by malice, Cf. Gannett Co., Inc. v. Re, Del.Supr., 496 A.2d 553, 559 (1985); Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Del.Super., 239 A.2d 709, 715 (1967), or for wilful or malicious breaches of contract. Cf. Casson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., Del.Super., 455 A.2d 361, 368 (1982).