Ind.Code § 31–15–7–9.1(a).Put another way, as it was entirely within the trial court's discretion to enforce the terms of its original decree, and the trial court's order appears to do just that, there is simply no support for Wife's claim that the trial court “made its decision solely on an assertion of law” made by Husband's counsel. Appellant's Br. p. 6; see Shepherd v. Tackett, 954 N.E.2d 477, 480 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (stating that “[a] dissolution court retains jurisdiction to interpret the terms of its decree and decide questions emanating from its decree pertaining to its enforcement”). Accordingly, this argument fails.
Indeed, a strong policy favors the finality of property-division orders. Shepherd v. Tackett , 954 N.E.2d 477, 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). One purpose of this policy is to eliminate vexatious litigation that often accompanies dissolution of marriages.
Indeed, a strong policy favors the finality of property-division orders. Shepherd v. Tackett, 954 N.E.2d 477, 480 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). One purpose of this policy is to eliminate vexatious litigation that often accompanies dissolution of marriages.
"Although a court may not modify a final decree, it may construe and clarify it in case of uncertainty, in order to sustain the decree, rather than defeat it; however, an order is not merely a clarification where it makes substantial changes in the original decree." Shepherd v. Tackett, 954 N.E.2d 477, 482 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). [30] Here, the trial court, when faced with the issue of work-related childcare expenses, interpreted the decree's provision that "[p]ending subsequent Order, the parties' [p]reliminary [o]rder as it pertains to all child-related provisions shall remain in full force and effect."
The agreement is ambiguous as to whether Joseph is entitled to a twenty-five percent share of the standalone payments. See Shepherd v. Tackett, 954 N.E.2d 477 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (divorce decree ambiguous as to husband's obligation to make mortgage payments for marital home). [13] We may consider parol evidence to resolve the ambiguity.
[21] Furthermore, it is well within a dissolution court's discretion to interpret subsequent agreements between the parties regarding the original property settlement agreement even if the dissolution court was not required to and did not approve the amendments. Shepherd v. Tackett, 954 N.E.2d 477, 480 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (“A dissolution court retains jurisdiction to interpret the terms of its decree and decide questions emanating from its decree pertaining to its enforcement. Clarifying a settlement agreement, consistent with the parties' intent, is not the same as modifying the agreement.”).
As a general matter, strong policy favors the finality of marital property divisions, whether the court approves the terms of a settlement agreement reached by the parties or the court mandates the division of the property among the parties. Shepherd v. Tackett, 954 N.E.2d 477, 480 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (citing Beike v. Beike, 805 N.E.2d 1265, 1267 (Ind.Ct.App.2004) ). However, a dissolution court may exercise continuing jurisdiction to reexamine a property settlement to seek clarification of a prior order.