The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reserved for the courts. Shepherd v. Carlin, 813 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004). We will review questions of law under a de novo standard and owe no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions.

I.C. § 34-50-1-6(a)-(c). In Shepherd v. Carlin, 813 N.E.2d 1200 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004), the plaintiff's judgment after a jury trial was $358.25. Based on his earlier qualified settlement offer in the amount of $1,366.50, the defendant then submitted a timely motion for "an award of attorney's fees, costs, and expenses and an accompanying affidavit."Id. at 1201. The motion stated that the "undersigned attorney verifie[d] that . . . attorney's fees, costs and expenses" after the date of the qualified settlement offer totaled $3,487.39, and asked for an award pursuant to the qualified settlement offer statute "in the amount of $1,000.00."

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reserved for the courts. Shepherd v. Carlin, 813 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004). We will review questions of law under a de novo standard and owe no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions.

Finally, with respect to the statute at issue, we observe that "Indiana adheres to the `American Rule' with respect to the payment of attorney fees and requires that parties pay their own attorney fees absent an agreement between the parties, statutory authority, or rule to the contrary." Shepherd v. Carlin, 813 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004) (quoting Courter v. Fugitt, 714 N.E.2d 1129, 1132 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999)). The statute in question, Indiana Code section 28-9-5-3 (emphasis added), provides:

This is an issue of law, and we therefore review it de novo. Shepherd v. Carlin, 813 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004). In analyzing statutes, our fundamental responsibility is to determine and effect the intent of the legislature.

The question before the Court in Cole v. Taylor, supra, ( 132 Tenn. 92, 177 S.W. 63) was whether or not, "on the grounds of comity between the states" the laws of Georgia and Alabama or Mississippi granted "to ex-slaves coming from one or the other of these states a right of collateral inheritance which the Legislature of our own state has refused to persons born of slave marriages in the state of Tennessee". The Court herein said that this State had settled the question under our Act hereinbefore referred to, Sec. 31-302, T.C.A., that we only recognized the children of slave marriages of this State of direct inheritance from the parents. In doing so this Court in Cole v. Taylor, supra, quoted again and with approval from Shepherd v. Carlin, 99 Tenn. 64, 41 S.W. 340, as follows: "`We are of opinion that, by the plain terms of this act, the right and power of inheritance is conferred only as to such property as may descend from parents, and that no right of collateral inheritance is conferred by the act.

Radziwiecki did not take issue with this below and does not do so on appeal. Regardless, we note that Gough's counsel owed a duty of candor to the tribunal, Shepherd v. Carlin, 813 N.E.2d 1200, 1202 n.1 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004) (citing Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 3.3), and that Radziwiecki does not dispute the veracity of his own statements. We further note that "[a]n attorney's clear and unequivocal admission of fact during opening statement constitutes a judicial admission that binds the client[.]" Collins v. McKinney, 871 N.E.2d 363, 374 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007) (quoting 13 Robert L. Miller, Jr., Indiana Evidence § 801.422 (2d ed. 1995 & 2004 Supp.).

"When the word shall appears in a statute, it is construed as mandatory rather than directory unless it appears clear from the context or the purpose of the statute that the legislature intended a different meaning." Shepherd v. Carlin , 813 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Here, Mammoth Solar does not argue that the UDO's drafters intended for shall to have a different meaning, and our review of the context and purpose of the UDO reveals no such intent.

When construing a statute, our primary goal is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the legislature. Shepherd v. Carlin, 813 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004). The best evidence of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself, and all words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise indicated by statute.

We also note that when the interpretation of a statute is at issue, a question of law arises that is reserved for the courts. Shepherd v. Carlin, 813 N.E.2d 1200, 1203 (Ind.Ct.App. 2004). We review questions of law under a de novo standard and owe no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions.