In admiralty cases, however, the substantive rules concerning damages do not generally differ from the common law: as a general proposition, courts award admiralty damages to make injured parties whole. See, e.g., Shepard S.S. Co. v. United States, 111 F.2d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1940) (citing Standard Oil Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 268 U.S. 146, 45 S.Ct. 465, 69 L.Ed. 890 (1925)); Tug June S v. Bordagain Shipping Co., 418 F.2d 306, 307 (5th Cir. 1969). Where vessels are damaged in marine accidents, the law permits owners to recover the reasonable cost of repair even though such repair may place the owners in a better position by providing them with new materials for old. The Baltimore, 8 Wall 377, 75 U.S. 377, 386, 19 L.Ed. 463 (1869); Shepard S.S. Co. v. United States, 111 F.2d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1940). If property is so badly damaged that the cost of repair exceeds the fair market value of the property just before the damage, the law considers the property destroyed. If property is destroyed it is not reasonable to attempt repair and a fair market value calculation then becomes proper.

We find no error in the court's treatment of this issue. Shepard S.S. Co. v. United States, 111 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1940); The Westchester, 254 F. 576 (2d Cir. 1818) (dictum). 111 F.2d at 113.

Although Catanzaro's report is not legally binding on TIL, it is entitled to evidentiary weight since his client also could have been held liable for the loss. Cf. Shephard S.S. Co. v. United States, 111 F.2d 110, 113 (2 Cir. 1940) (lack of notice and absence of party at damage survey "are only important as they serve as guides to decision as to the weight to be given the evidence relating to the facts in issue").

The old one was sufficient, and the county was damaged by being compelled to incur the cost of a new one."See also, T. H. Browning Steamship Co. v. F. H. Peavey Co., 235 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1956); United States v. State Road Dept. of Florida, 189 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1951); Hewlett v. Barge Bertie, in Rem Evelyn, 418 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 1969); Shepard S.S. Co. v. United States, 111 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1940); Pan-American Petroleum Transport Co. v. United States, 27 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1928); West v. Martin, 51 Wn. 85, 97 P. 1102 (1908), and the discussion in Gillmore and Black, The Law of Admiralty, § 7-18. The same rule was more recently applied in United States v. Ebinger, 386 F.2d 557 (2d Cir. 1967), the court recognizing, however, that the rule may well be otherwise "where the damaged part was scheduled for early replacement, long before the expiration of the useful life of the whole."

Under such circumstances it has been generally held that the defendant is not entitled to a credit merely because the plaintiff has acquired a new unit, presumably with a longer life expectancy than the old, if that was the cheapest course available. The Baltimore v. Rowland, 8 Wall. 377, 75 U.S. 377, 385-386, 19 L.Ed. 463 (1869); J.W. Paxson Co. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 201 F. 656, 663 (3 Cir. 1912); Shepard S.S. Co. v. United States, 111 F.2d 110, 113 (2 Cir. 1940). This can be justified by the consideration that the plaintiff should not be required to finance in part the premature replacement of equipment when there is no assurance that this will add to the realizable value of the property to which it appertains. It is true that, as Judge Chase noted in Shepard S.S. Co. v. United States, supra, "much might be said logically to the contrary," and we are not sure we would apply the established rule when this would be clearly inequitable, e.g., in a case where the damaged part was scheduled for early replacement, long before the expiration of the useful life of the whole.

Plaintiff vigorously attacks the allowance of $135,428.52 for the wrecked Hulett, contending that it should have been compensated for the entire cost of the Mead-Morrison actually erected to replace the Hulett, namely, $435,889.42, without any deduction for depreciation, reduced by allowable credits. It is urged that the allowance in this amount for this item is required, on the theory that the Hulett was an integral part of the production unit consisting of docks, slip, storage bins, blast furnace and coke oven. Plaintiff relies on decisions which hold that if an integral part of a machine, as, for instance, the fender of a car, Stephens v. Hamtramck Bottling Works, 224 Mich. 156, 194 N.W. 483, or the span of a bridge, Cf. J.W. Paxson Co. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 3 Cir., 201 F. 656, or the gears on a ship, Cf. Shepard S.S. Co. v. United States, 2 Cir., 111 F.2d 110, has been destroyed by negligence, the tort feasor is liable for the full cost of replacing the integral part. There are two answers of substance to this contention, both of which require the overruling of plaintiff's objections to this phase of the judgment.

17. There are numerous other cases that apply this exception to the "new for old" rule. See, e.g., Brunet v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 15 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1994) (no depreciation where useful life of property as existed before collision is not extended; when the whole pipeline eventually needed replacing, these pieces would also need replacing); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Atropos Island, 777 F.2d 1344, 1352 (9th Cir. 1985) (no depreciation should be deducted where nothing of substance is added to the overall value of a structure, but should be deducted for damage to a non-integral part of the structure); Shepard S.S. Co. v. United States, 111 F.2d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1940) (liable party is not given credit for the difference between the value of the ship after repair and the value prior to collision; but do not apply this rule where the part replaced was not in good condition); Paktank Corp. v. M/V M.E. Nunez, 35 F. Supp.2d 521, 530 (S.D.Tex. 1999) (no deductions for depreciation if the repairs do not extend a structure's life or enhance its value). 18. These principles, to a certain degree, comply with common sense.

There are numerous other cases that apply this exception to the "new for old" rule. See, e.g., Brunet v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 15 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1994) (no depreciation where useful life of property as existed before collision is not extended; when the whole pipeline eventually needed replacing, these pieces would also need replacing);Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Atropos Island, 777 F.2d 1344, 1352 (9th Cir. 1985) (no depreciation should be deducted where nothing of substance is added to the overall value of a structure, but should be deducted for damage to a non-integral part of the structure); Shepard S.S. Co. v. United States, 111 F.2d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1940) (liable party is not given credit for the difference between the value of the ship after repair and the value prior to collision; but do not apply this rule where the part replaced was not in good condition); Paktank Corp. v. M/V M.E. Nunez, 35 F. Supp.2d 521, 530 (S.D.Tex. 1999) (no deductions for depreciation if the repairs do not extend a structure's life or enhance its value). These principles, to a certain degree, comply with common sense.

The Second Circuit has noted that the rule that "where the party charged with liability for the damage is not given notice of any survey of the alleged damage and no excuse for such failure is shown, the claim of damage is to be viewed with some suspicion" is to "serve as [a] guide to decision as to the weight to be given the evidence relating to the facts in issue." Shepard S.S. Co. v. United States, 111 F.2d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 1940). As a rational economic actor, the plaintiff will have maximized the salvage value obtained.

But, however, that may have been, such matters are only important as they serve as guides to decision as to the weight to be given the evidence relating to the facts in issue.Shepard S.S. Co. v. United States, 111 F.2d 110, 113 (2d Cir 1940). In another case involving damage to a ship, the Fifth Circuit has stated "the lack of a joint damage survey is not fatal."