Shenfield v. Prather

15 Citing cases

  1. Petit v. Gingerich

    427 F. Supp. 282 (D. Md. 1977)   Cited 10 times

    It is well settled that the appropriate standard of review is whether the Maryland Bar examination bears a rational relationship to the state's admittedly valid interests in professional licensure. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. at 239, 77 S.Ct. 752; Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d at 1099-1101; Whitfield v. Illinois Bd. of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474, 476 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Feldman v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 438 F.2d 699, 705 (8th Cir. 1971); Chaney v. State Bar of California, 386 F.2d 962, 964-65 (9th Cir. 1967), cert.denied, 390 U.S. 1011, 88 S.Ct. 1262, 20 L.Ed.2d 162, reh. denied, 391 U.S. 929, 88 S.Ct. 1803, 20 L.Ed.2d 670 (1968); Lewis v. Hartsock, No. 73-16 at 15-16 (S.D.Ohio, Mar. 9, 1976); Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676, 686 (N.D.Miss. 1974). That plaintiffs allege disparate racial impact stemming from the Bar examination does not suffice to evidence a suspect racial classification and thereby trigger a strict scrutiny analysis.

  2. Schumacher v. Nix

    965 F.2d 1262 (3d Cir. 1992)   Cited 45 times
    Finding that bar admission rule prohibiting graduates from unaccredited law schools from sitting for Pennsylvania's bar examination, except such graduates who were members in good standing of a bar of a ‘reciprocal state’ and who had practiced law in that state for five years, was rationally related to the state's interest in securing mutual treatment for its attorneys seeking admission to the bar of another state

    Id. at 1178-79 (emphasis added). Cf. Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676, 683-86 (N.D.Miss. 1974) (undertaking right to travel analysis of state bar rule requiring attorneys from nonreciprocal states to sit for bar examination but concluding that rational basis review applied). Finally, our conclusion that rational basis review applies here squares with the deference the Supreme Court has long afforded states in regulating the practice of law and admission to the bar.

  3. Goldsmith v. Pringle

    399 F. Supp. 620 (D. Colo. 1975)   Cited 10 times

    Our research discloses two recently reported decisions which address the very issues presented here. In Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676 (N.D.Miss. 1974) (three-judge court), the reciprocity Rule of Mississippi was upheld on the following grounds: The attorney seeking admission through the reciprocity exemption must also come from a state which grants similar privileges to Mississippi attorneys. Although it is true, as plaintiffs argue, that whether a sister-state jurisdiction admits Mississippi attorneys by reciprocity has no bearing on the fitness of the individual applicant, it does not follow that the reciprocity requirement is therefore arbitrary, or that there are no other legitimate governmental objectives which it may promote.

  4. Nordgren v. Hafter

    789 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1986)   Cited 18 times
    Rejecting constitutional challenge to Mississippi's approved law school requirement and its temporary exception for graduates of in-state law schools without ABA approval

    The district court concluded that the "legislature could reasonably have relied on its own knowledge, combined with that of the Board . . . and the [state] Supreme Court, in determining . . . the quality of the legal education offered by the Mississippi College School of Law, formerly known as Jackson School of Law." See also Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676, 686 (N.D. Miss. 1974) (three-judge court) (legislature had a reasonable basis for exempting University of Mississippi law graduates from bar exam requirement); Huffman v. Montana Supreme Court, 372 F. Supp. 1175 (D.Mont. 1974) (Montana law exempting only state law school graduates from taking the bar exam is reasonable and therefore constitutional), aff'd, mem., 419 U.S. 955, 95 S.Ct. 216, 42 L.Ed.2d 172 (1974). Were this Court to accept Nordgren's argument, the Mississippi legislature would be compelled to study and "provisionally accredit" every non-Mississippi, non-ABA accredited law school which spawns a Mississippi-bound graduate.

  5. Ronwin v. State Bar of Arizona

    686 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1981)   Cited 70 times
    Describing a litigant's suit or threatened suit against the court

    Statutes permitting admission without examination are valid. Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Miss. 1974). A state may validly require an applicant to pass an examination in essay form.

  6. Nordgren v. Hafter

    616 F. Supp. 742 (S.D. Miss. 1985)   Cited 4 times

    The constitutionality of the diploma privilege has been directly addressed by the federal courts in Mississippi. Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676 (N.D.Miss. 1974). In Shenfield, Judge William C. Keady, relying on the rigid curriculum and the Mississippi-law orientation of the University of Mississippi School of Law, concluded that the state's Legislature had a reasonable basis for exempting University of Mississippi law graduates from taking the bar examination.

  7. Airport Taxi Cab Advisory Comm. v. City of Atlanta

    584 F. Supp. 961 (N.D. Ga. 1984)   Cited 9 times
    Upholding the City's residency requirement for taxi drivers as against an equal protection challenge

    The rational basis test has been applied to state legislation restricting employment and business opportunities. See Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976) (mandatory retirement statute); Coolman v. Robinson, supra (one year residence required to obtain license to sell alcoholic beverages); Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676 (N.D.Miss. 1974) (residence requirement for bar applicants); but see Nehring v. Ariyoshi, 443 F. Supp. 228 (D.Hawaii 1977) (residency requirement for all public employment invalid; statute served no compelling state interest and had no rational basis). Because the right involved in the instant case, employment in a particular occupation, is not a fundamental one, the burden imposed by the residency requirement on the right to travel must be analyzed under the rational basis standard.

  8. Louis v. Supreme Court of Nevada

    490 F. Supp. 1174 (D. Nev. 1980)   Cited 37 times
    Noting that a "state bar association is an integral part of the judicial process" and acts "as an agency of the state"

    However, where, as here, the constitutional claims were not and could not have been raised in the state court, a U.S. District Court has subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether the adverse state court order was predicated on constitutionally impermissible reasons. Martin-Trigona v. Underwood, 529 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1975); Whitfield v. Illinois Board of Law Examiners, 504 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1974); Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners of State of N.C., 317 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676 (N.D.Miss. 1974); Newsome v. Dominique, 455 F. Supp. 1373 (E.D.Mo. 1978); see also Potts v. Honorable Justices of Supreme Court of Hawaii, 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D.Haw. 1971). In exercising such jurisdiction, the federal court is confined to adjudicating those facts necessary to resolve the constitutional claims.

  9. Attwell v. Nichols

    466 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Ga. 1979)   Cited 4 times

    Moreover, rule 2-101 clearly applies to all persons who seek admission to the State Bar of Georgia. This is not a case where the plaintiff has alleged some disparity of treatment based upon status, such as graduation from an in-state school of law, Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676 (N.D.Miss. 1974), nor is this a case challenging the constitutionality of a reciprocity statute. See Hawkins v. Moss, 503 F.2d 1171 (4th Cir. 1974); Goldsmith v. Pringle, 399 F. Supp. 620 (D.Colo. 1975).

  10. Delgado v. McTighe

    442 F. Supp. 725 (E.D. Pa. 1977)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that Title VII is inapplicable to bar examiners in a case involving Pennsylvania State Bar

    To hold otherwise would be to leave without a remedy a significant class of deprivations of federal rights under color of state law that Congress intended to redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343.Accord, Richardson v. McFadden, 540 F.2d at 746 n. 2; Pettit v. Gingerich, 427 F. Supp. 282 at 285-286, 287 (D.Md. 1977); Shenfield v. Prather, 387 F. Supp. 676, 679 n. 4 (N.D.Miss. 1974); Lipman v. Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391, 394-97 (N.D.Miss. 1971); Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners of State of North Carolina, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1353-56 (E.D.N.C. 1970).