A violation of the rule goes to the credibility of the witness, and renders him amenable to the court for contempt in disobeying the court's order, but does not render him incompetent or permit the exclusion of his testimony. May v. State, 90 Ga. 793, 800 (2) ( 17 S.E. 108) (1892); Shelton v. State, 111 Ga. App. 351 (1) ( 141 S.E.2d 776) (1965); Thomas v. State, 7 Ga. App. 615 (1) ( 67 S.E. 707) (1910). Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court did instruct the jury that violations of the rule could be considered in evaluating the credibility of witnesses.

Appellant cannot now complain that the trial court failed to strike a responsive answer to a question he propounded. See Knight v. State, 148 Ga. 40 ( 95 S.E. 679) and Shelton v. State, 111 Ga. App. 351 ( 141 S.E.2d 776). 3. Appellant's third enumeration of error complains that the trial court erred in charging the jury that in order to prevail he must prove that appellees made misrepresentations at the sale.

The answers complained of were responsive to questions propounded by the defense counsel or were explanations of answers already made. A trial court does not commit error by failing to strike answers which are responsive or which explain responsive answers. Knight v. State, 148 Ga. 40 ( 95 S.E. 679); Shelton v. State, 111 Ga. App. 351 ( 141 S.E.2d 776). In St. Claire v. State, 27 Ga. App. 43 ( 107 S.E. 567), where the defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated, a police officer was asked what made him think the defendant was intoxicated, and answered that he had arrested the defendant previously for the same offense. That court held that the admission of this evidence under these circumstances did not require the grant of a new trial.

Spurlin v. State, 222 Ga. 179 (7) ( 149 S.E.2d 315). In Shelton v. State, 111 Ga. App. 351, 353 ( 141 S.E.2d 776), It is stated: "As pointed out in Thomas v. State, 125 Ga. 286 ( 54 S.E. 182), one charged with larceny will not be heard `to raise nice and delicate questions as to the title of the article stolen.'" The testimony in this case authorized a finding that the victim was in lawful possession of the vehicle taken and there was no fatal variance between the allegation in the indictment and the proof presented on the trial.

3. The defendant does not have standing to complain of an alleged warrantless search of the stolen automobile. See Grantling v. State, 229 Ga. 746 (3) ( 194 S.E.2d 405); Shelton v. State, 111 Ga. App. 351 ( 141 S.E.2d 776), and cits. The admission of evidence obtained from such automobile shows no reversible error. 4. The placing of the defendant in a lineup without the presence of counsel prior to indictment and prior to the appointment of counsel did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights.

She testified that most of this money belonged to her son. In Shelton v. State, 111 Ga. App. 351, 353 (5) ( 141 S.E.2d 776), we held it was not error to refuse to charge that the defendant could not be convicted if the stolen automobile was the property of his wife or of the person named as the owner in the indictment or was the joint property of such person and his wife. In Spurlin v. State, 222 Ga. 179, 182 (7) ( 149 S.E.2d 315), it was stated: "In an indictment for robbery, ownership of the property taken may be laid in the person having actual lawful possession of it, although he may be holding it merely as the agent of another, and it is not necessary to set forth in the indictment the fact that the person in whom the ownership is laid is holding it merely as the agent of the real owner."

"`In an indictment for robbery, ownership of the property taken may be laid in the person having actual lawful possession of it, although he may be holding it merely as the agent of another, and it is not necessary to set forth in the indictment the fact that the person in whom the ownership is laid is holding it merely as agent of the real owner.' Spurlin v. State, 222 Ga. 179 (7) ( 149 S.E.2d 315). In Shelton v. State, 111 Ga. App. 351, 353 ( 141 S.E.2d 776), it stated: `As pointed out in Thomas v. State, 125 Ga. 286 ( 54 S.E. 182), one charged with larceny will not be heard "to raise nice and delicate questions as to the title of the article stolen."'" Gomez v. State, 234 Ga. 614 ( 216 S.E.2d 844) (1975).

Thomas v. State, 125 Ga. 286 (1) ( 54 S.E. 182). Avis Rent-A-Car had been in possession and control of the vehicle delivered to Karp Motors and this was sufficient. Jackson v. State, 15 Ga. App. 179, 180 ( 82 S.E. 771); Lawrence v. State, 26 Ga. App. 607 (1) ( 107 S.E. 621); Norton v. State, 73 Ga. App. 307 (1) ( 36 S.E.2d 120); Shelton v. State, 111 Ga. App. 351 (5) ( 141 S.E.2d 776) U.S. cert. den., 382 U.S. 917; Gomez v. State, 234 Ga. 614 (1) ( 216 S.E.2d 844). We now reach the crux of the issue.

Such a witness is not disqualified from testifying. Shelton v. State, 111 Ga. App. 351 ( 141 S.E.2d 776) (1965). Only his credibility as a witness, not his competence, is affected.

'" Dixon v. State, 231 Ga. 33 (5) ( 200 S.E.2d 138). See also Shelton v. State, 111 Ga. App. 351 (8) ( 141 S.E.2d 776); Norrell v. State, 116 Ga. App. 479 (3) ( 157 S.E.2d 784) and cits. The motion to suppress the evidence was properly denied. 3. Enumeration of error 2 contends that the defendant was denied due process of law when the state, upon cross examination of the defendant, elicited from him admissions of his prior convictions of other offenses, without showing that the defendant either had had or had waived counsel in such prior convictions.