Although the jury twice stated that it was at an eleven to one "deadlock," the trial court was not bound by those pronouncements. Todd v. State, 255 S.E.2d 5 (Ga. 1979) (court is not required to accept jury's feeling that it is "hopelessly deadlocked"). On the contrary, the trial court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, was required to make its own determination as to whether further deliberations were in order.
Although the jury twice stated that it was at an eleven to one "deadlock," the trial court was not bound by those pronouncements. Todd v. State, 243 Ga. 539, 542, 255 S.E.2d 5 (1979) (court is not required to accept jury's feeling that it is "hopelessly deadlocked"). On the contrary, the trial court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, was required to make its own determination as to whether further deliberations were in order.
Furthermore, Hill was not entitled to rely on the State to summon a witness whom it had subpoenaed but on whom it did not rely to make out its case. See Todd v. State, 243 Ga. 539, 542(2), 255 S.E.2d 5 (1979); Bonds v. State, 232 Ga. 694, 696(5), 208 S.E.2d 561 (1974). Therefore, the subpoena obtained by the State, combined with the attempts to locate Poole on the day that Hill intended to call him as a witness and on the following day, clearly do not demand a finding of due diligence in obtaining Poole's presence.
Therefore, it was not error for the trial court to not conduct further inquiry and to deny the request for a change of venue and a mistrial. Id. See also Todd v. State, 243 Ga. 539, 545 (8) ( 255 SE2d 5) (1979). 5. There is no merit to Denny's contention that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of two independent crimes, or as he characterizes it, "bad character" evidence.
See also Romine v. State, 256 Ga. 521 (1) (d) ( 350 S.E.2d 446) (1986).Sears, supra; Todd v. State, 243 Ga. 539 (3) ( 255 S.E.2d 5) (1979).Sears, supra.
Although the jury twice stated that it was at an eleven to one "deadlock," the trial court was not bound by those pronouncements. Todd v. State, 243 Ga. 539, 542 ( 255 S.E.2d 5) (1979) (court is not required to accept jury's feeling that it is "hopelessly deadlocked"). On the contrary, the trial court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, was required to make its own determination as to whether further deliberations were in order.
The trial court did not err in limiting defense counsel's voir dire examination. See Henderson v. State, supra; Todd v. State, 243 Ga. 539 (7) ( 255 S.E.2d 5) (1979). Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Moreover, the trial court "is not bound to accept the jury's feeling that it is hopelessly deadlocked." Todd v. State, 243 Ga. 539, 542 ( 255 S.E.2d 5) (1979). Romine argues that the general rule is inapplicable to sentencing proceedings, because under the rule of Miller the jury has three possible choices in the sentencing phase; i.e., the jury may (1) unanimously agree to recommend death; or (2) unanimously agree to recommend mercy; or (3) unanimously agree that it will not be able to recommend death or life.
We cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in placing the limits on voir-dire questioning here. See Todd v. State, 243 Ga. 539 (7) ( 255 S.E.2d 5) (1979) and cits.; Patterson v. State, 154 Ga. App. 877 (1) ( 270 S.E.2d 86) (1980) and cits.; Young v. State, 131 Ga. App. 553 (2) ( 206 S.E.2d 536) (1974) and cits. 10.
Accordingly, it has been held not to be error for the court to refuse to allow defense counsel in criminal cases to ask questions concerning the law and its application to the case on trial, specifically the presumption of innocence, Pinion v. State, 225 Ga. 36 (4) ( 165 S.E.2d 708) (1969). ("Do you, at the moment believe the defendant innocent?"); McNeal v. State, 228 Ga. 633 (3) ( 187 S.E.2d 271) (1972) ("If you were asked right now to return a verdict without hearing any evidence from either side, what would your verdict be?"); Mills v. State, 137 Ga. App. 305 (2) ( 223 S.E.2d 498) (1976); Montgomery v. State, 128 Ga. App. 116 (1) ( 195 S.E.2d 784) (1973); the weight to be given the fact that the defendant has been charged or indicted, Todd v. State, 243 Ga. 539 (7) ( 255 S.E.2d 5) (1979); Freeman v. State, 132 Ga. App. 615 ( 208 S.E.2d 625) (1974); the state's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Stack v. State, 234 Ga. 19 (2) ( 214 S.E.2d 514) (1975); Mills v. State, supra; the jury's duty to acquit if the state fails to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, Bethay v. State, supra; Hall v. State, 135 Ga. App. 690 (4) ( 218 S.E.2d 687) (1975); Stack v. State, supra; the defendant's right not to testify, Anderson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 816 ( 289 S.E.2d 22) (1982); Freeman v. State, supra, 132 Ga. App. 615, and the credibility of law enforcement officers over ordinary citizens, Bennett v. State, 153 Ga. App. 21, 25-26 ( 264 S.E.2d 516) (1980); Smith v. State, 148 Ga. App. 1 ( 251 S.E.2d 13) (1978); Cox v. State, 248 Ga. 713 (3) ( 285 S.E.2d 687) (1982). In cases in which the death penalty is sought, questions concerning the jurors' convictions regarding capital punishment are required by Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 ( 88 S.C. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776) (19