The Plan grants FMC discretionary authority to decide all questions of eligibility for benefits, which is ordinarily enough to limit judicial review to the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. See Shelton v. ContiGroup Co., 285 F.3d 640, 642 (8th Cir. 2002). However, if an ERISA plan gives its administrator discretion to decide certain issues and the administrator fails to render a decision on those issues, judicial review of those issues is de novo.

Thus, "`ERISA provides a plan beneficiary with the right to judicial review of a benefits determination.'" Norris v. Citibank, N.A., Disability Plan, 308 F.3d 880, 883 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir. 1998), and citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)); Jackson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 303 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 1996)); Shelton v. ContiGroup Cos., Inc., 285 F.3d 640, 642 (8th Cir. 2002) (also quoting Woo); Delta Family-Care Disability Survivorship Plan v. Marshall, 258 F.3d 834, 840 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1162 (2002). a. "Deferential" review of factual determinations

Thus, "'ERISA provides a plan beneficiary with the right to judicial review of a benefits determination.'" Norris v. Citibank, N.A., Disability Plan, 308 F.3d 880, 883 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir. 1998), and citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)); Jackson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 303 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 1996)); Shelton v. ContiGroup Cos., Inc., 285 F.3d 640, 642 (8th Cir. 2002) (also quoting Woo); Delta Family-Care Disability Survivorship Plan v. Marshall, 258 F.3d 834, 840 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1162, 122 S.Ct. 1173, 152 L.Ed.2d 117 (2002). a. "Deferential" review of factual determinations

Thus, "`ERISA provides a plan beneficiary with the right to judicial review of a benefits determination.'" Norris v. Citibank, N.A., Disability Plan, 308 F.3d 880, 883 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir. 1998), and citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)); Jackson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 303 F.3d 884, 887 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 898 (8th Cir. 1996)); Shelton v. ContiGroup Cos., Inc., 285 F.3d 640, 642 (8th Cir. 2002) (also quoting Woo); Delta Family-Care Disability Survivorship Plan v. Marshall, 258 F.3d 834, 840 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1162 (2002). 1. "Deferential" review of factual determinations

(1) whether the administrator's interpretation is consistent with the goals of the Plan; (2) whether the interpretation renders any language in the Plan meaningless or internally inconsistent; (3) whether the administrator's interpretation conflicts with the substantive or procedural requirements of the ERISA statute; (4) whether the administrator has interpreted the relevant terms consistently; and (5) whether the interpretation is contrary to the clear language of the Plan. Id., citing Shelton v. ContiGroup Cos., Inc., 285 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir.2002). In addition to analyzing these five factors, the Court must also consider that a conflict of interest may exist in this case, as Defendant both determines whether an enrollee is eligible for benefits and also pays the benefits out of its own pocket.

The district court granted MetLife's motion for summary judgment. After de novo review, see Shelton v. ContiGroup Cos., 285 F.3d 640, 642 (8th Cir. 2002), we reverse and remand. Harden worked for American Express Financial Corporation (AmEx) from May 1992 until December 31, 1999, when he quit his job as a financial advisor due to cardiac and other physical problems, and stress-related mental problems.

Orr did not allege in his complaint or argue in the district court that eating is a major life activity which is substantially limited because of his diabetes. Ordinarily, we do not consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal. See Shelton v. ContiGroup Cos., 285 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 2002); Berg, 169 F.3d at 1145. We consider a newly raised argument only if it is purely legal and requires no additional factual development, or if a manifest injustice would otherwise result.

(5) whether the interpretation is contrary to the clear language of the Plan.Torres v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 405 F.3d 670, 680 (8th Cir.2005) (citing Shelton v. ContiGroup Cos., Inc. , 285 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir.2002) ).III. DISCUSSION

(5) whether the interpretation is contrary to the clear language of the Plan.Id. (citing Shelton v. ContiGroup Cos., Inc., 285 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 2002)). III. Discussion

(5) whether the interpretation is contrary to the clear language of the Plan.Id. (citing Shelton v. ContiGroup Cos., Inc., 285 F.3d 640, 643 (8th Cir. 2002)). III. Discussion