Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parrish

13 Citing cases

  1. Steelman v. Holford

    765 S.W.2d 372 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 24 times
    Finding auto exclusion in homeowner's policy did not apply where vehicle was the situs of a firearm discharge; the use of the vehicle was temporally and spatially related, but not causally

    The trial court erred in concluding, as a matter of law, that the bodily injuries of respondent Larry Steelman were neither expected nor intended by the respondent Dennis Holford because the trial court failed to apply the proper legal standard that an act is `intended' or `expected', as those terms are used in policies of insurance, where the insured acts with a specific intent to cause harm or the intent to cause harm can be inferred as a matter of law from the nature or character of the act, or is an act from which there is a strong probability that certain consequences will result. In support of this contention, Home Mutual relies on the holdings of Hanover Ins. Co. v. Newcomer, 585 S.W.2d 285 (Mo.App. 1979); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cole, 631 S.W.2d 661 (Mo.App. 1982); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parrish, 659 S.W.2d 315 (Mo.App. 1983), and Western Indem. Co., Inc. v. Alley, 740 S.W.2d 372 (Mo.App. 1987). While we have no quarrel with any of the rules of law expressed in these cases, all are distinguishable on the facts.

  2. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Am. Grain Distribs., LLC

    958 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2020)   Cited 6 times   2 Legal Analyses

    This distinction is critical because judgment as a matter of law on the question of foreseeability may be inappropriate under a subjective standard in circumstances where it would be appropriate under an objective standard. See Shelter Mut. Ins. v. Parrish , 659 S.W.2d 315, 320 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing that this is a "crucial inquiry," applying an objective standard, and holding "as a matter of law" the underlying incident "was not an ‘occurrence’ " when "viewed objectively"). The parties have not cited, and we have not found, a Missouri Supreme Court decision expressly addressing whether an objective or subjective standard governs the foreseeability inquiry in this context.

  3. Indiana Lumbermens Mutual Insurance v. Timberland Pallet & Lumber Co.

    195 F.3d 368 (8th Cir. 1999)   Cited 54 times
    Holding that appellant was not prejudiced by court's incorrect dismissal of jury and treatment of its verdict as advisory

    If this case were the typical erroneous denial of jury demand case, then we would agree that the standard of review would be whether the evidence was sufficient to submit the case to the jury or whether the issues could have been disposed of on summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law. See id.; Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. Affiliated FM Insurance Co., 471 F.2d 238, 245 (8th Cir. 1972) (applying directed verdict or JNOV test of sufficiency of evidence to submit case to jury); Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Parrish, 659 S.W.2d 315, 317-20 (Mo.Ct.App. 1983) (holding denial of jury trial was harmless because evidence was insufficient to create issue of fact for submission to jury and insurer would have been entitled to directed verdict). However, as discussed above, this is not such a case.

  4. Leonardi v. Sherry

    137 S.W.3d 462 (Mo. 2004)   Cited 58 times
    Holding the Missouri Constitution vests legal and equitable jurisdiction in the courts

    Thornbrugh v. Poulin, 679 S.W.2d 416, 417-18 (Mo.App. 1984); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parrish, 659 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Mo.App. 1983); Suburbia Pools, Inc. v. Fischer, 661 S.W.2d 823, 824 (Mo.App. 1983); Linville v. Wilson, 628 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo.App. 1982);

  5. American Family Mut. Ins. v. Pacchetti

    808 S.W.2d 369 (Mo. 1991)   Cited 43 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Mentioning but not resolving argument that anti-redundancy canon should be applied in the paired use of "expected" and "intended," and observing, "We could note many examples of legal parlance in which studied redundancies are used, but there are many suggestions of a shade of difference in the meaning of the two terms."

    Id. at 116. See also Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parrish, 659 S.W.2d 315 (Mo.App. 1983); Subscribers at Auto. Club Inter-Insurance Exch. v. Kennison, 549 S.W.2d 587 (Mo.App. 1977); Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Reed, 530 S.W.2d 470 (Mo.App. 1975).

  6. Allstate Ins v. Freeman

    432 Mich. 656 (Mich. 1989)   Cited 184 times
    Holding "the word ‘a’ or ‘an’ in front of the word ‘insured’ ... unambiguously means ‘any insured’ "

    We find these cases persuasive, but rather than engaging in their theoretical exercises or drawing questionable inferences to determine the insured's "subjective expectation," we hold that the "expected or intended" exclusion must be determined on the basis of an objective standard. Shelter Mutual Ins Co v Parrish, 659 S.W.2d 315 (Mo App, 1983); Pickering, supra; Fireman's Ins Co v Smith, 13 Ark. App. 250, 253-254; 683 S.W.2d 234 (1985); CNA Ins Co v McGinnis, 282 Ark. 90, 93-94; 666 S.W.2d 689 (1984). Justice BOYLE attempts to distinguish McGinnis and Smith on the ground that they involved the interpretation of a provision which excluded coverage for "expected or intended" injuries, without reference to the "standpoint of the insured."

  7. Meyer v. Lofgren

    949 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 21 times
    In Meyer, announcements were printed announcing that Meyer had joined the accounting firm as a "partner in charge of personal financial planning" and business cards indicated that she was a "partner of the firm."

    The doctrine of equitable clean-up, which applies in Missouri, is "when equitable jurisdiction attaches, the court may determine the legal issues incident to the entire case." Linville v. Wilson , 628 S.W.2d 422 (Mo.App. 1982).SeeThornbrugh v. Poulin, 679 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Mo.App. 1984; Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parrish , 659 S.W.2d 315, 318(Mo.App. 1983). We find that the issue of whether a partnership existed was incidental to Meyer's claim for an equitable accounting and that the doctrine of equitable clean-up would apply allowing the trial court sitting in equity to determine the issue.

  8. Licare v. Hill

    879 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 5 times

    Under the doctrine of equitable clean-up, "when equitable jurisdiction attaches the court may determine the legal issues incident to the entire case. . . ." Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parrish, 659 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Mo.App., S.D. 1983) (quoting Linville v. Wilson, 628 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo.App., W.D. 1982)). Appellant's fourth point on appeal raises two claims.

  9. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Bollig

    878 S.W.2d 837 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 2 times

    American Family Mut. Ins. v. Pacchetti, 808 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Mo. banc 1991). Numerous cases involving shootings and insurance coverage are discussed and collected in Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parrish, 659 S.W.2d 315, 320-321 (Mo.App. 1983). See also Steelman v. Holford, 765 S.W.2d 372 (Mo.App. 1989).

  10. Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. L.D.G

    835 S.W.2d 436 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 7 times
    In Mid-Century, a panel divided in its reasoning held that an insured was not covered by his homeowner's policy for the damage he caused by transmitting a venereal disease to a two-year-old girl who he had raped.

    This court has equated the intent to kill in Pacchetti with the transmission of a specific venereal disease, chlamydia, in determining the intent required to exclude coverage in this case. Missouri's case law, including Pacchetti, has never so restricted the character or degree of injury. See Western Indemnity Co. v. Alley, 740 S.W.2d 372 (Mo.App. 1987) and Shelter Mutual Ins. Co. v. Parrish, 659 S.W.2d 315 (Mo.App. 1983), both of which refer to the terminology "bodily injury" in the insurance policy, without requiring an intent to cause the "specific injury" suffered. The majority in Pacchetti did not interpret the "bodily injury" portion of the insurance contract, but focused exclusively on the insured's intent. If a person intends to strike another in the stomach, but inadvertently strikes him in the head, it is not logical to declare his acts unintentional simply because he missed the target.