Summary
In Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Puckett, 29 S.W.2d 809, 810, Court of Civil Appeals (Texarkana Division), we find the following language: "Appellant insists that the right conveyed to appellees `of mining and operating for oil and gas' on the land did not pass to them a right to resort to seismographs as a means of determining whether there was oil or gas thereon or not; and that, owning no right to resort to seismographs, appellees should not have been heard to complain because appellant resorted to them for such a purpose, if it did.
Summary of this case from Yates v. Gulf Oil CorporationOpinion
No. 3857.
May 29, 1930.
Appeal from District Court, Wood County; J. R. Warren, Judge.
Action by H. V. Puckett and others against the Shell Petroleum Corporation. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.
Reversed and rendered.
In their petition appellees H. V. Puckett, G. A. McCreight, and E. Q. Shamburger, who were the plaintiffs in the court below, alleged that they "acquired (quoting) the ownership during the months of March and April, 1927, and continued to hold and own throughout the entire year of 1927, the oil, gas and mineral rights, together with the exclusive license, right and permission to search for, explore and test for oil, gas and other minerals, in and to" described tracts of land in Wood county, aggregating 5,691 acres. They alleged further that in May and June, 1927, the Roxana Petroleum Corporation by its agents "unlawfully, wilfully (quoting further) and without the license, permission, knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs or either of them, entered upon" the lands and "erected and set up seismographs at various and sundry points" thereon, "and buried large quantities of high explosives beneath the surface" thereof, "and discharged and exploded the same at numerous points and places thereof, and by this method and by numerous other methods * * * searched, explored and prospected over the entire block of 5,691 acres of plaintiffs' lands for oil, gas and other minerals." They alleged, further, "that (quoting) the reasonable market value in Wood County, Texas, in the months of May and June, 1927, for the right, permission, license, privilege and consent of these plaintiffs to explore, seek and search for oil, gas and other minerals on the aforesaid lands and premises was fifty cents per acre." They alleged, further, that by an amendment of its charter in September, 1928, said petroleum company changed its corporate name to "Shell Petroleum Corporation." They sued it in that name, and prayed for judgment against it in the sum of $2,845 as the damages at 50 cents per acre they claimed they were entitled to for the trespass alleged. The answer of the Shell Petroleum Corporation, appellant here, consisted of exceptions questioning the sufficiency of the allegations in appellees' petition and a denial of the truth of said allegations. It appeared from written instruments admitted as evidence at the trial that the leases to appellees of said 5,691 acres of land were "for the sole and only purpose (quoting) of mining and operating for oil and gas and of laying pipe lines and of building tanks, power stations and structures thereon to produce, save and take care of said products." It appeared from other written instruments admitted as evidence that on May 27 and May 31, 1927, appellees gave one Skinner "an option to purchase all or any of the leases," and that Skinner assigned the option to the Roxana Petroleum Corporation. It appeared, further, that said Roxana Petroleum Corporation never exercised the right it so acquired to purchase the leases, but, on the contrary, that by an instrument dated July 1, 1927, it released to appellee all right it acquired by the assignment from Skinner. There was evidence that after the owners of some of the tracts constituting the 5,691 acres hereinbefore referred to had leased same to appellees for the purposes specified they conveyed to said Skinner and to one Rouse a right to enter upon such tracts and explore for gas and oil by excavations and explosions thereon; and there was evidence that thereafter persons did enter upon such tracts and so explore for oil and gas. There was evidence that the right to so explore for gas and oil on land in Wood county had a market value of from 10 to 50 cents an acre. It seems the trial court was of the opinion it conclusively appeared appellant was liable to appellees in some sum, for he submitted to the jury only an issue as follows: "What, if any, was the resonable market value in the months of May and June, 1927, for the right and permission to explore and search for oil, gas and other minerals on the land described in plaintiffs' petition?" And the jury having answered that such right and permission had a market value, and that such value was $853.65, rendered judgment in appellees' favor against appellant for that amount.
Jones Jones, of Mineola, for appellant.
Britton Wherry, of Quitman, for appellees.
Appellant insists that the right conveyed to appellees "of mining and operating for oil and gas" on the land did not pass to them a right to resort to seismographs as a means of determining whether there was oil or gas thereon or not; and that, owning no right to resort to seismographs, appellees should not have been heard to complain because appellant resorted to them for such a purpose, if it did. We think a right to prospect for oil and gas was incidental to the right conveyed to appellees to mine and operate for same on the land, and are inclined to think that in prospecting for such minerals appellees had a right to resort to seismographs. But in disposing of the appeal we do not think it necessary to decide the question; for if appellees did not have such a right they had no cause to complain because appellant exercised such a right, if it did; and if appellees had such a right they were not deprived of it by any conduct attributed by them to appellant. The fact, if it was a fact, that appellant used seismographs in prospecting for oil and gas on the land did not deprive appellees of the right, if they had any, to also use seismographs for such a purpose. It appears in the record that, if injury resulted from the use of seismographs as charged by appellees, it was to the land, and that the right to recover damages therefor was in the owners of the land and not in appellees.
The judgment will be reversed, and judgment will be here rendered that appellees take nothing by their suit against appellant.