From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Shelby v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District
Dec 20, 1989
554 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

Summary

In Shelby v. State, 554 So.2d 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), the defendant pled nolo contendere after a remand for retrial. At sentencing, he sought a court award of credit for gain time earned while serving the sentences that were subsequently reversed.

Summary of this case from Walker v. State

Opinion

No. 89-01193.

December 20, 1989.

Appeal from the Circuit Court, Sarasota County, Lee E. Haworth, J.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and T. Orin Lee, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Brenda S. Taylor, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.


Following the reversal of appellant's convictions, see Shelby v. State, 541 So.2d 1219 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), and upon remand for retrial, appellant pleaded no contest to certain charges and was sentenced pursuant to a negotiated plea. Appellant, relying on State v. Green, 547 So.2d 925 (Fla. 1989), contends that the trial court erred in deciding that it did not have the authority to rule on whether he would receive credit for gain time previously earned while serving the sentences that were subsequently reversed. The state contends that awarding gain time is a matter that should be left to the Department of Corrections, not to the courts.

In Green, the supreme court held that trial courts have no authority to deny credit for gain time earned while previously incarcerated against a sentence imposed after revocation of probation, stating:

Further, as the district court noted, "[t]he awarding of statutory gain time is solely a function of the [department], and the trial court is without authority to prevent such award or order its waiver." Green [ v. State], 539 So.2d 484 at 485 [Fla. 1st DCA 1988]. The statute places in the hands of the department the ability to award, forfeit, or restore gain time. There is no statutory authority for the court to initiate the forfeiture of gain time by denying credit for accrued gain time at resentencing.

547 So.2d at 926-927.

In accordance with Green, appellant should be given credit for gain time earned while serving his previously-imposed sentence. The trial court's action is not inconsistent with Green, and indeed, is in compliance with that decision. The trial court neither granted nor denied credit for gain time earned. It determined correctly that it did not have the authority to rule on gain time. That function is with the Department of Corrections, which we are confident will award appellant the gain time he has earned.

Affirmed.

SCHEB, A.C.J., and LEHAN and PARKER, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Shelby v. State

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District
Dec 20, 1989
554 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

In Shelby v. State, 554 So.2d 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), the defendant pled nolo contendere after a remand for retrial. At sentencing, he sought a court award of credit for gain time earned while serving the sentences that were subsequently reversed.

Summary of this case from Walker v. State
Case details for

Shelby v. State

Case Details

Full title:JAMES D. SHELBY, APPELLANT, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Court:District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District

Date published: Dec 20, 1989

Citations

554 So. 2d 24 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

Citing Cases

Walker v. State

Otherwise, the court effects a forfeiture of gain time, an executive function of the Department of…

Rice v. State

That is the function of the Department of Corrections. See Shelby v. State, 554 So.2d 24 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).…