Shelby Twp. v. Boundary Comm

13 Citing cases

  1. Clam Lake Twp. & Haring Charter Twp. v. Dep't of Licensing

    500 Mich. 362 (Mich. 2017)   Cited 15 times

    MCL 117.9(2). Our opinion in Shelby Charter Twp. v. State Boundary Comm., 425 Mich. 50, 387 N.W.2d 792 (1986), does not, as Casco asserted, support a contrary conclusion. There we addressed MCL 42.34, which exempted charter townships from annexation if they met certain statutory criteria.

  2. Meridian Twp. v. Ingham Co Clerk

    285 Mich. App. 581 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 3 times

    In regard to annexations, in Midland Twp., 401 Mich. at 664, 259 N.W.2d 326, our Supreme Court stated that the " Legislature is free to change city, village and township boundaries at will," and, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in [285 Mich.App. 594] Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 28 S.Ct. 40, 52 L.Ed. 151 (1907), that the Legislature could constitutionally change such boundaries without an election. Our Supreme Court further explained in Shelby Charter Twp. v. State Boundary Comm., 425 Mich. 50, 56 n. 3, 387 N.W.2d 792 (1986): The fixing of municipal boundaries is generally considered to be a legislative function.

  3. Lansing v. Ingham Cnty. Clerk

    No. 363214 (Mich. Ct. App. Jul. 20, 2023)

    The purpose of MCL 42.34 is primarily to protect charter townships against annexation. Shelby Charter Twp v State Boundary Comm, 425 Mich. 50, 61-63; 387 N.W.2d 792 (1986).

  4. Charter Township of Bloomfield v. Oakland Co. Clerk

    253 Mich. App. 1 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 41 times
    In Bloomfield Charter Twp, supra, this panel affirmed the circuit court's refusal to enjoin the annexation election and the court's dismissal of the remaining counts of the township's complaint challenging the legality of the annexation petitions.

    Midland Twp v State Boundary Comm, 401 Mich. 641, 664; 259 N.W.2d 326 (1977); see also Rudolph Steiner School, supra at 736, 741. "`The fixing of municipal boundaries is generally considered to be a legislative function.'" Shelby Charter Twp v State Boundary Comm, 425 Mich. 50, 56, n 3; 387 N.W.2d 792 (1986) (citation omitted); see also Midland Twp, supra at 664-666. Moreover, the annexation referendum provisions within MCL 42.34(5) further a legitimate governmental interest and rationally relate to achieving the interest.

  5. Casco Township v. State Boundary Comm

    243 Mich. App. 392 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 7 times   1 Legal Analyses

    The commission would not otherwise have been able to perform its function of resolving the petition. See Shelby Charter Twp v. State Boundary Comm, 425 Mich. 50, 73-77; 387 N.W.2d 792 (1986) (the commission may proceed with an annexation petition where it has identified only "pro forma" or "de minimus" exercises of statutory measures that would otherwise supplant its jurisdiction); Judges of the 74th Judicial Dist v. Bay Co, 385 Mich. 710, 728-729; 190 N.W.2d 219 (1971) (an administrative agency is competent to determine its own jurisdiction). The commission's determination was thereafter subject to review in the circuit court. MCL 24.301; MSA 3.560(201), MCL 123.1018; MSA 5.2242(18); Rudolph Steiner School of Ann Arbor v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp, 237 Mich. App. 721, 731; 605 N.W.2d 18 (1999).

  6. Rudolph Steiner School v. Ann Arbor Charter Township

    237 Mich. App. 721 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 26 times

    MCL 123.1001 et seq.; MSA 5.2242(1) et seq. (the boundary commission act) created the State Boundary Commission in 1968 and granted the commission authority over annexations in 1970. Shelby Charter Twp v. State Boundary Comm, 425 Mich. 50, 58; 387 N.W.2d 792 (1986); 1970 PA 219; 1968 PA 191. Under the 1970 amendment of the boundary commission act giving the commission authority over annexations, MCL 117.9; MSA 5.2088 (§ 9 of the Home Rule Cities Act) became the exclusive means of annexing territory from a township to a home rule city.

  7. Ahearn v. Bloomfield Charter Township

    235 Mich. App. 486 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 29 times
    Concluding that just because a township has provided sanitary sewer service does not mean that it is under a continuing duty to do so

    If defendant sought to provide new sanitary sewers to an area within the township lacking sewer service, it could fund the project through special assessments. See Kadzban, supra at 500-501; see also Shelby Charter Twp v. State Boundary Comm, 425 Mich. 50, 80; 387 N.W.2d 792 (1986) (Levin, J., dissenting); Oakland Co Drain Comm'r v. City of Royal Oak, 325 Mich. 298, 313; 38 N.W.2d 413 (1949). Historically, this is how defendant has funded the original construction of local sanitary sewers throughout the township.

  8. Wyckoff v. Detroit

    233 Mich. App. 220 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 4 times

    Where a statute is ambiguous or susceptible to two or more constructions, judicial interpretation of the statute is warranted. Shelby Charter Twp v. State Boundary Comm, 425 Mich. 50, 72; 387 N.W.2d 792 (1986). The primary goal of judicial construction of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.

  9. Little Caesar v. Treasury Dep't

    226 Mich. App. 624 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 8 times

    Where a statute is ambiguous or susceptible to two or more constructions, the statute must be interpreted. Shelby Charter Twp v State Boundary Comm, 425 Mich. 50, 72; 387 N.W.2d 792 (1986). The primary goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.

  10. Stratton-Cheeseman v. Treas

    159 Mich. App. 719 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 13 times
    In Stratton-Cheeseman Management Co v. Dep't of Treasury, 159 Mich. App. 719, 721; 407 N.W.2d 398 (1987), the plaintiff corporation managed the Michigan Physicians Mutual Liability Company pursuant to a written agreement, which required Stratton-Cheeseman to issue policies, collect premiums, administer claims, and do a variety of other tasks.

    If a statute is ambiguous or susceptible to two or more constructions that could cause reasonable minds to disagree as to its meaning, the statute must be interpreted. Shelby Charter Twp v State Boundary Comm, 425 Mich. 50, 72; 387 N.W.2d 792 (1986). We find no ambiguity in the meaning of gross receipts as defined by the SBTA.