Opinion
9:22-cv-0519 (BKS/TWD)
01-23-2024
RONELL SHEFFIELD, Plaintiff, v. M. COOK, et al., Defendants.
APPEARANCES: RONELL SHEFFIELD Plaintiff, pro se OF COUNSEL: JESSICA A. ROUNDS, ESQ. GOLDBERG SEGALLA, LLP Attorneys for Defendants
APPEARANCES:
RONELL SHEFFIELD
Plaintiff, pro se
OF COUNSEL:
JESSICA A. ROUNDS, ESQ.
GOLDBERG SEGALLA, LLP
Attorneys for Defendants
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
THERESE WILEY DANCKS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter has been referred for a report and recommendation by the Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 72.3(c). Plaintiff Ronell Sheffield (“Plaintiff”), a prison inmate formerly held as a pretrial detainee at the Schenectady County Jail (“County Jail”), commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging, while he was held as a pretrial detainee, corrections officers deprived him of his civil rights. See Dkt. No. 1, Complaint.
Plaintiff's remaining claims are: (1) First Amendment retaliation and free exercise claims against Defendant Cook; and (2) Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Cook and Giuliano. Dkt. No. 4, Decision and Order, at 12. Currently before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Dkt. No. 16. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends Defendants' motion be granted in part and denied in part.
Citations to the parties' submissions will refer to the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court's electronic filing system.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was arrested by the City of Schenectady Police and entered the County Jail on February 17, 2022. See Dkt. No. 16-6, Booking Sheet. In a misbehavior report, Officer Steven Redmond noted Plaintiff “refused multiple direct orders to stand up to have proper restraints applied” to leave police court, was “argumentative[,]” made “threats towards officers[,]” and had to be restrained. Dkt. No. 16-5 at 2. Redmond reported Plaintiff was transported to the County Jail where “he refused all intake procedures[.]” Id.
Unless otherwise indicated, excerpts from the record are reproduced exactly as they appear in the original and errors in spelling, punctuation, and grammar have not been corrected.
Plaintiff was deposited in connection with this matter on March 20, 2023. See generally, Dkt. No. 16-4, Transcript of Plaintiff's Deposition. Plaintiff testified he received an inmate handbook when he entered the County Jail but refused to sign for it. Id. at 13. He changed from his street clothes into an orange jumpsuit “[s]omewhere down by booking.” Id. at 14-15. He further testified that when he first entered the jail:
The officer told me to hand over my clothes. I handed him my clothes. He told me put this on. I turned around. He told me turn around. Told me spread them. I did. And I asked them then, I said, excuse me, I'm Muslim, can I squat. And he said no, everybody got's to. All right.Id. at 16-17. Plaintiff confirmed he asked “to squat rather than spread” his buttocks but the officer informed him “[e]verybody got to bend over and spread them.” Id. at 17.
But see Dkt. No. 16-4 at 39 (Plaintiff testified, when he arrived at the facility, staff “took me right up[stairs] . . . I never went through the screening that everybody else goes through . . . When I first got to the jail, they took me right upstairs. After changing my clothes, they took me upstairs and had me on one-on-one watch.”).
Plaintiff testified one officer and one sergeant were present for the strip search. Dkt. No. 16-4 at 18-19. Following the search, he was escorted upstairs to the “D block.” Id. at 19. Officer Redmond confirmed Plaintiff was taken to “D-27” and placed in administrative segregation “per Covid protocol[.]” Dkt. No. 16-5 at 2-3.
On February 19, 2022, Corrections Officer Paul Longi was serving as the constant watch officer for the County Jail D block. Dkt. No. 16-17, Longi Affidavit, at 2. According to Longi, “[a]t approximately 1535 hours . . . [Plaintiff] reported to me that he had ingested a heroin balloon and was concerned that it had opened in his stomach” and “started exhibiting violent behavior while in his cell which included kicking the walls.” Id. at 2-3. Accordingly, Longi notified the floor Sergeant, Michael Cook. Id. at 3.
Sergeant Cook and Officers Longi and Defendant Joseph Giuliano affirmed “[t]he suspected contraband plaintiff reported being in possession of created a concern for the safety of both the inmate and the jail making the search of plaintiff reasonably necessary.” Dkt. No. 16-17 at 3; Dkt. No. 16-18 at 4; Dkt. No. 16-19 at 4. Plaintiff acknowledged in his complaint officers expressed their intent to perform a search based on the belief he had ingested/possessed contraband. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1 at 7 (“[Defendants] brought plaintiff to booking in order to perform an X-ray body scan for suspected contraband. After passing the body scan x-ray process plaintiff was ordered to a strip frisk/search of body and rectal area.”). In his deposition, however, Plaintiff denied reporting he had ingested heroin. Dkt. No. 16-4 at 19-20.
See also Dkt. No. 24 at 13-14 (arguing “the Defendants' strip search of the Plaintiff who is/was at all times a pre-trial detainee Muslim that never claimed to be in possession of heroin, (or any drugs for that matter), was clearly unreasonable and [violated] Plaintiff's constitutional rights[.]”).
Sergeant Cook affirmed he learned Plaintiff had “reported he was in possession of a heroin balloon[,]” therefore, Cook “immediately” responded to the “D block where [Plaintiff] was being housed . . . with Officers Mark Nerney and Joseph Giuliano[.]” Dkt. No. 16-19, Cook Affidavit, at 2-3. Both Sergeant Cook and Officer Giuliano affirmed Plaintiff initially refused Cook's orders to place his hands behind his back but “ultimately complied” and was escorted “to the changeover room in booking.” See id. at 3; see also Dkt. No. 16-18, Giuliano Affidavit, at 3.
Plaintiff faced the wall and Officer Nerney removed his handcuffs. Dkt. No. 16-18 at 3. Sergeant Cook advised him “[they] would be performing a strip search of his person for contraband.” Dkt. No. 16-19 at 3. Plaintiff removed his clothing and Officers Nerney and Giuliano began performing the search. Id.; Dkt. No. 16-18 at 3. Defendants Cook and Giuliano affirmed Plaintiff refused to comply with the strip search procedure. Dkt. No. 16-19 at 3 (“[Plaintiff] refused to comply with multiple orders to bend over at the waist and spread his buttocks so that staff could check for the heroin balloon he reported ingesting.”); Dkt. No. 16-18 at 3 (“[Plaintiff] did not comply with the strip search procedure and refused to bend and spread his buttocks after removing his clothing.”).
Defendants Cook and Giuliano reported Plaintiff turned around and “became irate.” Dkt. No. 16-19 at 3 (“[Plaintiff] turned off the wall towards staff in an aggressive manner and became irate.”); Dkt. No. 16-18 at 3 (“[Plaintiff] became irate . . . and turned off the wall in [Giuliano's] direction in a menacing and aggressive manner.”). Sergeant Cook deployed OC/pepper spray. Dkt. No. 16-19 at 3 (“Due to the perceived threat of violence as exhibited by [Plaintiff]'s conduct towards staff, I deployed a one second burst of OC spray.”); Dkt. No. 16-18 at 3 (“Sergeant Cook deployed OC spray to gain compliance and subdue [Plaintiff].”). Officer Giuliano affirmed he and “Officer Nerney . . . attempted to place [Plaintiff] back on the wall and put handcuffs on him.” Dkt. No. 16-18 at 3. Plaintiff was ordered to face the wall and place his hands behind his back but refused. Dkt. No. 16-19 at 3 (“[He] continued to refuse orders from staff. He refused to turn around and face the wall as instructed.”); Dkt. No. 16-18 at 3 (“[He] continued to resist and refused to place his hands behind his back.”).
Plaintiff “was brought to the ground” and Sergeant Cook called “a Code 3” over the County Jail radio. Dkt. No. 16-19 at 3; Dkt. No. 16-18 at 3. Defendants Cook and Giuliano affirmed Plaintiff continued to resist and refuse orders on the ground. Dkt. No. 16-19 at 4 (“[He] continued to resist and refused to allow staff to handcuff him while on the ground.”); Dkt. No. 16-18 at 3 (“[He] continued to refuse orders to stop resisting and place his hands behind his back.”). With the assistance of jail staff, Plaintiff was placed in handcuffs and escorted from the changeover room to the birdcage area. Dkt. No. 16-19 at 4; Dkt. No. 16-18 at 3. He was placed in a restraint chair where he was decontaminated and examined by RN Choquette. Dkt. No. 1619 at 4; Dkt. No. 16-18 at 3-4.
Plaintiff testified he was in his cell when “officers come in the room, drag me out, took me downstairs to booking and told me to strip.” Dkt. No. 16-4 at 20. He inquired: “strip for what?” and an officer responded another “officer said he seen you doing something . . . fumbling in your clothes and all that” then Plaintiff “said, what are you talking about.” Id. He was instructed to strip and complied, but “asked the officer . . . yo, can I squat?” Id. Continuing, Plaintiff testified the officer said “you don't tell us what to do here. And [then] they jumped on me, sprayed me, broke my ribs.” Id.
In a subsequent portion of his deposition, Plaintiff asserted that as he turned his clothes over to an officer, he “did everything [the officer] told me to do. When he asked me to bend over and spread em, I asked, I said, excuse me, can I squat. I'm Muslim. He said, you don't tell us what to do. And from there, they just jumped on me.” Dkt. No. 16-4 at 45. Plaintiff also stated he “asked the officer can I squat because there is more than one officer. They never took me to a strip room. They took me right there in booking next to the cage.” Id. at 17.
Plaintiff stated he was sprayed with OC spray both while he was standing with his hands on the wall and as he was taken to the ground by jail staff. Dkt. No. 16-4 at 32, 37. He was not warned OC spray would be discharged and was not even aware of Defendant Cook's possession of a chemical agent. Id. at 47. The OC spray was discharged into the back of his head, all in his hair, and all in his face. Id. at 37.
Plaintiff testified “[he] was handcuffed and dragged down to booking . . . [by t]wo officers and a sergeant.” Dkt. No. 16-4 at 23. He identified Sergeant Cook as one of the staff members who dragged him down to booking. Id. at 29. He further stated Defendant Cook sprayed him with the OC spray. Id. This was not the only force Defendant Cook used on him. Id. at 35. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Cook “started putting hands on me after he sprayed me, he helped the officers. They started beating me up.” Id. at 31.
Plaintiff testified Defendant Giuliano was “one of the officers that was stripping me . . . [and] the one that assaulted me first.” Dkt. No. 16-4 at 34; see also Dkt. No. 16-4 at 32 (The first person to lay hands on him was not Sergeant Cook but “[t]he officers that was stripping me.”).
Plaintiff further stated that Defendant Giuliano assaulted him “[b]y grabbing my head and . . . punching on me. He's the one that took me to the ground.” Id. at 34.
Plaintiff “felt multiple hands on me” therefore was unable “to say exactly where” the Defendants hit him. Dkt. No. 16-4 at 30. He could not identify which officer broke his ribs. Id. at 34. However, he “doubt[ed]” anyone other than Cook or Giuliano broke his ribs. Id. at 37.
Plaintiff recalled a code was called and eleven or twelve officers responded to the area. Dkt. No. 16-4 at 35. “After they finished beating me up, they put me in a . . . restraining chair” and fastened straps around his extremities. Id. at 31. “[T]he first thing that [an officer] told me was . . . this is not Coxsackie.” Id. Plaintiff explained his records would have revealed he had previously “assaulted an officer at Coxsackie.” Id.
Defendant Giuliano issued a misbehavior report pertaining to Plaintiff following the incident. See Dkt. No. 16-8, Misbehavior Report. Giuliano reported at approximately 15:50 on February 19, 2022, he:
[W]as strip searching the above listed inmate for possible contraband. I ordered inmate to bend and spread his buttocks. Inmate refused and turned towards this officer and became argumentative. Sgt Cook ordered inmate to turn around and inmate refused. Inmate was OC sprayed and a code 3 was called. Inmate resisted while being placed in handcuffs. Inmate was then placed in the restraint chair.Id. at 2. Defendant Cook completed a chemical agent report about Plaintiff wherein he reported:
Inmate Sheffield was in the process of being strip searched when he began to refuse orders from staff. Inmate Sheffield became non-compliant with my orders to continue the strip search. At this time, I deployed a 1, One Second burst of OC spray to Inmate Sheffield'[s] Facial area to gain compliance. Inmate Sheffield continued to refuse orders from staff to get on the ground and a Code 3 was called.Dkt. No. 16-10, Chemical Agent Report, at 2; see also Dkt. No. 16-15, Use of Force Report, at 2 (indicating a chemical agent was displayed and used/deployed). Julie Choquette, RN, reported Plaintiff was decontaminated. Dkt. No. 16-8 at 10.
In an emergency room referral document, Margaret Jackson, LPN, noted: “Patient reports he swallowed a balloon filled with heroin, amount unknown.” Dkt. No. 17, Medical Records, at 11. Modupe R. Adedoja, NP, noted he received a report from Ellis ER staff who “Gave report about p[atien]t sent to ER due to CP and swallowing of Heroin[]. Chest X-ray shows P[atien]t has a Rt Lat non-displaced Rib fracture but no breathing difficulty at this time.” Id. at 14. NP Adedoja further reported a “Plain Abdominal X-ray done due to hx of Ingestion of heroin[] in a ballon [sic][;]” the result was “[n]egative[;]” and the “P[atien]t claimed he believed he might have passed it in his stool because he saw a balloon in his stool[.]” Id.
The referral was electronically signed “on 02/19/2022 at 4:49 PM[.]” Dkt. No. 17 at 11.
The note was electronically signed “on 02/19/2022 at 10:11 PM[.]” Dkt. No. 17 at 14.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is warranted if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-52 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Salahuddin v. Gourd, 467 F.3d 263, 272-73 (2d Cir. 2006). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and is genuinely in dispute “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553 (2d Cir. 2005). The movant may meet this burden by showing the nonmoving party has “fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
If the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party must move forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 273. In that context, the nonmoving party must do more than “simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). “Conclusory allegations, conjecture and speculation . . . are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact.” Kerzer v. Kingly Mfg., 156 F.3d 396, 400 (2d Cir. 1998).
The Second Circuit instructs that on summary judgment motions, “‘[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.'” Jeffreys, 426 F.3d at 554 (alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). In other words, “a nonmoving party must offer some hard evidence showing that [his] version of the events is not wholly fanciful.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, statements “that are devoid of any specifics, but replete with conclusions, are insufficient to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 452 (2d Cir. 1999).
In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the moving party. Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 309 (2d Cir. 2008). Where a party is proceeding pro se, the court is obligated to “read [the pro se party's] supporting papers liberally, and . . . interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994). However, that status “does not relieve [a pro se] plaintiff of his duty to meet the requirements necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment.” Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In applying the summary judgment standard, the district court should not weigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Hayes v. New York City Dep't of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 619 (2d Cir. 1996); Rule v. Brine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Assessments of credibility and choices between conflicting versions of the events are matters for the jury, not for the court on summary judgment.”).
IV. DISCUSSION
A. First Amendment Retaliation Claim Against Defendant Cook
“To sustain a First Amendment retaliation claim, [Plaintiff] must demonstrate . . . (1) that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected [act] and the adverse action.” Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 380 (2d Cir. 2004) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Plaintiff has failed to meet the first prong of the retaliation inquiry because he has failed to demonstrate he was engaged in protected speech or conduct. See Dkt. No. 1 at 7; Dkt. No. 24 at 16. Plaintiff has not alleged his statement or action in refusing to comply with officers' directives to submit to a body search/frisk amounted to protected conduct under the First Amendment. In any event, such an argument would be unpersuasive as refusal to obey an officer's directive does not constitute a protected act for First Amendment purposes. Storms v. Harriman, No. 9:05-CV-1115, 2009 WL 2424131, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2009) (finding “nothing in the record from which a reasonable factfinder could determine that the issuance . . . of misbehavior reports to the plaintiff was in retaliation for his having engaged in protected activity, as distinct from his refusal to obey legitimate directives by prison officials” and recommending dismissal of plaintiff's retaliation cause of action) (emphasis added), aff'd, 391 Fed.Appx. 107 (2d Cir. 2010).
Nor has Plaintiff established a causal connection between any protected speech or conduct and Defendant Cook's alleged adverse action(s). See Cato v. Feliz, No. 9:20-CV-0176 (MAD/DJS), 2022 WL 687253, at *5-6 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2022) (recommending granting summary judgment motion as to the plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim where the plaintiff “failed to establish a causal connection between any protected activity and the allegedly adverse action taken as a result.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 574972 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2022). On the contrary, in his deposition, Plaintiff asserted the Defendants' execution of a strip search and subsequent “assault” were “premediated” due to Plaintiff's prior assault of another officer. See Dkt. No. 16-4 at 54 (“when I asked the question can I squat . . . I'm Muslim. They said, you don't tell us what to do. You do what you're told. And they was already on me. So I know that's why . . . I know that this was premediated.”); see also Dkt. No. 16-4 at 31 (Plaintiff testified “[a]fter they finished beating me up, they put me in a chair” and Cook told Plaintiff “this is not Coxsackie. Because if you look on my record, I know they looked on the records. The first thing they said was, oh, you assaulted an officer at Coxsackie.”); Dkt. No. 16-4 at 59 (Plaintiff admitting he was convicted of charges involving the assault of an officer in Coxsackie and explaining officers in Schenectady were aware of his conviction).
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute as to his engagement in a protected act or any connection between his conduct and Defendant Cook's alleged actions. Because there is not sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude Cook retaliated against Plaintiff, the Court recommends granting summary judgment as to Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim.
The Court need not address Defendant Cook's alternative qualified immunity argument as the undersigned recommends granting Defendant's motion on the merits with respect to Plaintiff's retaliation claim. See Warren v. Corcoran, No. 9:09-CV-1146 (DNH/ATB), 2011 WL 5599587, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 2011) (“This court need not address qualified immunity with respect to [the] plaintiff's various causes of action because . . . he has not established any alleged violations of his constitutional rights.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 5599620 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2011).
B. First Amendment Free Exercise Claim Against Defendant Cook
In assessing Plaintiff's free exercise claim, this Court must assess: “(1) whether the practice asserted is religious in the person's scheme of beliefs, and whether the belief is sincerely held; (2) whether the challenged practice of the prison officials infringes upon the religious belief; and (3) whether the challenged practice of the prison officials furthers . . . legitimate penological objectives.” Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 128 (2d Cir. 2023) (citing Farid v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917, 926 (2d Cir. 1988)) (internal quotations omitted).
Previously, to succeed on a claim under the Free Exercise Clause, prisoners were required to “show at the threshold that the disputed conduct substantially burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs.” Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 274-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). However, in Kravitz, the Second Circuit “join[ed] those circuits that have held that an inmate does not need to establish a substantial burden in order to prevail on a free exercise claim under § 1983.” 87 F.4th at 125 (citing Williams v. Morton, 343 F.3d 212, 217 (3d Cir. 2003); Butts v. Martin, 877 F.3d 571, 585 (5th Cir. 2017); Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 885 (9th Cir. 2008)).
Plaintiff has failed to explain any sincerely held belief he has in the Muslim religion. In his complaint, Plaintiff merely stated he asked to squat rather than bend at the waist “because plaintiff is a muslim and due to . . . several John Doe officers present in the strip search area [which] was a violation of plaintiff[']s privacy, and religious rights.” Dkt. No. 1 at 7. In his response to the Defendants' motion, Plaintiff reiterated his assertion he “asked to squat privately in lieu of bending over and spreading his buttocks ‘in front of multiple officers' due to being a Muslim pre-trial detainee.” Dkt. No. 24 at 14 (citations omitted). Plaintiff added “[his] ‘interest in observing Islam's nudity taboo' outweighs the Defendants' interest in ensuring the safety of the jail and its occupants when other means are available to determine if Plaintiff is [a]ctually in possession of any suspected drugs.” Id. (citations omitted). However, neither Plaintiff's claims he told an officer he was Muslim nor his passing mentions of the presence of multiple officers and “Islam's nudity taboo” identify a religious practice in his scheme of beliefs.
Similarly, in his deposition, Plaintiff testified he asked officers to let him squat rather than bend because he is Muslim. See Dkt. No. 16-4 at 16-17 (when he first entered the County Jail, Plaintiff “said, excuse me, I'm Muslim, can I squat” when asked to “spread them”); 45 (on February 19, 2022, “[w]hen [the officer] asked me to bend over and spread em, I asked, I said, excuse me, can I squat. I'm Muslim.”); 54 (“It wasn't no, no, you can't squat. And then I turn around. And then, and show my, no. Soon when I asked the question can I squat, I said, can I squat. I'm Muslim. They said, you don't tell us what to do.”). However, Plaintiff agreed he did not tell the County Jail staff performing the strip search “the relevance” of his “being a Muslim[.]” Dkt. No. 16-4 at 56-57. Nor did Plaintiff explain, in his deposition, the relevance of his claimed beliefs to the performance of a strip search. See id. Additionally, Plaintiff admitted he did not request meal, prayer, or any other accommodations based on his religion upon his admission to the facility. Id. at 45.
In this portion of his deposition, Plaintiff was asked the following questions and provided the following answers:
Q. Did you ever refuse a direct order while you were in the booking room at the time of the incident?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. And when you were asked to bend, did you tell them it was because you were a Muslim?
A. I asked them can I squat. I said, can I squat. I'm Muslim. And they said, you don't tell us what to do and they jumped on me.
Q. Did you ever tell them what the relevance was about being a Muslim?
A. I didn't have a chance to. I told you, soon as I said what I said, they jumped on me.Dkt. No. 16-4 at 56-57.
Because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate he has a sincerely held religious belief, no reasonable jury could return a verdict in Plaintiff's favor on his free exercise claim. See, e.g., Joseph v. Cnty. of Nassau, No. 2:18-CV-2290, 2022 WL 4647867, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2022) (noting the plaintiff's failure to “actually articulate what his religious beliefs are, whether he is Muslim, or whether the [requested] services ‘were central or important to [his] faith' . . . constitute[d] an independent ground on which to dismiss Plaintiff's free-exercise-of-religion claim.”) (citing Lopez v. Cipolini, 136 F.Supp.3d 570, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)).
Even assuming Plaintiff had enumerated a sincerely held religious belief, however, Plaintiff has not explained how Defendant Cook's performance of a strip search infringed upon his belief(s). Dkt. No. 1 at 7; Dkt. No. 24 at 14-15. In his deposition, Plaintiff did not articulate how the execution of a strip search infringed upon his beliefs, on the contrary, he solely identified the Defendants' use of force as his “complaint” in this matter. See Dkt. No. 16-4 at 27. Plaintiff insisted, on February 19, 2022, had the officers simply “told me no . . . you can't squat, you have to bend,” he “would have just spread them and went about my business.” Id. at 48. Indeed, as Plaintiff testified, he bent over and spread his buttocks without issue when he first arrived at the County Jail on February 17, just two days prior. Dkt. No. 16-4 at 16-17 (“Told me spread them. I did . . . I said, excuse me, I'm Muslim, can I squat. And he said no, everybody got's to. All right.”). Moreover, Plaintiff stated he regularly participated in strip frisk procedures throughout his time at the County Jail and had also done so while incarcerated in state prison, during which he would bend as instructed. See id. at 45-47.
Specifically, Plaintiff was asked and answered:
Q. Is that your complaint . . . that other officers were in the room that it wasn't one-on-one?
A. It wasn't one-on-one. That's why I asked them, can I squat. He said, you don't tell us what to do and jumped on me. That's my complaint. My complaint is that they broke my ribs and it was uncalled for.
Q. Was your complaint that there were multiple officers in the room and they didn't allow you to squat or just that there were multiple officers in the room?
A. No. My complaint is that they broke my ribs, that I was assaulted. That's my complaint.Dkt. No. 16-4 at 27 (emphasis added).
In his deposition, Plaintiff was asked and answered questions as follows:
Q. The entire time that you've been at the jail, the year, you've been stripped, you've been strip frisked other times?
A. Yes. Going to visits.
Q. And all those times you have to bend, right, not squat?
A. Yes.
***
Q. And when you were in State prison, you also had to bend not squat?
A. Yes. Like I said, in State prison, you one-on-one behind the curtain, not out in the open, not where they have a thousand cameras at. Not when you got five and six officers standing in back of you. It's a one-on-one strip search.Dkt. No. 16-4 at 45-47. To be sure, while Plaintiff repeatedly suggested four to six County Jail staff members were present as Defendants conducted the strip search, “[c]ase law reflects that the constitutionality of a strip search is not negated by the presence of other inmates and employees of the facility . . . during the search.” Montgomery v. Hall, No. 1:11-CV-4645, 2013 WL 1982920, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2013) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 3816706 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2013).
In sum, Plaintiff has not shown Defendant Cook's practice of requiring him to remove his clothing, bend at the waist, and spread his buttocks infringed upon a sincerely held religious belief of his. Because of this deficiency, dismissal of Plaintiff's free exercise claim is warranted. See, e.g., McQuilkin v. Cent. New York Psychiatric Ctr., No. 9:08-CV-00975 (TJM/DEP), 2010 WL 3765847, at *13 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2010) (recommending dismissal on “any cause of action deemed to assert a First Amendment freedom of religion violation” where the plaintiff's complaint and response to the defendant's motion for summary judgment did not “explain how the forced administration of psychiatric medications infringe[d] upon his sincerely held religious beliefs.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3765715 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010).
Furthermore, “[s]trip searches of pre-trial detainees . . . are constitutionally valid if they are reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” LaFever v. Clarke, 525 F.Supp.3d 305, 337-38 (N.D.N.Y. 2021) (dismissing the plaintiff's claim “she was subjected to an ‘unlawful' strip search” where the defendants “offered a legitimate penological interest for conducting the search; i.e., to determine whether [plaintiff] possessed . . . contraband.”) (citing Perez v. Ponte, 236 F.Supp.3d 590, 622-23 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)); see also Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 322-28 (2012) (observing “[c]orrectional officials have a legitimate interest, indeed a responsibility, to ensure that jails are not made less secure by reason of what new detainees may carry in on their bodies.”). As Defendant Cook affirmed, he “was notified by . . . Longi that [Plaintiff] . . . reported he was in possession of a heroin balloon”- Dkt. No. 16-19 at 2 -which “created a concern for the safety of both [Plaintiff] and the jail[.]” Dkt. No. 16-19 at 4. Therefore, even if Plaintiff had properly alleged the strip search infringed upon a sincerely held religious belief, Plaintiff's reported ingestion of a balloon containing heroin justified the performance of a search in an effort to discover contraband on Plaintiff's person. See, e.g., Jones v. City of New York, No. 1:18-CV-1937, 2020 WL 1644009, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2020) (a strip search that infringes on a prisoner's freedom of religion can survive First Amendment scrutiny where the search is rationally related to a legitimate penological interest) (citing Jean-Laurent v. Wilkerson, 438 F.Supp.2d 318, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd, 461 Fed.Appx. 18 (2d Cir. 2012)); see also Florence, 566 U.S. at 328 (“courts should ordinarily defer to the[] expert judgment” of correctional officials “in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to” security issues such as the possession of contraband) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Accordingly, the Court recommends granting summary judgment as to Plaintiff's First Amendment free exercise claim.
In light of the undersigned's recommendation to grant Defendant Cook's motion on the merits with respect to this claim, the Court need not address the alternative qualified immunity argument.
C. Fourteenth Amendment Excessive Force Claims Against Defendants Cook and Giuliano
“[T]he right of pretrial detainees to be free from excessive force amounting to punishment is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment[.]” United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). To succeed on a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim, “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015).
Accordingly, a plaintiff must first show the defendant used force “purposefully, knowingly, or (perhaps) recklessly[.]” Edrei v. Maguire, 892 F.3d 525, 534 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 395-96). Then, the plaintiff must demonstrate the force used was objectively unreasonable in light of:
[T]he relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)). These considerations are “not . . . exclusive[,]” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397, but rather “inform the ultimate Fourteenth Amendment inquiry: whether the governmental action was rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective.” Edrei, 892 F.3d 536 (citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 398).
Plaintiff's Complaint asserts Defendant Cook's use of a chemical agent and the alleged assault by Defendants Cook and Giuliano violated the Fourteenth Amendment's prescription against the use of excessive force. See Dkt. No. 1; see also Dkt. No. 24 at 17-18. Defendants contend their “response to plaintiff's combative, aggressive and threatening behavior when being searched was [] legal, reasonable and warranted as it was at all times proportionate and intended to keep order.” Dkt. No. 16-22 at 22. Therefore, Defendants aver they are entitled to summary judgment on the merits and on the basis of qualified immunity. See id. at 11-15, 21-23.
“Because whether a use of force was objectively unreasonable is a fact-intensive inquiry that often involves assessments of credibility and choices between conflicting versions of events-questions that must often be left for a jury to decide-granting summary judgment against plaintiffs on excessive force claims is rarely appropriate.” Vega v. Broome Cnty., No. 9:21-CV-0788 (BKS/DJS), 2023 WL 6318919, at *19 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2023) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Here, several issues of fact exist concerning the need for the use of force, the amount of force used, the threat perceived by the Defendants, and Plaintiff's resistance and injuries, all of which are relevant to the reasonableness of force used and preclude summary judgment.
For example, Plaintiff insists he complied with the strip search procedures until he was asked to bend, and merely inquired whether he could squat instead in response, while Defendants assert Plaintiff refused to comply and became irate and aggressive. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 16-4 at 20; Dkt. No. 16-19 at 3; Dkt. No. 16-18 at 6. Plaintiff maintains he faced the wall, moving only when so instructed, but Defendants contend Plaintiff turned towards them. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 16-4 at 27-28; Dkt. No. 16-19 at 3; Dkt. No. 16-18 at 6. Defendant Cook stated Plaintiff refused to comply with multiple orders to bend, but Plaintiff testified he was instructed to spread his buttocks once and “[as] soon as” Plaintiff asked whether he could squat, officers “jumped on” him. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 16-19 at 3; Dkt. No. 16-4 at 26. Defendants assert Plaintiff was brought to the ground and a one second burst of OC spray was deployed while Plaintiff contends he was sprayed with a chemical agent both as he was brought to the ground and then as he was repeatedly punched. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 16-19 at 3; Dkt. No. 16-18 at 3; Dkt. No. 16-4 at 34-37.
In sum, granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment would be inappropriate due to the parties' conflicting recitations of materials facts. Jordan v. Fischer, 773 F.Supp.2d 255, 272-73 (N.D.N.Y. 2011) (collecting cases in support of the proposition that granting summary judgment for the defendants on a plaintiff's excessive force claim is not appropriate where the claim turns on issues of credibility). Summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is similarly inappropriate due to the remaining material factual disputes concerning the reasonableness of Defendants' use of force. Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 240 (2d Cir. 2001) (“summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is not appropriate when there are facts in dispute that are material to a determination of reasonableness.”) (citation omitted); see also Smith v. Sawyer, 435 F.Supp.3d 417, 435 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (collecting cases); Myers v. Saxton, No. 9:20-CV-0465 (BKS/DJS), 2023 WL 2863569, at *4 n.3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2023) (explaining “[t]he same questions of fact that preclude summary judgment on the merits of the excessive force claim preclude summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2568912 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2023). Accordingly, the Court recommends denying summary judgment as to Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claims.
V. CONCLUSION
After carefully reviewing the record, the parties' submissions, and the applicable law, and for the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 16) be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation and free exercise claims against Defendant Cook be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Cook and Giuliano proceed to trial; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide to Plaintiff a copy of this Report-Recommendation and Order, along with copies of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14) days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW . Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72.
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Report-Recommendation and Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Report-Recommendation and Order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a)(1)(C).
IT IS SO ORDERED.