Sheffield v. Begeman

5 Citing cases

  1. In re Gonzales

    619 S.W.3d 259 (Tex. 2021)   Cited 16 times

    ; In re Echols , 569 S.W.3d 776, 780–81, 783 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (citing and agreeing with the First Court of Appeals in Unitec ); Phi Van Cao v. Hardy , 352 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (agreeing with Unitec and "finding subsection (j) to be uniquely applicable to unknown third parties"); Arango v. Davila , No. 13-09-00470-CV, 2011 WL 1900189, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg May 19, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing and agreeing with Unitec ), disapproved of on other grounds byHaygood v. De Escabedo , 356 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. 2011) ; Sheffield v. Begeman , 274 S.W.3d 846,850 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet. denied) (explaining that the "legislature clearly distinguished between known and unknown potential third parties" given that section 33.004(j) applies when the third party's identity is unknown); Figueroa , 2007 WL 2127168, at *2 (stating that "the sole avenue for designating unknown third parties is set forth in [section] 33.004(j)" and to read "the time limits set forth in subsection (a) to apply to both named and unknown third parties-would render subsection (j) superfluous"). Contrasting subsection (j) with subsections (f) and (g) confirms this construction.

  2. In re Windstar Trucking, LLC

    657 S.W.3d 474 (Tex. App. 2022)   Cited 5 times
    Comparing § 33.004 and § 33.004(j)

    And for unknown persons, certain allegations must be in the answer. Sheffield v. Begeman , 274 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Tex.App.--Eastland 2008, pet. denied) ("If the third party's identity is unknown, Section 33.004(j) unambiguously requires the defendant to also timely include a specific allegation in its answer.

  3. Lewis v. Ally Fin. Inc.

    No. 11-12-00290-CV (Tex. App. Dec. 4, 2014)   Cited 3 times
    In Lewis v. Ally Fin. Inc., No. 11-12-00290-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 13004, at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Dec. 4, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.), the court held that the appellant's attempt to recuse two judges in the trial court was waived for failure to follow procedure in filing motions to recuse.

    For traditional summary judgment motions, questions of law are reviewed de novo. Sheffield v. Begeman, 274 S.W.3d 846, 848 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2008, pet. denied). To determine if a fact question exists, we must consider whether reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions in light of all the evidence presented.

  4. Valverde v. Biela's Glass Aluminum

    293 S.W.3d 751 (Tex. App. 2009)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that designation becomes effective upon trial court's granting of motion for leave

    We held that the clear language of the statute unambiguously requires that a motion be filed. Id.; see also Sheffield v. Begeman, 274 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2008, pet. filed). Further, we held that the plain language of the statute requires the trial court to take action by granting the motion.

  5. Ruiz v. Guerra

    293 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. App. 2009)   Cited 23 times
    Noting there was no evidence decedent was conscious after vehicles came to stop

    The motion must be filed on or before the 60th day before the trial date unless the court finds good cause to allow the motion to be filed at a later date." Id. (emphasis added); see also Sheffield v. Begeman, 274 S.W.3d 846, 850 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2008, pet. filed) (holding that when third party's identity is known, section 33.004(a) unambiguously requires defendant to file a timely motion for leave to designate responsible third party). It is undisputed that Sterling did not file a motion for leave to designate Ruiz and G.E.M. as responsible third parties as required by the statute.