See Steel Co. v. Morgan Marshall Indus., Inc., 278 Ill.App.3d 241, 250–252, 214 Ill.Dec. 1029, 662 N.E.2d 595 (1996) (although no dispute that art. 9 of Uniform Commercial Code was complied with, genuine issue of material fact remained whether transfers made with actual intent to defraud). Cf. Sheffield Progressive, Inc. v. Kingston Tool Co., 10 Mass.App.Ct. 47, 50, 405 N.E.2d 985 (1980), quoting 1B Coogan, Hogan, & Vagts, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 13.07(1), at 1381 (1980) (“Clearly, article 9 does not replace the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act”). Cases decided before the enactment of the UFTA in Massachusetts have stated that when a debtor has paid one creditor over another, even when the payment comprised substantially all of the debtor's assets, this fact by itself is insufficient to establish an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.