8. It is equally self-evident that a collusive foreclosure sale may be set aside as involving a fraudulent transfer (BFP v. RTC, 511 U.S. 531, 545, 114 S.Ct. 1757, 128 L.Ed.2d 556 (1994)) (interpreting the Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent transfer provision, 11 U.S.C. § 548, which is comparable to UFTA § 4); Garrett v. Walker (In re Garrett, 172 B.R. 29, 30 (Bankr.E.D.Ark. 1994); Bennett v. Genoa Ag Ctr., Inc. (In re Bennett), 154 B.R. 140, 147 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y. 1992); Consumers Credit Union v. Widett (In re Health Gourmet, Inc.), 29 B.R. 673, 676 (Bankr.D.Mass. 1983); Sheffield Progressive, Inc. v. Kingston Tool Co., 10 Mass. App. Ct. 47, 405 N.E.2d 985, 987 (1980); accord, analysis in United States v. Shepherd, 834 F. Supp. 175 (N.D.Tex. 1993), though that decision was later reversed for lack of federal jurisdiction to overturn a state forfeiture, 23 F.3d 923 (5th Cir. 1994)). 9. It must be held here, and this Court concludes, that the transfers at issue involved a collusive foreclosure sale.

See Steel Co. v. Morgan Marshall Indus., Inc., 278 Ill.App.3d 241, 250–252, 214 Ill.Dec. 1029, 662 N.E.2d 595 (1996) (although no dispute that art. 9 of Uniform Commercial Code was complied with, genuine issue of material fact remained whether transfers made with actual intent to defraud). Cf. Sheffield Progressive, Inc. v. Kingston Tool Co., 10 Mass.App.Ct. 47, 50, 405 N.E.2d 985 (1980), quoting 1B Coogan, Hogan, & Vagts, Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 13.07(1), at 1381 (1980) (“Clearly, article 9 does not replace the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act”). Cases decided before the enactment of the UFTA in Massachusetts have stated that when a debtor has paid one creditor over another, even when the payment comprised substantially all of the debtor's assets, this fact by itself is insufficient to establish an intent to hinder, delay, or defraud.