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Sheena J. v. Mari K.

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Jan 28, 2020
A154952 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2020)

Opinion

A154952

01-28-2020

SHEENA J., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MARI K., Defendant and Appellant.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. AF14729384)

Mari K. appeals from a modification of a custody and visitation order, authorizing her former wife, Sheena J., to relocate with their son, Z.K.J., to Florida. Mari asserts the family court abused its discretion and deprived Mari of a fair custody trial by: (1) denying her request to continue trial, (2) excluding witness testimony, (3) restricting her cross-examination of the court-appointed custody evaluator, and (4) limiting the time for her to present her case-in-chief. Mari further contends the family court erred in denying her motion for a new trial, which presented those same claims of error. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Family History

In 2012, Sheena gave birth to Z.K.J. Sheena and Mari married in 2013, but legally separated after several months and divorced in 2015. The stipulated judgment of dissolution named Mari as Z.K.J.'s other parent and gave Mari and Sheena joint and legal physical custody of Z.K.J. Z.K.J. would be with Mari every Tuesday from morning to afternoon and alternating between Wednesday through Saturday one week, and Thursday through Saturday the following week. Z.K.J. would be with Sheena all other remaining times. In early 2016, Sheena offered Mari a fifty-fifty custody timeshare schedule. Mari agreed, and the parents shared Z.K.J. equally for approximately the next six months.

Conflict over custody exchanges erupted. In September 2016, after Mari had not seen Z.K.J. for about three months due to a bug infestation at Mari's residence, Sheena asked the court to order Mari to undergo a psychological or psychiatric assessment. Sheena claimed that Mari was not adequately supervising Z.K.J. who returned to Sheena with bug bites and other injuries and that Mari became increasingly unstable. After Mari opposed the request, the parties stipulated to resuming the equal co-parenting schedule.

B. Sheena's Move-Away Request

In January 2017, Sheena notified Mari that she planned to move to Florida and requested that Z.K.J. also relocate and attend school there. Sheena had considered and discussed with Mari the potential of a Florida move since at least 2014. Sheena decided to move to Florida after her relationship with Mari ended, so that Sheena could be closer to her family, afford a lower cost of living, and focus on gaining stability for Z.K.J and herself.

In March 2017, before Sheena's planned move, Mari, in pro per, requested that the court modify the child custody order and give her sole legal and physical custody of Z.K.J. She also filed an ex parte request seeking temporary sole custody. Mari claimed that Z.K.J. had been strangled by Sheena's stepfather during Sheena's and Z.K.J.'s prior visit to Florida. Sheena denied the abuse allegations and requested an order that would continue joint custody, authorize Z.K.J. to move to Florida, make Sheena the school-year parent, and appoint a child custody evaluator pursuant to Evidence Code section 730. Sheena proceeded with her move in late March 2017.

All further undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.

The court ordered a full custody evaluation. It further ordered the parties to jointly select and pay for an evaluator. When the parties could not agree on one, in May 2017 the court appointed Rhonda Barovsky, Psy.D., as the evaluator and ordered the evaluation to be completed by August 21. It also granted Mari temporary sole physical custody of Z.K.J. and allowed Sheena to visit Z.K.J. only in California. Dr. Barovsky did not complete and circulate the evaluation report until November 30, 2017.

C. Substitution of Mari's Counsel and Requests to Continue Trial

On December 1, 2017, James Ward substituted into this case as Mari's counsel of record. Days later, Ward had a medical emergency that prevented him from attending a post-evaluation status conference on December 7, which the court continued to December 11. On that day, the court set a half-day trial on March 9, 2018 on the child custody and visitation issues.

On January 3, 2018, Ward emailed Sheena's counsel, notifying her of his recent medical diagnosis that required Mari to seek new representation, with a request that counsel agree to continue trial. When Sheena's counsel refused, on January 11, Mari made an ex parte request for an order continuing trial to May or June 2018. Sheena opposed the request. On January 17, the court denied the request "pending hearing," without setting a hearing date. Mari then retained attorney Sara Raymond, who substituted into the case on February 9.

On March 6, 2018, Mari filed a document entitled "Motions in Limine for Long Cause Hearing," which consisted of requests to continue trial and for appointment of minor's counsel. Mari argued good cause supported a continuance partly because she could not secure the attendance of witnesses at trial and her recently retained consulting psychologist had not completed his assigned tasks in this case. Mari did not provide notice of the motion or supporting declarations. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1332(b).)

All further undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

D. Trial and Ruling

On March 9, 2018, the first day of trial, the court heard and denied Mari's renewed request to continue trial. It found "[Mari] had more than enough time to secure counsel," since the evaluation report had been made available to the parties in November 2017. The court also explained that no good cause supported the request because "[c]ases of custody and visitation take priority," and Z.K.J. and the "parties have been in limbo for awhile." The court also denied Mari's request for the court to appoint minor's counsel.

Mari then requested to call several witnesses, namely Z.K.J.'s therapist, Dr. Robert Epstein, and Mari's two friends, Suzanne Turnquest and Kirsten Simon. After hearing Mari's offer of proof as to Turnquest's and Simon's testimony, the court said it was inclined to exclude such testimony as cumulative. But when the court stated it would revisit the need for the witnesses later in the day, Mari's counsel explained the witnesses were not available to attend trial that day.

Mari also made an offer of proof that Dr. Esptein would testify as "to the child's state of mind over the past year." The court ruled his testimony would be irrelevant because Z.K.J. was too young to express a preference on living with any particular parent. The court found Dr. Epstein's testimony also lacked probative value because he never met with or spoke to Sheena.

At trial, Dr. Barovsky testified she did not complete and circulate the evaluation report until November 30, 2017. Although the family court had ordered that the report be completed by August 21, 2017, Dr. Barovsky stated that Mari's lack of cooperation in scheduling and psychological testing contributed to the delay in the evaluation. Dr. Barovsky concluded that it was in Z.K.J's best interests to move with Sheena to Florida and that it would be detrimental to Z.K.J.'s relationship with Sheena if Z.K.J. were to remain in California with Mari. On this score, Dr. Barovsky determined that Mari engaged in "restrictive gatekeeping," which Dr. Barovsky defined as "actions by any parent that are intended to interfere with the relationship between the other parent and the child." For example, Mari withheld information from Sheena about Z.K.J.'s school and after-school care, and she failed to comply with court orders for allowing Sheena's visitations with Z.K.J. Also, Dr. Barovsky could not conclude that Z.K.J. was in fact abused by his step-grandfather. In particular, the investigating detective found Mari's allegations of the abuse to be incredible. Dr. Barovsky also interviewed Sheena, Sheena's sister, Sheena's mother and Z.K.J.'s teachers, who saw no signs of abuse.

After Mari completed her cross-examination of Dr. Barovsky, the family court set trial for an additional half day on March 13, 2018. On the second day of trial, Sheena closed her case-in-chief after she testified as a witness. Mari presented her case, calling herself as the only witness in her case-in-chief. The court rejected Mari's renewed request to call additional witnesses, stating it had heard enough evidence to make its decision.

On March 26, 2018, the court announced its statement of decision. The court adopted Dr. Barovsky's recommendations with several modifications and granted Sheena's move-away request. It ordered that Z.K.J. should not be left solely in the care of Sheena's mother and stepfather. It also ordered that Z.K.J. was to finish the 2017-2018 school year in California and begin living with Sheena on June 8. The court issued a 30-day stay on the order pursuant to section 917.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure and set a review hearing on June 4. The court filed its "Findings and Order After Hearing" on June 5, 2018.

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 917.7, provisions of a trial court order allowing, or eliminating restrictions against, removal of a minor child from the state are stayed by operation of law for 30 calendar days from entry of the order.

At the June 4 review hearing, the court made an interim visitation order that Z.K.J. would be allowed to travel to Florida with Sheena on June 8, immediately after the 2017-2018 school year ended, that Sheena had to return Z.K.J. to Mari on June 23 if the stay was still in place, and that Z.K.J. could then relocate to Florida after the stay expired. However, the court's lack of a written order as of the June 4 review hearing created confusion regarding when the 30-day stay began and expired. At the hearing, though the court acknowledged that the 30-day stay would begin to run upon entry of a written order (Code Civ. Proc., § 917.7), it could not recall if any such order had been filed and did not have any document before it. (The court would later rule that the stay would last until July 5, 2018, 30 days after the Findings and Order After Hearing was filed on June 5, 2018.) Sheena did not return Z.K.J. to Mari in California on June 23, which led to a police investigation and Sheena's arrest and detention for criminal interference with the custody of a minor. Sheena was released days after, and Z.K.J. stayed with Child Protective Services until Mari retrieved him. Mari then filed a motion to retain custody of Z.K.J., which the court denied. The court then ordered that Z.K.J. be returned to Florida on August 7, 2018 to begin school.

Shortly after filing a notice of appeal from the June 5, 2018 judgment in this case, Mari also filed a petition for writ of supersedeas, with a request for an immediate stay, which this court denied.

E. Mari's Motion for a New Trial

In June 2018, Mari requested an order for a new trial, contending that the family court deprived her of a fair trial by denying her requests to continue trial, precluding witness testimony, and imposing arbitrary time limits on the presentation of her case. Sheena opposed the motion. On August 2, the court heard the motion and denied it. Reiterating its prior rulings at trial, the court concluded no good cause supported Mari's requests to continue trial, because Mari had contributed to the delay in the custody evaluation's completion. The court also highlighted that Z.K.J.'s need for stability outweighed the need for a continuance. In addition, the court explained that it considered the Mari's offers of proof concerning the witnesses she intended to call and found their testimony would be irrelevant or cumulative and thus inadmissible.

DISCUSSION

A. Denial of Continuance

Mari argues the family court erred in denying her requests to continue the custody trial. We disagree.

As a general rule, "continuances of trials are disfavored." (Rule 3.1332(c).) However, each request "must be considered on its own merits." (Id.) If the party seeking a continuance makes "an affirmative showing of good cause requiring the continuance" (id.), the trial court may exercise its discretion to grant or deny the continuance "with due regard to all interests involved." (In re Marriage of Hoffmeister (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 1163, 1169.) The grant or denial of a continuance " 'cannot be disturbed "on appeal except upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion." ' " (Lazarus v. Titmus (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249.) "[A]n abuse of discretion results in reversible error only when the denial of a continuance results in the denial of a fair hearing, or otherwise prejudices a party." (Freeman v. Sullivant (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 523, 527.)

Good cause for a continuance includes "[t]he unavailability of trial counsel because of . . . illness," and "[a] party's excused inability to obtain essential testimony, documents, or other material evidence despite diligent efforts." (Rule 3.1332(c)(3), (6).) A trial court may also consider the following factors in granting a continuance: "proximity of the trial date"; "[w]hether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any party"; "[t]he length of the continuance requested"; "[t]he prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance"; "[i]f the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay"; "[w]hether all parties have stipulated to a continuance"; "[w]hether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance"; and "[a]ny other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application." (Rule 3.1332(d)(1)-(3), (5)-(6), (9)-(11).)

In her first request for a continuance, Mari unsuccessfully argued that good cause existed because the then-recent diagnosis of a serious medical illness of her attorney Ward required her to seek new counsel. Mari's second continuance request unsuccessfully asserted that her newly retained counsel did not have enough time to secure several witnesses' attendance at trial, make use of a consulting psychologist, or explore the methodology and possible biases in Dr. Barovsky's evaluation.

We conclude the family court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested continuance. While ordinarily the serious illness of trial counsel is considered good cause (Oliveros v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1398), the record supports the court's determination that Mari's own conduct contributed to her claimed need for a continuance. Specifically, Mari's lack of cooperation hindered Dr. Barovsky's ability to complete her custody evaluation report by the court-ordered August 21 date, and consequently, the report was not circulated until November 30, 2017. Mari apparently had not obtained an attorney before this point, despite knowing that the custody proceedings were coming to a head, and her chosen attorney (Ward) did not substitute in until the next day, December 1. Additionally, Mari knew days later that Ward had a medical emergency, and was aware no later than January 3, 2018, that Ward sought to substitute out. Though Mari's replacement attorney substituted into the case on February 9, and though Mari knew that trial was set for March 9, she waited until three days before the scheduled trial to make a renewed request for continuance based on her attorney's inability to prepare for trial. Misnamed "motion[s] in limine," the request did not provide the proper notice and supporting declaration required for a motion to continue trial. (Rule 3.1332(b).)

Moreover, as the family court emphasized, the trial itself was limited to the issue of child custody and was therefore entitled to preference over other civil cases. (Fam. Code, § 3023, subd. (b).) The reason for preference is well recognized—harm to a child results when the child is removed from a stable environment. (See Burchard v. Garay (1986) 42 Cal.3d 531, 538, fn. 6, citing Michael U. v. Jamie B. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 787, 795, fn. 7, superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 448-449.) Observing that Z.K.J. and the parties "have been in limbo for awhile," the court effectively determined that the need for a trial continuance did not outweigh the need to avoid delay. (See rule 3.1332(d)(6).) And contrary to Mari's suggestion, the court concluded that Z.K.J. did not have "stability when he didn't know when or if he could see his other mother and under what circumstances that would take place," even though Z.K.J. resided with Mari at the time and was able to finish the 2017-2018 school year in California.

In light of these factors and the circumstances reflected in the record, we cannot say the family court's denial of Mari's continuance request was " ' " arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd." ' " (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.) Moreover, for the reasons stated in parts B and C, post, we cannot conclude the denial had "the practical effect of denying her a fair hearing." (In re Marriage of Hoffmeister, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at p. 1169.)

Mari's reliance on Hernandez v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1242 is misplaced. Hernandez held that a trial court abused its discretion in denying requests to reopen discovery and continue trial, because it failed to consider that the petitioner's prior counsel's cancer had affected his ability to properly conduct discovery before the cut-off. (Id. at p. 1247.) The trial court also ignored the circumstances that the petitioner's new lawyer was unable to appear on the trial date and that the petitioner was scheduled for spinal surgery that same month. (Id. at pp. 1245, 1247.) The court simply adopted the opposing party's "conclusional claim[s]" of prejudice without requiring any additional explanation. (Ibid.) Unlike the situation in Hernandez, the family court here appropriately considered and weighed various relevant factors before denying Mari's continuance request.

B. Exclusion of Witnesses

Mari contends the family court also erred in precluding the testimony of Z.K.J.'s therapist, Dr. Epstein, and Mari's two friends, Suzanne Turnquest and Kirsten Simon. We review a trial court's rulings on exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. (People v. Richardson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 959, 1000-1001.) Here, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's evidentiary rulings.

Proceedings under the Family Code are governed by the same statutory rules of evidence that apply in other civil trials. (See Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1354; Fam. Code, § 210.) Only relevant evidence is admissible. (§§ 350, 351.) Evidence is relevant if it has a "tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action." (§ 210.) The family court has broad discretion in deciding the relevance of evidence. (See People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 681.) In exercising its discretion to admit or exclude evidence, the court may consider the constraints of section 352, under which evidence is excluded if its probative value is outweighed by undue prejudice or necessitate undue consumption of time. (§ 352.)

Here, Mari made the offer of proof that Dr. Epstein would have testified as to Z.K.J.'s state of mind, including "any stress or fears that the child has expressed to him about the potential move, the experience that the child has had in Florida and the emotional impact it's had on him." The court explained that evidence of Z.K.J.'s state of mind was irrelevant because Z.K.J. was undeniably too young to state a preference.

At first blush, it seems the family court could have benefited from hearing Dr. Epstein's testimony of Z.K.J.'s state of mind, regardless of the preference issue. But the court expressed its concern that Dr. Epstein's testimony would be "all one-sided," explaining that "when [Dr. Epstein] has the child in session, the basis for whatever he observes, his observations, for example, does he know that there could be any other cause[?] All he hears is from one parent. He hasn't heard anything from the other parent." Given that circumstance, the court concluded that Dr. Epstein's observations of Z.K.J.'s emotional and mental state would not be based on a balanced assessment of Z.K.J.'s interactions with both parents. In this highly contentious custody dispute between the two parents, in which a comprehensive report of a neutral evaluator had been submitted, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Dr. Epstein's "one-sided" testimony would not have been helpful to the court's custody determinations.

Second, the family court also acted within its discretion to bar admission of the testimony of Turnquest and Simon. At trial, Mari made an offer of proof that both witnesses were "percipient witnesses to behavior changes in the child before and after visits to Florida," and "to various incidents that became part of the custody evaluation." Aside from the inadequacy of Mari's showing due to lack of specificity (see In re Mark C. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 433, 444; § 354, subd. (a))), her proffer generally indicated that the testimony of these witnesses would be cumulative of other anticipated testimony as well as evidence in the evaluation report. Moreover, the two witnesses were apparently unavailable to attend the trial on that day in any event. Given Mari's showing, the court could reasonably decide it did not need to hear from multiple people about the same things.

Although we conclude the family court's evidentiary ruling was correct based on the record at the time it rendered the ruling, we note the more specific content of Mari's new trial motion confirms that the proffered testimony of Turnquest and Simon would have been cumulative of the evidence actually presented at trial. Specifically, Mari's new trial motion represented that the two witnesses would have testified about their observations of blood in Z.K.J.'s eye, a change in his behavior when he returned from Florida in February 2017, and statements from Z.K.J. that his step-grandfather choked him. However, Dr. Barovsky's testified she interviewed Z.K.J.'s teachers who recounted their observations concerning the blood in Z.K.J.'s eye one day and a marked change in Z.K.J.'s behavior when he returned from Florida. Concerning the alleged choking incident, Dr. Barovsky testified as to her interviews with numerous individuals, including the investigating detective, Sheena's mother and sister, and Z.K.J.'s preschool teachers.

For these reasons, Mari's due process challenges also fail. The right to a fair hearing only protects a party's right to present "all competent, material, and relevant evidence." (Elkins, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1357-1358, italics added.) While Mari had a right to present such evidence, as explained above she was not entitled to present irrelevant or cumulative evidence.

C. Cross-Examination of the Custody Evaluator

Mari's contentions that the family court impermissibly restricted her ability to cross-examine Dr. Barovsky also lack merit.

A court may not act on a custody evaluation report unless the parties are given the opportunity to cross-examine the evaluator. (See Fewel v. Fewel (1943) 23 Cal.2d 431, 433, 436.) In contending the court denied her that opportunity, Mari argues the court "cut her off and took over the questioning" and, consequently, Mari "was never able to question Dr. Barovsky as to whether [Dr. Barovsky] was concerned by ZKJ's report that [Sheena] instructed [Z.K.J.] not to discuss the abuse with [Dr. Barovsky]." The record reflects otherwise. During cross-examination, Mari's attorney questioned Dr. Barovsky at least three times about whether she was concerned that Sheena was coaching Z.K.J. not to report the choking incident. In fact, the court's interjection of more targeted questions yielded more direct responses from Dr. Barovsky, who stated she could not conclude whether the parents had coached Z.K.J. Thus, the evidence Mari contends she was barred from eliciting had in fact been admitted.

Further, we find no error in the family court's actions during Dr. Barovsky's cross-examination. The court explained there was "quite a bit of delay on the part of [Mari's attorney] . . . in terms of the amount it's taking to move forward" on cross-examination. For example, the court admonished Mari's attorney for relying on hypotheticals rather than actual statements or evidence. There was nothing inappropriate about the court's interjections during cross-examination, and its actions were both reasonable and measured in the effort to promote efficiency in the proceedings. (§ 765, subd. (a) ["The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode of interrogation of a witness so as to make interrogation as rapid, as distinct, and as effective for the ascertainment of the truth."]; Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(3) [trial court has inherent authority "[t]o provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it"]; California Crane School, Inc. v. National Com. for Certification of Crane Operators (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 12, 22 ["[T]he court has the power to expedite proceedings which, in the court's view, are dragging on too long without significantly aiding the trier of fact."].)

D. Time Limits Imposed During Trial

Moreover, the family court did not impose arbitrary limits on the time for Mari to present her case at trial. Before trial, the parties understood and did not object when the court set trial for half a day. Ultimately, the court set trial for an additional afternoon. The court acted within its discretion in prescribing those time limits. (California Crane School, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 22.)

Mari does not establish these time limits prevented her from having a fair hearing. As noted above, Mari's claim that she lacked sufficient time to cross-examine Dr. Barovsky had more to do with her counsel's manner of questioning rather than the court's time limitations. With respect to the time allotted to Mari's case-in-chief, the court gave Mari two hours to testify on direct, even though she had requested only one hour. At the end of redirect, Mari's counsel stated she had no further questions. Thus, we cannot conclude Mari was denied an opportunity to adequately present her case. We also reject Mari's assertion that the court's denial of her renewed request to call additional witnesses deprived her of a fair hearing, since, as noted above, the court had properly excluded their testimony under section 352.

We find the circumstances in In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 281 are significantly different from those in this case, contrary to Mari's assertions. In Carlsson, the family court unquestionably erred by abruptly ending the trial in the middle of a witness's testimony during the husband's case-in-chief, without giving the husband an opportunity to complete his presentation of evidence or offer rebuttal evidence. (Id. at pp. 288-290, 291.) The court also repeatedly threatened a mistrial if the proceedings were not concluded quickly enough, pressured the husband into rushing through presenting his case without any breaks, and exited the courtroom as the husband's attorney was speaking. (Id. at pp. 286, 288-292, 294.) Nothing remotely close to that occurred here, and the court even granted Mari additional time to present her case.

In sum, the denial of continuance and the manner in which the court conducted the trial proceedings were within the court's discretion and did not deprive Mari of a fair trial.

E. Denial of Mari's Motion for New Trial

On a final note, Mari contends the family court erred in denying her motion for new trial, which had presented the same grounds she now asserts on appeal. Because we have concluded the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mari's requests to continue trial, precluding witness testimony, imposing time limits on trial proceedings, and interjecting its own questioning during Mari's cross-examination of Dr. Barovsky, we also conclude the family court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for new trial on the same grounds. (See parts A, B, C, D, ante.)

Mari argued for the first time in reply to the opposition to the new trial motion that Sheena's arrest after trial constitutes new evidence requiring a new trial, a position Mari has abandoned on appeal. --------

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

/s/_________

Fujisaki, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Siggins, P. J. /s/_________
Petrou, J.


Summaries of

Sheena J. v. Mari K.

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE
Jan 28, 2020
A154952 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2020)
Case details for

Sheena J. v. Mari K.

Case Details

Full title:SHEENA J., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MARI K., Defendant and Appellant.

Court:COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION THREE

Date published: Jan 28, 2020

Citations

A154952 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2020)