Opinion
No. 13–0875.
04-10-2015
SHEENA H. for RUSSELL H., deceased, on behalf of the minor child, L.H., Petitioner v. AMFIRE, LLC., Respondent.
Stephen P. New, Esq., Amanda J. Taylor, Esq., Beckley, WV, for Petitioner. Robert J. Busse, Esq., Timothy E. Huffman, Esq., Jackson Kelly PLLC, Charleston, WV, for Respondent. John H. Shumate, Jr., Esq., Attorney at Law, Mount Hope, WV, Guardian Ad Litem for L.H.
Stephen P. New, Esq., Amanda J. Taylor, Esq., Beckley, WV, for Petitioner.
Robert J. Busse, Esq., Timothy E. Huffman, Esq., Jackson Kelly PLLC, Charleston, WV, for Respondent.
John H. Shumate, Jr., Esq., Attorney at Law, Mount Hope, WV, Guardian Ad Litem for L.H.
Opinion
Justice KETCHUM :Petitioner, Sheena H. (“Ms. H.”), on the behalf of her six-year-old granddaughter (“L.H.”), appeals an order of the Workers' Compensation Board of Review, denying dependent's death benefits for the death of L.H.'s father, Russell H. The Board of Review based its denial on Ms. H. not filing her application within six months after Mr. H's death.
Because L.H. is a minor, we follow our traditional practice in cases involving sensitive facts and use only her initials. See Shelby J.S. v. George L.H., 181 W.Va. 154, 155 n. 1, 381 S.E.2d 269, 270 n. 1 (1989). See also W.Va. R.App. P.40(e)(1).
Ms. H. argues that there was no indication that the death of L.H.'s father was work-related until eight months after his death, when the Chief Medical Examiner's autopsy report was completed and made available to her. She asserts that the time limitation on applying for death benefits begins to run when she could have learned that the death was work-related, not when the death occurred. Respondent (“Amfire”) contends that the time limitation on applying for death benefits begins to run on the date of the death and may never be tolled.
We reverse and remand the Board of Review's order. We find that the Legislature did not intend to completely bar a claim for dependent's death benefits when, due to the medical examiner's delay in preparing an autopsy report, there was no indication that an employee's death was work-related until eight months after the death. Furthermore, Ms. H. was a proper party to file a claim for dependent's death benefits under West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) [2010] on L.H.'s behalf. The Board of Review erred in finding otherwise.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 7, 2010, Russell H., a twenty-four-year-old coal miner, died in his sleep from a seizure. He left behind his mother, Ms. H., who is the petitioner, and a now six-year-old daughter, L.H., on whose behalf Ms. H. petitions this Court. L.H.'s mother (who never married Mr. H.) is not a party to this proceeding.
Mr. H. suffered a work-related injury on March 24, 2009, when a wrench fell from a coal mine's ceiling and hit him on the head. The injury left him unconscious for one minute and resulted in a golf-ball-size knot on his head. Even though he was transported to the local hospital, neither he, his employer, nor his treating physicians recognized the magnitude of Mr. H's injury. He did not stay in the hospital overnight. Rather, his treating physicians prescribed him pain medication and told him to return to the walk-in clinic for a follow up visit if he deemed it necessary. He did not seek additional medical treatment for this injury or for health-related issues arising out of the injury. Mr. H. returned to work a couple of days later, and in May 2009, his claim for temporary total disability benefits was closed because he was off work for less than three days.
Twenty-one months later (on December 7, 2010), Mr. H. died in his sleep. The Office of the Chief Medical Examiner performed an autopsy on Mr. H. the following day, December 8, 2010. However, for unknown reasons, the autopsy report was not completed and made available to Mr. H's family until August 24, 2011 (more than eight months after his death). The autopsy report declared that Mr. H's 2010 death was the result of a traumatic seizure disorder that stemmed from
the 2009 work-related injury. It stated: “[Mr. H.] died as a result of a seizure while sleeping; in the setting of a traumatic seizure disorder following a remote head injury at work [.] ... [T]he manner of death is best certified as accident. ” (Emphasis added). The autopsy report did not establish when Mr. H. began to suffer from the seizure disorder. His death certificate was then amended to reflect that his cause of death was a “seizure” as a consequence of “traumatic seizure disorder.”
There is conflicting evidence as to whether the family knew at the time of the death that Mr. H. (who lived alone) suffered from seizures. The Chief Medical Examiner stated in the autopsy report that Mr. H's family “reported witnessed seizure activity.” By contrast, Ms. H. responded to an interrogatory that the family did not know he suffered from seizures. What is clear, however, is that there was no medical evidence at that time which linked Mr. H's death to his work-related injury.
Dependents of a deceased employee have six months to apply for death benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. Ms. H. (on L.H.'s behalf) applied for dependent's death benefits on February 24, 2012, exactly six months after she received the autopsy report and amended death certificate indicating that Mr. H's cause of death stemmed from a work-related injury.
See W.Va.Code § 23–4–15(a). We discuss this statute in greater detail in Section A of our Analysis.
On March 19, 2012, the employer's claims administrator rejected the application for benefits, finding: (1) it was filed more than six months after Mr. H's death; (2) Ms. H. was not the proper person to file the application on L.H.'s behalf because she was not L.H.'s legal guardian; and (3) there was insufficient evidence to establish that Mr. H's work-related injury in March 2009 was a material contributing factor to his death in December 2010. Ms. H. protested the decision, but the Workers' Compensation Office of Judges affirmed the claims administrator on the ground that the application was filed more than six months after Mr. H's death. The Workers' Compensation Board of Review affirmed the Office of Judges.
By order of this Court, the parties addressed whether Ms. H's application for dependent's death benefits was timely and whether Ms. H. was a proper party to bring a claim for dependent's death benefits on L.H.'s behalf. This Court appointed a guardian ad litem to represent L.H.'s interests.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When considering a question of law, we have held: “[w]here the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995). Furthermore, we review de novo legal conclusions of the Workers' Compensation Board of Review. Johnson v. W.Va. Office of Ins. Comm'r., 226 W.Va. 650, 654, 704 S.E.2d 650, 654 (2010).
III.
ANALYSIS
Dependents of a deceased employee have six months from the date of a work-related death to apply for death benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act. The parties dispute two issues: (1) whether the time limitation for applying for death benefits may be tolled until a claimant could have reasonably learned that the death was work-related; and (2) whether Ms. H. (L.H.'s grandmother) is a proper party to apply for dependent's death benefits on L.H.'s behalf. We examine the parties' arguments in turn.
A. Statutory Deadline to Apply for Dependent's Benefits
In 1986, the Legislature adopted a six-month period in which claims may be filed for workers' compensation dependent's death benefits. The pertinent statute provides:
To entitle any employee or dependent of a deceased employee to compensation under this chapter, other than for occupational pneumoconiosis or other occupational disease, the application for compensation shall be ... [filed] within six months from and after the injury or death, as the case may be, and unless filed within the six months period, the right to compensation under this chapter is forever barred, such time limitation being hereby declared to be a condition of the right and hence jurisdictional [.]”
W.Va.Code § 23–4–15(a) [2010] (emphasis added).
Ms. H. argues that, despite the time limitation in West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) being jurisdictional, there was no way of knowing that Mr. H's death was work-related until the autopsy report was completed and made available. She argues this is a narrow circumstance in which the time limitation for filing a claim may be tolled. Amfire responds that West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) does not specify an exception to its time limitation, and therefore, it may not be tolled under any circumstances, even when there was no indication that the decedent's death was work-related until eight months after the death had passed.
We have held that, “[t]he primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature.” Syl. Pt. 8, Vest v. Cobb, 138 W.Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885 (1953). “If the literal meaning of a statute is inconsistent with the meaning or intent of the legislature, or would lead to perverse results, the words of the statute must be interpreted to reflect the intention of the legislature.” Pryor v. Gainer, 177 W.Va. 218, 222, 351 S.E.2d 404, 408 (1986). See also Mitchell v. Broadnax, 208 W.Va. 36, 46, 537 S.E.2d 882, 892 (2000) ( “Although a provision's language may be plain, there nevertheless may arise circumstances in which the plain language does not speak completely on the subject to which it is addressed.”). In the same vein, we have said:
It is the duty of a court to construe a statute according to its true intent, and give to it such construction as will uphold the law and further justice. It is as well the duty of a court to disregard a construction, though apparently warranted by the literal sense of the words in a statute, when such construction would lead to injustice and absurdity.
Syl. Pt. 2, Click v. Click, 98 W.Va. 419, 127 S.E. 194 (1925) (emphasis added). Likewise, “[w]here a particular construction of a statute would result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction, which will not produce such absurdity will be made.” Syl. Pt. 2, Newhart v. Pennybacker, 120 W.Va. 774, 200 S.E. 350 (1938).
Therefore, our inquiry does not end just because West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) does not specify any exceptions to its time limitation that is “a condition precedent and hence jurisdictional.” Rather, we read the statute so as to effectuate the Legislature's intent. In ascertaining the Legislature's intent behind the time limitation in West Virginia Code 23–4–15(a), we are guided by the spirit, purposes, and objects of the general Workers' Compensation Act. As we have often said: “[a] statute should be so read and applied as to make it accord with the spirit, purposes, and objects of the general system of law of which it is intended to form a part[.]” Syl. Pt. 5, in part, State v. Snyder, 64 W.Va. 659, 63 S.E. 385 (1908).
Similarly, in Miller v. Romero, 186 W.Va. 523, 413 S.E.2d 178 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by Bradshaw v. Soulsby, 210 W.Va. 682, 558 S.E.2d 681 (2001) ), we tolled a time limitation that was a “an integral part of the statute itself and creates a condition precedent to ... the bringing of an action” on grounds of defendant's fraudulent concealment of facts. Although Miller dealt with the Wrongful Death Act, the fact that the time limitation was a “condition precedent” to the cause of action in that case makes it analogous to this case.
The legislative intent behind setting time limitations for claims under the Workers' Compensation Act is two-fold. On the one hand, it protects employers from frivolous or outdated claims, while on the other hand, it is intended to afford claimants sufficient opportunity to investigate a claim before it is filed.
As to the Legislature's goal of protecting employers from frivolous or outdated claims,
we have stated, “[i]t is generally accepted that the purpose of time limitations in filing workers' compensation claims is to provide notice and to enable the employer to protect himself by prompt investigation and treatment of the injury. ” Holdren v. Workers' Comp. Comm'r., 181 W.Va. 337, 339, 382 S.E.2d 531, 533 (1989) (emphasis added). Pursuant to this goal, the Legislature amended the Workers' Compensation Act in 1986 to provide that the time limitations are “jurisdictional.” These 1986 amendments were in response to a prior decision by this Court in Bailey v. SWCC, 170 W.Va. 771, 296 S.E.2d 901 (1982), which held that the time limitations for workers' compensation claims were procedural, not jurisdictional. Syl. Pt. 1, Id., 170 W.Va. 771, 296 S.E.2d 901. Under Bailey, even when the claimant missed the deadline by years, the delay in filing would be excused for a wide array of reasons, such as “innocent mistake, excusable neglect, unavoidable cause, fraud, misrepresentation, or any other reason justifying relief from the running of the time period.” Syl. Pt. 2, Id., 170 W.Va. 771, 296 S.E.2d 901. The 1986 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act effectively overruled Bailey. See Syl. Pt. 2, Fucillo v. Workers' Comp. Comm'r., 180 W.Va. 595, 378 S.E.2d 637 (1988).
As to the Legislature's goal of affording claimants sufficient time to investigate and file claims, we have stated:
[A] literal construction of the statute, which ... would end the jurisdiction of the commissioner ... eight days after the claimant asked that his case be reopened, would in many cases result in a lack of opportunity to properly investigate the claim.... Such a construction cannot reasonably be held to have been within the intent of the Legislature. Consideration of the merits of every claim, with reasonable time for investigation, must have been what was intended.
Wilkins v. State Comp. Comm'r, 120 W.Va. 424, 429, 198 S.E. 869, 871 (1938) (emphasis added).
The position that the time limitation in West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) can never, under any circumstances, be tolled is contrary to both of these goals. It would be harmful to employers because it encourages a decedent's family to file a rushed application for death benefits before they have any medical evidence indicating that the death was work-related. Despite Amfire's suggestion that Ms. H. should have filed her application for death benefits before she received the autopsy report, such a claim would have been purely speculative without it. This finding would necessarily entail that any dependent of a person who has died should file for death benefits with the glimmering hope that some evidence might later present itself showing that the death was work-related. Such a result flies in the face of the Legislature's intent of protecting employers from frivolous claims.
A finding in this case that the time limitation in West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) can never, under any circumstances, be tolled is also patently unfair to the claimant. Such a finding would saddle the claimant with the impossible task of linking an injury to a death that occurred twenty-one months later. The absurdity of such a result is heightened by the fact that even the decedent's treating physicians and his employer did not recognize the injury as life-threatening, and the autopsy report was not completed and made available to the claimant until eight months after the death. This result directly contradicts the Legislature's intent of affording a claimant reasonable time to investigate his/her claim.
Furthermore, Amfire's argument that West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a)'s time limitation can never be tolled is inconsistent with other provisions in the Workers' Compensation Act. For example, West Virginia Code § 23–4–16(a)(3) bars awards under the Workers' Compensation Act from being made more than two years after the employee's death, a provision which would be obsolete if the six-month time limitation in West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) could not, under any circumstances, be tolled. This position would be inconsistent with our prior holding that “[i]t is always presumed that the legislature will not enact a meaningless or useless statute.” Syl. Pt. 4, State ex rel. Hardesty v. Aracoma, 147 W.Va. 645, 129 S.E.2d 921 (1963).
Amfire's proposed interpretation of the time limitation in West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) causes potential harm to employers and claimants alike, and it is inconsistent with other provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act. Therefore, adopting Amfire's position would bring about an absurd and unjust result that was surely unintended by the Legislature. As we said in Syllabus Point 2 of Click, 98 W.Va. 419, 127 S.E. 194, when a construction of a statute (even one that is apparently warranted by the literal sense of the statute's words) would lead to injustice or absurdity, this Court has a duty to disregard that construction. Pursuant to this duty, we interpret West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) to reflect the Legislature's true intent, uphold the law, and further justice. Id. Thus, in drafting West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a), we find that the Legislature did not intend that a claimant be completely barred from receiving dependent's death benefits where: due to the medical examiner's delay in completing the autopsy, there was no knowledge or understanding that the decedent's death was work-related until eight months after the death, and the claimant promptly filed his/her claim within six months of learning that the death was work-related.
Therefore, we hold that where a claimant to dependent's death benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act delays filing a claim because the claimant was unaware, and could not have learned through reasonable diligence, that the decedent's cause of death was work-related, and the delay was due to the medical examiner completing and making available an autopsy report, the six-month time limitation on filing a claim in West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) [2010] is tolled until the claimant, through reasonable diligence, could have learned of the autopsy report finding that that the decedent's cause of death was, in any material degree, contributed to by an injury or disease that arose in the course of and resulting from the decedent's employment. However, we limit our holding to death benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act where the delay was on the part of the medical examiner, not the claimant. This holding does not apply to claimants who delay having an autopsy performed.
We recognize that the language of the Workers' Compensation Act evidences an intent to limit a claimant's ability to file for benefits, protest, object, or appeal, subject to strict time limitations. Such language is necessary to bar frivolous or outdated claims. Therefore, we tread lightly in our holding to render a narrow ruling that does not have the same unintended, expansive consequences as Bailey, 170 W.Va. 771, 296 S.E.2d 901. It is for this reason that we limit our holding to death benefits.
However, we caution that the six-month time limitation in West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) is jurisdictional and a condition of the right to compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act. Therefore, the claimant's failure to timely file a claim within six months of when he/she could have learned that the employee's death arose in the course of and resulting from employment will not be excused.
There was no medical evidence at the time Mr. H. died linking the death to his employment. The autopsy was the first known medical evidence indicating that his cause of death was work-related, but it was not completed and made available to the family until August 24, 2011 (eight months after the death). Therefore, the time limitation in West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) did not begin to run until August 24, 2011, if Ms. H. could not have reasonably learned that Mr. H's cause of death was work-related before that time. However, the Board of Review failed to determine whether Ms. H. could have reasonably learned that Mr. H's death was work-related before then. Therefore, Board of Review erred in finding that Ms. H's application was time-barred, as a matter of law, because she did not file her application within six months of Mr. H's death.
B. Proper Party to File for Dependent's Death Benefits on Minor's Behalf
The claims administrator also rejected the application for dependent's death benefits on the ground that Ms. H., L.H.'s grandmother, was not a proper party to file an application on L.H.'s behalf. West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) provides that when an employee or dependent of an employee “is
mentally or physically incapable of filing the application, it may be filed by his or her attorney or by a member of his or her family. ” (Emphasis added). See also W.Va.Code § 2–2–10(m) [1998] (persons under the age of eighteen years are “under disability”). By law, L.H., a six-year-old child, is both mentally and physically incompetent to file an application for dependent's death benefits. Because Ms. H. is L.H.'s grandmother, she is a member of L.H.'s “family,” and she is a proper party to file an application on L.H.'s behalf. Accordingly, we find it was error to have rejected Ms. H's filed application on the ground that she was not L.H.'s legal guardian.
While Ms. H is a proper party to file the death benefits claim, ultimate payment and/or settlement of such claim might rest with the child's guardian.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the Board of Review erred in finding that, as a matter of law, Ms. H. was untimely in applying for dependent's death benefits on L.H.'s behalf. Furthermore, Ms. H. was a proper party to file for dependent's death benefits on L.H.'s behalf. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the Board of Review's order.
This appeal does not encompass whether there is sufficient, credible evidence linking Mr. H's death to the work-related injury or whether Mr. H's family should have reasonably known at the time of his death that the cause of death was work-related. On remand, the parties will have the opportunity to develop these issues.
Reversed and Remanded.
Chief Justice WORKMAN concurs and reserves the right to file a concurring opinion.
Justice DAVIS concurs and reserves the right to file a concurring opinion.
Justice BENJAMIN concurs and reserves the right to file a concurring opinion.
Justice LOUGHRY concurs and reserves the right to file a concurring opinion.
WORKMAN, Chief Justice, concurring, with DAVIS, Justice, joining:
I fully agree with the decision reached by the majority in this case to reverse and remand the Workers' Compensation Board of Review's decision and allow the claimant to pursue dependent's death benefits on behalf of her grandchild on remand. I write separately, however, because the new law enunciated by the majority in syllabus five is far too fact specific and needlessly restrictive regarding the tolling of the statute of limitations. The majority recognizes that despite the lack of any exceptions to West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a), “[t]he legislative intent behind setting time limitations for claims under the Workers' Compensation Act is two-fold. On the one hand, it protects employers from frivolous or outdated claims, while on the other hand, it is intended to afford claimants sufficient opportunity to investigate a claim before it is filed.” The majority then determines that to find that the statute of limitations set forth in West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) “can never, under any circumstances, be tolled is contrary to both these goals[,]” as well as is inconsistent with other provisions of the Act. See W. Va.Code § 23–4–16(a)(3) (bars awards under the Workers' Compensation Act from being made more than two years after an employee's death would be obsolete if the six-month statute of limitation in West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) could never be tolled).
Given the sound reasoning relied upon by the majority to support the determination that the relevant statute of limitations can be tolled, it is unwise and unnecessary to overly-restrict this recognition by limiting the general legal conclusion that the statute of limitations can be tolled only when “the delay was due to the medical examiner performing an autopsy.” The principles upon which the majority relies should be available to other claims, not just to the unique facts of this case.
BENJAMIN, Justice concurring:
I agree with the majority's conclusion as it relates to the ability of Sheena H. to pursue
a dependent's benefits claim on behalf of L.H. the minor child. I write separately to underscore that the issue of causation (i.e., compensability) has not been heretofore resolved, and the employer may challenge causation when this matter is remanded.
LOUGHRY, Justice, concurring:
I concur with the majority's decision because it is patently unfair and unjust to deny dependent's benefits to this six-year-old claimant solely because of the failure of the State Medical Examiner's Office to produce an autopsy report in a timely manner. I write separately to emphasize that the majority's decision should not be read as sanctioning the application of the discovery rule in every workers' compensation injury or dependent's benefits case. Our decision today is extremely limited and extends only to the unique situation in which the State Medical Examiner's Office does not issue an autopsy report until more than six months after the date of death and, absent that report, there is no other evidence indicating that a work-related injury contributed in a material degree to the decedent's death. While other members of this Court may wish to engraft the discovery rule onto the limitation periods for other injury or dependent's benefits claims, such a decision would be unwise and contrary to the purpose of our workers' compensation system.
It is well-established that “[t]he West Virginia Workers' Compensation system exists to the benefit of both employers and employees, freeing employers from lawsuits for simple negligence while ensuring employees compensation for their work-related injuries.” Repass v. Workers' Compensation Division and USX, 212 W.Va. 86, 92, 569 S.E.2d 162, 168 (2002). As this Court has explained,
[t]he Act is designed to compensate injured workers as speedily and expeditiously as possible in order that injured workers and those who depend upon them for support shall not be left destitute during a period of disability. The benefits of this system accrue both to the employer, who is relieved from common-law tort liability for negligently inflicted injuries, and to the employee, who is assured prompt payment of benefits.
Meadows v. Lewis, 172 W.Va. 457, 469, 307 S.E.2d 625, 638 (1983). To that end, the Legislature has imposed time limitations upon the filing of applications for benefits under the Act. Such limitations promote prompt investigation and treatment of injuries benefitting the employer and employee alike. It is obvious that by imposing the requirement that an application for benefits be filed within six months of an injury or death, the Legislature contemplated that the injured employee or the family of a deceased employee would be cognizant that the injury or death was work-related. However, as this case illustrates, there are rare instances where that may not be true.
While Mr. H.'s family was certainly aware that he had suffered a work-related injury on March 24, 2009, they had no basis to conclude that the injury was the cause of his death twenty-one months later. In that regard, the record reflects that while Mr. H. was transported to the emergency room for treatment of his injury on March 24, 2009, he was not hospitalized, and he returned to work just a couple of days later. Given the fact that Mr. H. never sought any further medical treatment for his work-related head injury, his death on December 7, 2010, at the age of twenty-four was undoubtedly unexpected. The State Medical Examiner's Office performed an autopsy the day after Mr. H. died. Unfortunately, for reasons that are not set forth in the record, the State Medical Examiner's autopsy report was not made available to the family until eight months later. Until that autopsy report was issued, the decedent's family had no documentation or other evidence indicating that the decedent's
I am troubled by the fact that the State Medical Examiner's Office took eight months to issue the autopsy report. Had such a report been timely issued, this case would not exist. West Virginia Code § 61–12–8 (2014) requires the State Medical Examiner to establish the cause of death when a person, like Mr. H., dies “suddenly when in apparent good health.” Id. Further, West Virginia Code § 61–12–10(c) (2014) provides that “[t]he office of the chief medical examiner shall keep full, complete and properly indexed records of all deaths investigated, containing all relevant information concerning the death and the autopsy report if an autopsy report is made.” More importantly, West Virginia Code § 61–12–10(d) requires that “[c]opies of these records or information shall be furnished, upon request to any court of law, or to the parties therein to whom the cause of death is a material issue[.]” Notwithstanding the reason why the autopsy report was needed in this instance, it is simply inexcusable to make a family wait months and months to find out the cause of their loved one's unexpected death.
work-related injury directly caused, or at least was a material factor, in his death. Accordingly, the family had no basis to file a claim for dependent's benefits pursuant to West Virginia Code § 23–4–15 (2010) within the six-month statutory time limitation.
As noted by the majority, the autopsy report states that the family had witnessed Mr. H. experiencing seizure activity in his sleep. The veracity and significance of that statement was not an issue below because the claim was simply rejected as being time-barred. This issue will undoubtedly be the subject of litigation upon remand of this case. Nonetheless, the record submitted to this Court indicates that there was no medical evidence indicating that Mr. H.'s death was caused by his work-related injury until the autopsy report was issued by the State Medical Examiner's Office.
Given these unique circumstances, applying the six-month time limitation of West Virginia Code § 23–4–15(a) to reject the claim for dependent's benefits would elevate form over substance. This Court has long recognized that “ ‘[t]he Workmen's Compensation Law is remedial in its nature, and must be given a liberal construction to accomplish the purpose intended.’ Syl. pt. 3, McVey v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 103 W.Va. 519, 138 S.E. 97 (1927) (citation omitted).” Syl. Pt. 1, Plummer v. Workers' Comp. Div., 209 W.Va. 710, 551 S.E.2d 46 (2001). Barring the application for dependent's benefits as untimely would be a particularly harsh outcome in this case because the State Medical Examiner's Office effectively prevented Mr. H.'s family from knowing the cause of his death until after the six-month time limitation expired. Regardless of how diligently the family investigated the cause of death, the State Medical Examiner's withholding of the autopsy report for eight months foreclosed any possibility of a timely filing of the application for dependent's benefits. Blindly enforcing the statutory time limitation under these circumstances would simply be wrong.
I do not believe that the Legislature conceived of this factual scenario when it statutorily imposed a six-month time limitation for filing dependent's benefits claims. The Legislature did, however, recognize that such a limitation should not apply with regard to occupational pneumoconiosis and occupational diseases because a worker might not know that exposure to a hazardous condition at work was causing him or her to contract such a medical condition. Therefore, instead of imposing a finite time limitation for filing a workers' compensation claim for these conditions, West Virginia Code §§ 23–4–15(b) and 23–4–15(c) allows these types of claims to be filed within three years after the worker is made aware of the condition by a physician. Consequently, I do not believe that carving out a very narrow exception for the filing of a dependent's benefits claim beyond the six-month time limitation in situations like the case at bar is contrary to the legislative intent. While statutes of limitation are designed to prevent injured parties from sleeping on their rights and to promote diligence in the bringing of claims in a timely fashion, enforcing the six-month time limitation in this unusual circumstance would not only be
West Virginia Code § 23–4–15 provides, in pertinent part:
(b) To entitle any employee to compensation for occupational pneumoconiosis under the provisions of this subsection, the application for compensation shall be made ... within three years from and after the last day of the last continuous period of sixty days or more during which the employee was exposed to the hazards of occupational pneumoconiosis or within three years from and after a diagnosed impairment due to occupational pneumoconiosis was made known to the employee by a physician[.]
(c) To entitle any employee to compensation for occupational disease other than occupational pneumoconiosis under the provisions of this section, the application for compensation shall be made ... within three years from and after the day on which the employee was last exposed to the particular occupational hazard involved or within three years from and after the employee's occupational disease was made known to him or her by a physician or which he or she should reasonably have known, whichever last occurs[.]
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an absurd result but would also unfairly punish the decedent's family for a situation that was beyond their control.
To be clear, I must again reiterate that the majority's decision today does not represent a carte blanche application of the discovery rule to all workers' compensation claims. Instead, this decision is limited to the unique circumstances of this case where the failure of the State Medical Examiner to provide an autopsy report within the time period for filling an application for dependent's benefits resulted in the loss of the claimant's right to seek compensation.
For the reasons set forth above, I concur with the majority's decision in this case.