Opinion
# 2018-053-572 Claim No. 128096 Motion No. M-92478 Cross-Motion No. CM-92614
12-27-2018
RONALD SHEEHAN v. STATE OF NEW YORK and NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION
LIPSITZ GREEN SCIME & CAMBRIA, LLP BY: Scott M. Schwartz, Esq. HON. BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD New York State Attorney General BY: Michael T. Feeley, Esq. Assistant Attorney General
Synopsis
The State's motion for summary judgment is granted and claimant's cross-motion for summary judgment is denied. Claimant asserted causes of action for malicious prosecution, unlawful imprisonment and deprivation of his civil rights and due process guarantees incident to an incarceration for his failure to appear for and participate in the Buffalo City Court DWI Program. The Court held that the acts of the judge and OCA personnel were protected by judicial immunity and the constitutional claims could be addressed in Federal Court.
Case information
| UID: | 2018-053-572 |
| Claimant(s): | RONALD SHEEHAN |
| Claimant short name: | SHEEHAN |
| Footnote (claimant name) : | |
| Defendant(s): | STATE OF NEW YORK and NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION |
| Footnote (defendant name) : | |
| Third-party claimant(s): | |
| Third-party defendant(s): | |
| Claim number(s): | 128096 |
| Motion number(s): | M-92478 |
| Cross-motion number(s): | CM-92614 |
| Judge: | J. DAVID SAMPSON |
| Claimant's attorney: | LIPSITZ GREEN SCIME & CAMBRIA, LLP BY: Scott M. Schwartz, Esq. |
| Defendant's attorney: | HON. BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD New York State Attorney General BY: Michael T. Feeley, Esq. Assistant Attorney General |
| Third-party defendant's attorney: | |
| Signature date: | December 27, 2018 |
| City: | Buffalo |
| Comments: | |
| Official citation: | |
| Appellate results: | |
| See also (multicaptioned case) |
Decision
Claimant Ronald Sheehan alleges in claim no. 128096 that he was summoned to appear before the Buffalo City Court by employees/agents of the New York State Unified Court System and the Office of Court Administration (OCA), who wrongfully advised Buffalo City Court that claimant was in violation of certain probation conditions in spite of the fact that claimant's probation had been transferred from Erie to Wyoming County, where he had not been charged with a violation. Claimant asserts causes of action for malicious prosecution, unlawful imprisonment and deprivation of his civil rights. Defendants move for summary judgment (motion no. M-92478) dismissing the claim. Claimant opposes defendants' motion and cross-moves for summary judgment (cross-motion no. CM-92614). Defendants oppose the cross-motion.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 14, 2014, claimant was arrested and charged with felony driving while intoxicated (DWI) and referred to the Buffalo City Court DWI Program while the felony charges remained pending against him in State Supreme Court before the Hon. Penny M. Wolfgang, J.S.C. The Buffalo City Court DWI Program (DWI Program) referral was a judicial diversion program pursuant to CPL § 216.05. On September 2, 2014, claimant executed a DWI Program contract listing the duration of the program to be from September 2, 2014 through October 8, 2015 (Defendants' Exhibit K). This contract required claimant, inter alia, to wear a SCRAM bracelet. Also on September 2, 2014, claimant executed a DWI Court Random Tox Agreement and a Buffalo City Court Program Agreement by which he agreed to be subjected to random urine toxicology testing, report to Buffalo City DWI Court and not to switch treatment facilities unless the DWI Program approved the change (Defendants' Exhibit K).
On February 10, 2015, claimant and the Hon. Penny M. Wolfgang, J.S.C. executed an Erie County Probation document which, inter alia, listed continued participation in ongoing programs and ordered claimant not to operate a motor vehicle as part of his sentencing (Defendants' Exhibit G).
On February 23, 2015, Justice Wolfgang signed an Order of Intrastate Transfer of Program Supervision (Claimant's Exhibit 1). This document transferred supervision of the claimant from the Erie County Probation Department to the Wyoming County Probation Department. On March 13, 2015, claimant's case was accepted by the Wyoming County Probation Department (Claimant's Exhibit 2).
On March 15, 2015, claimant appeared before Justice Wolfgang for sentencing on the crime of felonious driving while intoxicated. During the hearing, Jason C. Henskee, Esq., the claimant's attorney throughout the criminal proceedings, advised Justice Wolfgang that his client was "currently in the DWI Program" (Defendants' Exhibit F, p. 2). In addition, Mr. Henskee requested that the SCRAM bracelet be removed as the claimant was compliant with the DWI Program (Defendants' Exhibit F, p. 3). At the conclusion of sentencing, Justice Wolfgang ordered "that if there [was] an order for the SCRAM bracelet, it [was] to be removed" (Defendants' Exhibit F, p. 5). At no time during sentencing did claimant's attorney request that claimant be removed from the DWI Program. In addition, at no time during sentencing did Justice Wolfgang order the claimant removed from the DWI Program. (Defendants' Exhibit F).
On March 24, 2015, a letter executed on behalf of Justice Wolfgang was sent to claimant's counsel with a copy to claimant. This letter states, "we have determined that the scram bracelet is one of the DWI Court's requirements and that it must be worn by Mr. Sheehan until which time that the DWI Court determines that it may be removed" (Defendants' Exhibit H).
On April 10, 2015, claimant executed certain documents relating to the DWI Program (Defendants' Exhibit J). By the first document, claimant consented to communication between the Buffalo City DWI Court and Wyoming County Probation. By the next document, claimant agreed to participate in the DWI Program SCRAM bracelet program.
On May 20, 2015, Ronald Coleman, an employee of the OCA responsible for interacting with persons placed in the DWI Program, received a message stating that Wyoming County Probation Officer Gene Traxler had called to advise that claimant had a new arrest for driving without a license, that he had pled to AUO (aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle) and had a VOP (violation of probation) of June 1, 2015 (Claimant's Exhibit 3, p. 38-39). Claimant then voluntarily appeared before the Hon. Joseph A. Fiorella of the Buffalo City DWI Court on May 20, 2015 and told Judge Fiorella that the plea was to unauthorized operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree for which he was issued a fine. (Defendants' Exhibit I).
Claimant testified during his deposition that the present claim arises out of his incarceration that began on May 20, 2015 when it was imposed by Judge Fiorella. (Defendants' Exhibit D, p. 5). According to claimant, Mr. Coleman telephoned him and was told that Judge Fiorella wanted to see him. At that time, claimant was under the supervision of the DWI Program as a condition of his bail for his DWI offense (Defendants' Exhibit D, p. 6-7). Claimant testified that he had been sentenced by Justice Wolfgang for the DWI and that after sentencing, claimant continued to participate in the DWI Program, "like a dozen" times (Defendants' Exhibit D, p. 7-9).
Following sentencing, there was an issue with the SCRAM bracelet. Claimant testified that his criminal attorney, Jason Henskee, Esq., told him to remove the SCRAM bracelet. Subsequently, he was called by Mr. Coleman and told that he had received a letter from Justice Wolfgang and that claimant had to put the SCRAM bracelet back on and continue with the DWI Program (Defendants' Exhibit D, p. 9-10).
On May 20, 2015, claimant appeared in Buffalo City Court on an appearance ticket for aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle. Claimant's attorney told him that he was going to be incarcerated for violating the terms of his probation (Defendants' Exhibit D, p. 12-13). Claimant appeared before Judge Fiorella, who advised him that he had violated probation. Judge Fiorella imposed $50,000 bail and ordered claimant to be held. Claimant was remanded to and incarcerated in the Erie County Holding Center for three days. Claimant was then transferred to a correctional facility for an additional ten days. Claimant was incarcerated from May 20, 2015 to June 2, 2015, when he was released from custody (Defendants' Exhibit D, p. 14-15; Claim, ¶ 7).
Ronald Coleman, an employee of the OCA, testified that he was responsible for interacting with persons who had been placed in the DWI Program (Claimant's Exhibit 3, p. 7). Mr. Coleman testified that Justice Wolfgang had required claimant to continue with the DWI Program after he was sentenced. Mr. Coleman based his testimony in this regard on Justice Wolfgang's original referral of claimant to the DWI Program which had not been changed and the letter from Justice Wolfgang advising claimant's attorney that claimant should continue to wear the SCRAM bracelet as it was a requirement of the DWI Program (Claimant's Exhibit 3, p. 8; Defendants' Exhibit H).
On May 20, 2015, claimant's probation officer was Wyoming County Probation Officer, Gene Traxler (Claimant's Exhibit 3, p. 13). At some point, Mr. Traxler left a message for Mr. Coleman advising that claimant had violated parole and had been issued a traffic citation. Mr. Traxler's message further indicated that claimant had a VOP (violation of parole) date of June 1, 2015. According to Mr. Coleman, if there is a violation while participating in the DWI Program, you have to be seen by the DWI Court Judge (Claimant's Exhibit 3, p. 31, 38-39).
After receiving Mr. Traxler's message, Mr. Coleman contacted claimant and informed him that the Judge wanted to speak with him about the issue in Wyoming County. Mr. Coleman told claimant that a warrant would be issued if he failed to appear. According to Mr. Coleman, he didn't call and ask Mr. Traxler to contact claimant because as a DWI Program case manager, it was his job to interact with participants in the DWI Court. Claimant appeared voluntarily before Judge Fiorella, who sentenced claimant to be incarcerated on May 20, 2015. Claimant was released from custody on June 2, 2015 (Claimant's Exhibit 3, p. 31-41).
According to Mr. Coleman, claimant was released from custody on June 2, 2015 as he had completed the sanction imposed by Judge Fiorella as a deterrent for future noncompliance (Claimant's Exhibit 3, p. 41). On July 15, 2015, claimant was discharged from DWI Program compliance by Judge Fiorella (Claimant's Exhibit 3, p. 36).
Mr. Gene Traxler testified that he was employed as a Senior Probation Officer for Wyoming County. Mr. Traxler supervised high-risk cases to ensure that people on probation were following the conditions of their probation. (Claimant's Exhibit 4, p. 5-6). According to Mr. Traxler, claimant was placed on probation in Erie County but his supervision was then transferred to Wyoming County since claimant lived within that county in Arcade. (Claimant's Exhibit 4, p. 7). According to Mr. Traxler, the papers he received when claimant was transferred to Wyoming County did not indicate that claimant was required to continue with the DWI Program (Claimant's Exhibit 4, p. 8). At some point, Ms. Curry of Erie County Probation left a message for Mr. Traxler that Mr. Coleman wanted claimant to appear in court in Buffalo. Mr. Traxler returned Ms. Curry's call and told her that he would not contact claimant and tell him to go to Buffalo City Court (Claimant's Exhibit 4, p.15-16). In April, 2015, Mr. Traxler had an office visit with claimant, who advised him that he was back on the SCRAM bracelet and assigned in the DWI Program (Claimant's Exhibit 4, p. 10-20).
During a subsequent probation office visit with Mr. Traxler, claimant walked away from the probation meeting and he was observed by Mr. Traxler and another officer getting into a car and driving off. According to Mr. Traxler, claimant was then arrested for driving without a license and given an appearance ticket to appear at a later date in Warsaw Village Court (Claimant's Exhibit 4, p. 19-22).
By letter dated July 2, 2015, Wyoming County Court Judge, the Hon. Michael M. Mohun, wrote to Buffalo City Court Judge Fiorella requesting that claimant "no longer participate in your Treatment Court" (Defendant's Exhibit H).
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and will only be granted where the moving party establishes that there are no triable issues of fact (Vega v Restani Constr. Corp., 18 NY3d 499 [2012]). The proponent of a summary judgment motion must present facts in evidentiary form sufficient to establish its right to judgment as a matter of law (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). If the proponent of the motion fails to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment, its motion must be denied regardless of the sufficiency of the opposing papers (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., supra at 324). If a prima facie showing has been made, the burden shifts to the opposing party to produce evidentiary proof sufficient to establish the existence of a triable issue of fact. (Alvarez v. Prospect Hosp., supra at 324; Zuckerman v City of New York, supra at 562.). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party (Haymon v Pettit, 9 NY3d 324 [2007]). Mere conclusions, unsubstantiated allegations or expressions of hope, however, are insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. (Zuckerman v City of New York, supra at 562).
Claimant alleges three causes of action in his claim: unlawful imprisonment; malicious prosecution; and deprivation of his civil rights and due process guarantees (Defendants' Exhibit A). Each of these causes of action will be discussed separately.
Unlawful Imprisonment
The elements of a cause of action for unlawful or false imprisonment are that "the defendant intended to confine the [claimant], that the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement and did not consent to the confinement and that the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Martinez v City of Schenectady, 97 NY2d 78, 85 [2001]; Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert. denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). The only element of claimant's false imprisonment cause of action that is disputed is whether claimant's confinement was privileged. Defendants argue that Judge Fiorella's order to confine claimant was privileged, while claimant argues that Judge Fiorella did not have jurisdiction to sentence claimant and that Mr. Coleman is also responsible for claimant's imprisonment. It is the defendants' burden to prove that the confinement was privileged (Moulton v State of New York, 114 AD3d 115, 120 [3d Dept 2013]).
For purposes of a false imprisonment claim, there is a difference between acts done in excess of jurisdiction and acts performed in the clear absence of any jurisdiction over the subject matter. The former act is privileged, while the later act is not (Collins v State of New York, 69 AD3d 46 [4th Dept 2009]; Colin v County of Suffolk, 181 AD2d 653 [2d Dept 1992]).
By his cross-motion, claimant argues that Ronald Coleman and Judge Fiorella had no jurisdiction over claimant after claimant's probation had been transferred from Erie County to Wyoming County. In support, claimant relies on CPL 410.80, which provides that upon "completion of transfer, the appropriate court within the jurisdiction of the receiving probation department shall assume all powers and duties of the sentencing court and shall have sole jurisdiction in the case . . ." (CPL 410.80 [2] [a]). However, CPL 216.05 (8), provides that during the period of a person's participation in a judicial diversion program (like the DWI Program), the court shall retain jurisdiction of the person who may reside in another jurisdiction.
Claimant's claim for false imprisonment is based on an incarceration from May 20, 2015 to June 2, 2015. The only issue is whether Judge Fiorella at the time of claimant's detainer on bail on May 20, 2015 acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction (Colin v County of Suffolk, supra at 654). In concluding that Judge Fiorella did not act in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, I have considered that claimant agreed to participate in the DWI Program and that this participation was to last until October 8, 2015 (Defendant's Exhibit K); that a letter executed on behalf of Justice Wolfgang on March 24, 2015 (Defendant's Exhibit H), advised claimant's attorney that the SCRAM bracelet had to be worn until the DWI Program and the Buffalo City Court determined it could be removed (implying that Justice Wolfgang believed continuation in the DWI Program was a condition of her earlier sentence); and that claimant executed DWI Program documents and continued to attend the DWI Program after sentencing. Moreover, Wyoming County Probation Officer, Gene Traxler, believed that it was necessary to contact Ronald Coleman of the DWI Program to advise him that claimant had been found driving without a license and a Wyoming County Judge, after claimant had been released from custody, believed it necessary to request that claimant no longer participate in the DWI Program. At all relevant times, but especially on May 20, 2015 when claimant was confined, Judge Fiorella had every reason to believe that Buffalo City Court had jurisdiction over claimant. Accordingly, Judge Fiorella is protected by judicial immunity and the State may not be held liable for his actions (Best v State of New York, 116 AD3d 1198 [3d Dept 2014]).
Similarly, Ronald Coleman, as an OCA employee assigned to oversee participants in the DWI Program, is cloaked with judicial immunity (Morrison-Allen v State of New York, 152 AD3d 509 [2d Dept 2017], app dismissed 30 NY3d 1002 [2017]; Best v State of New York, 116 AD3d 1198 [3d Dept 2014]; Rosenstein v State of New York, 37 AD3d 208 [1st Dept 2007]). I find that at the time Mr. Coleman advised claimant that Judge Fiorella wanted to see him regarding the Wyoming County incident, he reasonably believed that the DWI Program and Buffalo City Court had jurisdiction. As noted before, claimant had signed a year long contract to attend the DWI Program which had not been rescinded by Justice Wolfgang during sentencing and Justice Wolfgang believed claimant was still required to participate in the DWI Program. Moreover, claimant voluntarily appeared before Judge Fiorella on May 20, 2015. No warrant was issued and claimant was not arrested. Further, Mr. Coleman had nothing to do with Judge Fiorella's decision of May 20, 2015. Accordingly, Mr. Coleman is protected by judicial immunity and the State may not be liable for his actions (Colin v State of New York, supra at 654; Misek-Falkoff v Donovan, 250 AD2d 579 [2d Dept 1998]).
Malicious Prosecution
Claimant also alleges in his claim that the State is liable for malicious prosecution. In order to make out a claim for malicious prosecution, claimant must show: "(1) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the [claimant], (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding and (4) actual malice" (Broughton v State of New York, supra at 451, 457). Even if arguably claimant established the first element, he failed to establish the remaining three elements. Whether claimant pled guilty on or before May 20, 2015 to a violation of parole or to aggravated or unauthorized operation of a motor vehicle, he was not authorized to drive pursuant to the conditions of his parole. In addition, claimant failed to even allege actual malice and no malice can be found in the actions of Justice Wolfgang, Judge Fiorella, Ronald Coleman or any other OCA employee (see generally, Moulton v State of New York, supra at 125). Thus, claimant's cause of action for malicious prosecution must be dismissed.
Civil Rights and Due Process Violations
Finally, claimant alleges in his claim that he was deprived of his civil rights and due process guarantees. Claims against the State based on alleged deprivations of rights pursuant to the United States Constitution are beyond the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and alleged civil rights claims against the State must be dismissed as the State is not defined to be a person pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 (Sheldon v New York State Liq. Auth., 61 AD3d 1145 [3d Dept 2009]; Brown v State of New York, 89 NY2d 172 [1996]). Insofar as the claim can be construed as alleging a violation of the New York State Constitution, it too must fail. While Brown establishes a limited remedy under the New York State Constitution, this remedy exists only where no other remedy is feasible (Martinez v City of Schenectady, supra at 83-84). Here, claimant's constitutional tort cause of action could be addressed in Federal Court. Accordingly, to the extent the claim asserts a cause of action alleging either a Federal or State Constitutional cause of action, it fails and must be dismissed.
Based on the foregoing, defendants motion (motion no. M-92478) for summary judgment is granted, claimant's cross-motion (motion no. CM-92614) for summary judgment is denied, and claim no. 128096 is dismissed.
December 27, 2018
Buffalo, New York
J. DAVID SAMPSON
Judge of the Court of Claims The following were read and considered by the Court: 1. Defendants' notice of motion no. M-92478 and supporting affidavit of Assistant Attorney General Michael T. Feeley sworn to June 25, 2018, with annexed Exhibits A-K; 2. Claimant's cross-motion no. CM-92614 and affirmation of Scott M. Schwartz dated July 24, 2018, with annexed Exhibits 1-4 in opposition to defendants' motion and in support of claimant's cross-motion; and 3. Affidavit of Assistant Attorney General Michael T. Feeley sworn to August 1, 2018 in response to claimant's cross-motion and in further support of defendants' motion