"An application to punish a party for civil contempt is addressed to the sound discretion of the court" (Matter of Freeborn v Elco, 188 A.D.3d 677, 680). Here, contrary to the father's contentions, he failed to demonstrate that the mother violated a clear and unequivocal mandate contained in any of the prior orders in question in a manner that was calculated to or actually "defeated, impaired, impeded, or prejudiced his rights" (Matter of Sheehan v Sheehan, 192 A.D.3d 894, 895; see Matter of Marotta v Marotta, 218 A.D.3d 468, 469-470). Accordingly, the Family Court properly denied his violation petitions (see Matter of Kraemer v Strand-O'Shea, 66 A.D.3d 901, 901).

In order to demonstrate the requisite prejudice, the petitioner must show that the respondent's acts or omissions "significantly defeated, impaired, impeded, or prejudiced his [or her] rights" (Matter of Perez v Richmond, 104 A.D.3d 692, 692; see Matter of Tonya YY. v James ZZ., 220 A.D.3d 1149, 1150-1151; Matter of Michael F. [Shreeis J.], 152 A.D.3d 770, 771). Indeed, the violation of a court order, standing alone, is insufficient to punish a party for civil contempt (see Matter of Sheehan v Sheehan, 192 A.D.3d 894, 895). If the petitioner "makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the [respondent] to refute that showing, or to offer evidence of a defense such as an inability to comply with the order" (Matter of Mendoza-Pautrat v Razdan, 160 A.D.3d 963, 964).