Commonwealth v. Allen, 443 Pa. 96, 277 A.2d 803 (1971). Wayne v. State, 8 Md. App. 5, 257 A.2d 455 (1969); Young v. Kansas, 207 Kan. 166, 483 P.2d 1020 (1971); State v. Hartstein, 469 S.W.2d 329 (Mo. 1971), reversed on other grounds 404 U.S. 988, 92 S.Ct. 531, 30 L.Ed.2d 539; Shedrick v. State, 235 So.2d 57 (Fla.App. 1970). This Court is in accord with the reasoning and conclusion of Judge Miller in Pinkard, and holds that the rules laid down by the Supreme Court in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2089, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) must be applied retroactively in all respects.

Before Payne was decided, lower courts had been split over the retroactivity of Pearce. Holding Pearce retroactive: United States v. Gross, 416 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1969); Barnes v. United States, 136 U.S. App. D.C. 171, 419 F.2d 753 (1969); Henderson v. United States, 446 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1971); Rivera v. Rose, 465 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1972), judgment vacated, 412 U.S. 935, 93 S.Ct. 2769, 37 L.Ed.2d 395 (1973); Torrance v. Henry, 304 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.C. 1969); Pinkard v. Neil, 311 F. Supp. 711 (M.D. Tenn. 1970); Commonwealth v. Allen, 443 Pa. 96, 277 A.2d 803 (Sup.Ct. 1971). Holding Pearce prospective only: James v. Copinger, 441 F.2d 23 (4th Cir. 1971); Shedrick v. State, 235 So.2d 57 (Fla.App. 1970); Young v. State, 207 Kan. 166, 483 P.2d 1020 (Sup.Ct. 1971); Wayne v. State, 8 Md. App. 5, 257 A.2d 455 (Ct. Sp. App. 1969). However, we do not believe that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Payne is dispositive of the issue of the retroactivity of DeBonis.

Our holding in this regard is without prejudice, however, to Young's right to reapply for the relief sought in the present action should the Supreme Court hereafter give retrospective effect to the standards set out in the Pearce decision. (See Wayne v. State, 8 Md. App. 5, 257 A.2d 455; Shedrick v. State, 235 So.2d 57 [Fla. App.].) The judgment of the court below is reversed and this case is remanded with directions that the sentence of not less than ten nor more than twenty-one years imposed on June 5, 1970, be vacated and set aside and that the sentence of not less than twenty nor more than forty-two years pronounced on April 20, 1966, be reinstated.

Upon consideration of the petition, the return and jurisdictional brief of the respondent, we find that the writ was improvidently issued. The writ is discharged but without prejudice to petitioner's right to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in the light of North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969); Stonom v. Wainwright, 235 So.2d 545 (Fla.App.1st 1970); and Shedrick v. State, 235 So.2d 57 (Fla.App.4th 1970). It is so ordered.

Ordered that petitioner's pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, filed March 24, 1971, is hereby denied. See Shedrick v. State, Fla.App., 235 So.2d 57. Habeas corpus denied.