Opinion
Civil Action 2:22-cv-1708
03-23-2023
DAARON SHEARS, Plaintiff, v. O.M.G., Defendant.
Judge Nora Barry Fischer
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PATRICIA L. DODGE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Daaron Shears, is a state prisoner. He has filed a civil rights Complaint (ECF 5) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in which he brings a claim or claims against O.M.G., who appears to be the victim in his state criminal case in which he was convicted of rape and related crimes.For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss this action prior to service of the Complaint and without leave to amend in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
The Court shall refer to Defendant by her initials.
II. REPORT
A. Background
Plaintiff was convicted in 2012 in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County of rape, sexual assault, and statutory sexual assault and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Shears, No. 670 WDA 2022, 2023 WL 140347, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2023). He is currently serving his sentence at SCI Rockview.
Plaintiff recently initiated the instant civil rights action with this Court by filing a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF 1.) He did not submit the required supporting documents and, therefore, the Court issued an order directing him to correct the deficiency. (ECF 2.) Plaintiff subsequently filed the required documents in support of his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court granted that motion (ECF 4), and the Clerk of Court filed the Complaint (ECF 5.)
Plaintiff asserts in the Complaint that his claim or claims against O.M.G., the sole defendant in this case, are authorized under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that the Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1343(a). (Id. at 1.) He alleges that O.M.G. defamed him by making a false police report and testifying against him at trial, which resulted in alleged false information being reported about him on the internet and the local newspaper. (Id. at 2-3.) As relief, Plaintiff seeks punitive and compensatory damages and injunctive relief directing that O.M.G. publicly clear his name. (Id. at 4.)
B. Standard of Review
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), courts are required to screen complaints where, as is the case here, the plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). It requires the Court to dismiss a complaint that, among other things, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The legal standard for dismissing a complaint under the PLRA for failure to state a claim is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
During the screening the Court also shall consider jurisdictional-related questions and should dismiss the case if it determines that subject matter jurisdiction does not exist. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed, in whole or in part, for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). While “accepting] all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true,” the court “may disregard any legal conclusions.” Id. at 210-11.
To survive a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Though ‘detailed factual allegations' are not required, a complaint must do more than simply provide ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'” Davis v. Abington Mem'l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 241 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In sum, the plaintiff “must plead facts sufficient to show that her claim has substantive plausibility.” Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10 (2014).
To assess the sufficiency of a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, a court must take three steps: (1) outline the elements the plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief; (2) peel away those allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth; (3) look for well-pled factual allegations, assume their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). The court's plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover, under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant.
C. Discussion
“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against state actors who violate an individual's rights under federal law.” Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.S. 377, 380 (2012) (emphasis added). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (emphasis added).
The allegations in the Complaint do not support a § 1983 claim against O.M.G., who is a private citizen. None of the factual allegations in the Complaint permit the reasonable inference that she was acting under color of state law or that she is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents. See, e.g., West, 487 U.S. at 50 (“The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980); David W. Lee, HANDBOOK OF SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, § 1:04, Westlaw (database updated 2023). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under § 1983 against O.M.G.
Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff's purported § 1983 claim against O.M.G. is premised on the testimony she gave against him at his trial, O.M.G. is entitled to absolutely immunity on such a claim. Briscoe v. Lahue, 460 U.S. 325, 343 (1983); Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1467 (3d Cir. 1992). Petitioner's claim is also barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), which held that a state prisoner may not use § 1983 as a vehicle to pursue redress if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration. See also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (“a state prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)-no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner's suit (state conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)-if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”)
Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff is asserting a state law claim for defamation in the Complaint, the Court does not have jurisdiction over that claim because there is no diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and no other independent basis for federal jurisdiction.
Plaintiff lists O.M.G.'s address on the Complaint. According to him, she resides in Pennsylvania.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Court dismiss the Complaint with prejudice to filing another § 1983 action against O.M.G. The Court should not provide Plaintiff with the opportunity to file an amended complaint in this federal action because it would be futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002) (when a deficient complaint is dismissed, the court must permit a curative amendment unless it would be futile).
III. CONCLUSION
It is respectfully recommended that this Court dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice to filing another § 1983 action against O.M.G. and without leave to amend. Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, Plaintiff is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).