Id. During the existence of a trust, legal title to the res is in the trustee and equitable title is in the beneficiaries. Id. at 871 (citing Shearrer v. Holley, 952 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ)). But, upon the termination of a trust,
During the existence of a trust, legal title to the res is in the trustee and equitable title is in the beneficiaries. Id. at 871 (citing Shearrer v. Holley, 952 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ)). But, upon the termination of a trust,
However, "[d]uring the existence of the trust, legal title to the res is in the trustee and equitable title is in the beneficiaries." Sorrel, 1 S.W.3d at 871 (citing Shearrer v. Holley, 952 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ)). However, legal title held by the trustee and the equitable title held by the beneficiaries merge in the beneficiaries and the beneficiaries acquire full ownership interest in the property when the trust terminates.
Appellees thus argue there is no express condition precedent in the trust agreement that Clark IV survive to the specified ages in order to receive the corpus of the trust and that Texas courts have refused to imply a condition of survival for the vesting of an interest. Appellees rely on Shearrer v. Holley, 952 S.W.2d 74,78 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ), and Turner v. Adams, 855 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1993, no writ). The Shearrer court noted, "The complete absence of specific language of survival dictates that [the decedent's] remainder interest vest at the time of the creation of the trust."
FWNB, as trustee, acquired the legal title to the Langille Trust's property, while the beneficiaries took an equitable interest. See Cutrer v. Cutrer, 334 S.W.2d 599, 605 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1960) ("for a trust to be a trust, the legal title must immediately pass to the trustee, and beneficial or equitable interest to the beneficiaries"), aff'd, 162 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. 1961); see also Shearrer v. Holley, 952 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ) (observing that the merger of legal and equitable interests ends a trust). The Government instituted a condemnation action in 1949 against approximately 85,237 acres in Zapata County to obtain land on which to construct Falcon Dam. See United States v. 85,237 Acres of Land, More or Less, in Zapata County, Tex., 157 F. Supp. 150, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1957), aff'd, 252 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1958).
ECF Nos. 247-2, 247-3, 247-4. ECF Nos. 247-2, 247-3, 247-4; Shearrer v. Holley , 952 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ) ("For example, in Rust , the Austin court of appeals held that ‘a devise by A to B for life with remainder at his death to C creates a vested remainder in C upon the death of A, subject to B's life estate,’ and that the words ‘at his death’ refer to the time when the right of possession begins, not when the remainder vests .... More recently, in McGill , the supreme court, citing Rust , interpreted the words ‘at the death of my said son’ as referring only to the time of enjoyment or possession, rather than vestment.") (citations omitted). Accordingly, this Court finds that in accordance with § 1187(b) Debtor was required but failed to disclose the payments made by Lyra and Vega for his adult children's educational and living expenses in his Monthly Operating Reports and lied under oath.
The Brazoria County judgment confirms the identity of interest; when the Brazoria County trial court distributed the family trust property pursuant to the special master's report, Woody acquired a full ownership interest of the assets distributed to his trust. See Shearrer v. Holley, 952 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ) (confirming that acquisition of full ownership interest occurs through merger of both legal and equitable interests in beneficiary); Perfect Union Lodge No. 10 v. Interfirst Bank, N.A., 748 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. 1988) (observing that separation of legal and equitable estates "is the basic hallmark of the trust entity"); cf. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.034(b) (West 2007) (providing trust generally terminates "if the legal title to the trust property and all equitable interests in the trust become united in one person"). Because both equitable and legal title to all of the assets distributed to Woody's trust merged in the Brazoria County judgment, an identity of interest exists between Woody's participation in the Brazoria County suit and the claims in the Harris County suit brought in his individual capacity.
The Brazoria County judgment confirms the identity of interest; when the Brazoria County trial court distributed the family trust property pursuant to the special master's report, Woody acquired a full ownership interest of the assets distributed to his trust. See Shearrer v. Holley, 952 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ) (confirming that acquisition of full ownership interest occurs through merger of both legal and equitable interests in beneficiary); Perfect Union Lodge No. 10 v. Interfirst Bank, N.A., 748 S.W.2d 218, 220 (Tex. 1988) (observing that separation of legal and equitable estates "is the basic hallmark of the trust entity"); cf. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.034(b) (West 2007) (providing trust generally terminates "if the legal title to the trust property and all equitable interests in the trust become united in one person"). Because both equitable and legal title to all of the assets distributed to Woody's trust merged in the Brazoria County judgment, an identity of interest exists between Woody's participation in the Brazoria County suit and the claims in the Harris County suit brought in his individual capacity.
The legal title held by the trustees and the equitable title held by the beneficiaries merged in the beneficiaries when Dr. Lombana died and the Investment Trust terminated. During the existence of a trust, legal title to the res is in the trustee and equitable title is in the beneficiaries. Shearrer v. Holley, 952 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ). Upon termination, legal and equitable interests merge and the beneficiaries acquire full ownership interest in the property.
This court has previously recognized this automatic vesting in discussing the ownership of trust property. See Shearrer v. Holley, 952 S.W.2d 74, 78 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no writ). As we previously explained: It is basic trust law that “for a trust to be a trust, the legal title of the [trust property] must immediately pass to the trustee, and beneficial or equitable interest to the beneficiaries.”