Opinion
C.A. No. 99C-12-233
Date Submitted: October 23, 2002
Date Decided: November 13, 2002
FINDINGS AFTER REMAND
AFTER REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DEFENDANT'S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION GRANTED
On this 13th day of November 2002, upon Remand from the Supreme Court for consideration of Allstate Insurance Company's ("Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment it appears to the Court that:
FACTS
Plaintiff Shearin instituted this action on December 29, 2000 seeking rescission of her automobile policy with Defendant Allstate and return of the premiums she had paid or, in the alternative, for payment for her stolen car. From January 12, 1995 until January 12, 1998, Plaintiff Shearin had a valid policy of insurance with Allstate for a 1980 Toyota Tercel. In January 1995, Plaintiff turned her car over to Mr. Stokesbury for repairs. At that time, Mr. Stokesbury gave Plaintiff a loaner car which she used until late 1997 or early 1998. At some point in late 1997, believed to be around October, Plaintiff received notice from Mr. Stokesbury or his wife that they no longer retained possession of her car, but had given it over to Chris Jones.
Shearin claims that when she learned her car had been junked by Chris Jones, she purchased another car and verbally notified someone at Allstate that Stokesbury had stolen her car. Plaintiff admits that she has not filed a police report nor made a claim to Allstate for her stolen car. Allstate declined to insure Plaintiff's new car and the old insurance policy lapsed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party has shown that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court must weigh the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Summary judgment will not be granted under circumstances where the record reasonably indicates that a material fact is in dispute or if it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of law to the circumstances.
Moore v. Sizemore, Del. Supr., 405 A.2d 679 (1979).
Id.
Ebersole v. Lowengrub, Del. Supr., 180 A.2d 467 (1962).
DISCUSSION
A cause of action for breach of contract arises at the time of the alleged breach. Nardo v. Guido DeAscanis Sons, Inc., Del. Super., 254 A.2d 254 (1969). Delaware caselaw has stated that an insurance contract is breached when a claim is denied. Harper v. State Farm, 703 A .2d 136, 140 (1997). Here, no cause of action has yet accrued. Plaintiff admitted in her arbitration transcript that she has not made a claim to Allstate for her stolen car. Further, neither party is disputing that Plaintiff had valid insurance from January 12, 1995 until January 12, 1998.Plaintiff did not comply with the requirements of the insurance policy: she did not notify Allstate in writing of the claim and did not file a police report. In fact, the insurance policy prohibits suits against Allstate unless there is full compliance with all the terms of the policy. Here, that was not done. Thus, no cause of action has accrued.
CONCLUSION
After examining the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Plaintiff Shearin, Defendant Allstate should be granted summary judgment. No genuine issue of material fact exists to allow this case to proceed to trial. Based on the agreed upon facts and admissions, no cause of action has yet arisen for this suit, thus depriving this Court of the power to adjudicate it.
For the forgoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.