Opinion
C.A. No. 05C-07-224-PLA.
Submitted: March 29, 2006.
Decided: March 31, 2006.
UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT GRANTED.
Richard A. DiLiberto, Jr., Esquire and Jennifer M. Kinkus, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
C. Scott Reese, Esquire and Noriss E. Cosgrove, Esquire, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendants.
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Kathryn Matassa ("Matassa") in this social host liability case. Susan Shea and the Estate of Christopher Shea ("Shea") argue that this Court should find that Delaware's common law and public policy permit social hosts to be liable for the tortious behavior of their intoxicated guests. For the reasons explained herein the motion will be GRANTED.
The tragic facts of this case have already been fully articulated in the Court's January 10, 2006 Opinion and Order, and the Court will not repeat them here at length. Christopher Shea died after his car was struck head-on by Philip Healy. At the time of the accident, Healy's blood alcohol level was more than three times the legal limit. The Sheas' are seeking damages from Matassa, Healy's sister, for negligently serving Healy numerous alcoholic beverages and failing to prevent him from driving on the public roadways.
2006 WL 258312 (Del.Super.).
Defendant Matassa moves for summary judgment on the ground that no Dram Shop liability exists in Delaware, and that the Delaware Supreme Court has applied similar logic with regard to social host liability. Matassa refers the court to DiOssi v. Maroney, in which the Delaware Supreme Court declined to extend social host liability beyond its current bounds. Shea argues that the holding in DiOssi is distinguishable due to language in the opinion that "the duty of a social host is not so limited [as that of a tavern]," and because the Court stated that it was not "passing upon the liability of a social host . . . to third parties off the premises" but instead chose to "leave such considerations to another day."
548 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1988).
Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1369.
In DiOssi, this Court granted summary judgment to defendant social hosts on the ground that they owed no duty to provide safe premises to plaintiff, a parking valet who was struck by an intoxicated guest. That holding was reversed by the Supreme Court on other grounds. The Court instead held that the defendant social hosts were liable specifically on a theory of premises liability. The property owners, the Court held, owed a duty to protect the valet expressly because he was a "business invitee" and therefore entitled to such protection. The Court emphasized that its opinion was premised, not on an expansive view of social host liability, but rather on "a safe workplace rationale." DiOssi, although not precisely applicable here, is sufficient to guide this Court in determining that the Delaware Supreme Court did not intend to create, or recognize, a cause of action against social hosts for damages caused by an intoxicated guest. Indeed, the Court in DiOssi explicitly held that:
Id. at 1362.
DiOssi, 548 A.2d at 1367.
Because our holding sustaining a claim against a social host is a novel one, we deem it important to emphasize what we do not decide. Our holding may not be read to extend the liability of a social host for the injuries of other guests which are caused by tortious conduct attributable to the social host's dispensing of alcoholic beverages.
In conjunction with this holding and the legislature's repeated refusal to create Dram Shop liability, the premises guest statute holds landowners free from liability for injuries caused to guests in the absence of "willful or wanton disregard of the rights of others."
In spite of this, Plaintiffs contend that the Supreme Court has distinguished social host liability from that of tavern owners. In particular, Plaintiffs argue that one of the reasons the Supreme Court has refused to impose Dram Shop liability is because the alcohol industry is highly regulated by the General Assembly, while social hosts are not. The Supreme Court in Wright v. Moffitt held that the public policy considerations of creating Dram Shop liability were best addressed by the General Assembly "not merely" because regulating the alcohol beverage business has traditionally been the province of the General Assembly, but because the issue also has many practical implications that are best addressed by a legislative body. Indeed, in that case, the Supreme Court particularly noted the "slippery slope" of judge-created Dram Shop liability because "inevitably, if a cause of action were recognized . . . a commercial dispenser of alcoholic beverages (and, probably, a social host) would be party to every suit in which an intoxicated person is alleged to have committed a tortious act." The Supreme Court was clearly not contemplating creating a cause of action in one case, but not the other. Certainly, it would be anomalous for this Court to find that social hosts may be held liable in light of my previous holding that Dram Shop liability does not exist in this state.
Wright v. Moffitt, 437 A.2d 554 (Del. 1981).
Id. at 556 (emphasis added).
Id.
It seems apparent to this Court that no common law claim against a social host for injuries caused by an intoxicated guest off the premises now exists. I have already made clear that this Trial Judge respects the Court's duty to follow the law as pronounced by the General Assembly and our State's highest court. I again conclude that it is not within the power of a trial court to create a new common law cause of action, and I again emphasize that while I am sympathetic to the tragedy of Christopher Shea's death, I am unwilling to usurp the authority of the Supreme Court and the legitimate right of the legislature to create such a cause of action by statute.
2006 WL 258312.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.