Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 02-7931.
June 12, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff alleges 1) violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and 2) disclosure of confidential information without his consent in violation of Pennsylvania state law. Currently before the court are defendants Service Access Management, County of Berks, Agere Systems and Susan Geise's motions to dismiss plaintiff's federal claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and his state claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. For the reasons that follow, these motions will be granted.
In his complaint, plaintiff also alleged a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. At oral argument, however, plaintiff specifically conceded this claim; as plaintiff correctly noted, the Fifth Amendment only applies to federal conduct, which was decidedly absent this case.
Facts
As required in considering motions to dismiss, the facts are gleaned from the allegations in the complaint, which are accepted as true for this purpose.
From July 1, 1979 until his retirement in May 2002, plaintiff Gregory Shay ("Shay" or "plaintiff") was an employee of Agere Systems ("Agere") and its predecessor. Compl. at ¶ 12. On October 17, 2001, several months prior to retiring, Shay and several of his colleagues were physically escorted from Agere's premises for allegedly falsifying time records. Id. at ¶ 13. Shay claims that Agere, which was experiencing financial difficulties at the time, manufactured these false allegations in an effort to eliminate jobs and thereby reduce its expenses. Id. at ¶ 14.
After his removal from his work place, Susan Geise ("Geise"), an Employee Assistance Counselor for Agere, contacted Shay, who stated that he did not wish to speak with her and that he wanted "to be left alone." Id. at ¶¶ 15-16. Geise then contacted Dr. Andrew Morris ("Morris"), who at the time was Shay's treating psychiatrist and an employee of Bornemann Health Corporation ("Bornemann"). Id. at ¶¶ 17-18. Without Shay's consent, Morris revealed Shay's confidential medical information to Geise, who then contacted Service Access Management ("SAM"). Id. at ¶¶ 18-20. Pursuant to a contract, SAM performs mental health and retardation services on behalf of the County of Berks ("the County"). Id. at ¶¶ 9.
During her conversation with SAM representatives, Geise relayed the confidential medical information she had obtained from Morris and completed an application for Shay's involuntary emergency examination and treatment pursuant to the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act ("MHPA"). Id. at ¶¶ 20-22, 26. The application stated that Shay posed a "clear and present danger to himself" because "in the past 30 days," he had "made threats to commit suicide and [had] committed acts which [were] in furtherance of [that] threat. . . ." Compl., Exh. A. In support of these allegations, Geise made the following verified statement, in which she detailed her version of her conversation with Shay:
Greg said he had Klonepin and alcohol in front of him to mix. He described very graphic events he experienced in Vietnam, including a man getting his head blown off for stealing a beer. Said he may be found in a pool of blood. He is a gun collector, stated that military taught him how to kill and how to hate and therefore he has killed before. He contracted for 24 hours of safety but his doctor, Dr. Andrew Morris of Bornaman [sic] Psychiatric . . . felt that his promise would not be reliable if alcohol is involved. I called employee in my position as employee assistance counselor for Agere Systems after being notified by his management that he was escorted out of the workplace for disciplinary action. He shared his psychiatric history with [illegible].Id.
Shay, however, alleges that he never made these statements to Geise and that she intentionally fabricated them for the purpose of having him involuntarily committed. Compl. at ¶¶ 26-27, 30, 33. Specifically, he states that "at no time did [he] attempt suicide, threaten suicide, or commit any acts in furtherance of a threat to commit suicide." Id. at ¶ 30. Nonetheless, SAM, which did not investigate Geise's allegations, prepared and executed a warrant for Shay's involuntary examination and treatment based solely on the information contained in Geise's application. Id. at ¶ 23.
With this warrant in hand, on October 18, 2001, police officers of the Fleetwood Borough Police Department "gained entrance to [p]laintiff's home by subterfuge, and arrested and handcuffed [him]." Id. at ¶ 24. Pursuant to the warrant, the officers took Shay to Reading Hospital and Medical Center, where he was evaluated and released after a physician concluded that he was not suicidal. Id. at ¶ 26. As a result of this experience, Shay filed the instant case.
Plaintiff's compliant does not state the period of time for which he was detained.
Standard of Review
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of fact, and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, in the plaintiff's complaint and must determine whether "under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 665-66 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989) (citations omitted). Although the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, it need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) only if "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id.
Discussion
The Supreme Court has stated that in order to succeed in a § 1983 suit, "the plaintiff must show that the defendant deprived him of [a] constitutional right `under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State or Territory." Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). Thus, "[t]he initial inquiry in a section 1983 suit is (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law and (2) whether the conduct deprived the complainant of rights secured under the Constitution or federal law." Sameric Corp. of Delaware, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) and Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995)). In the instant case, plaintiff's complaint and attachments thereto do not allege facts supporting the conclusion that Geise and Agere are state actors or that SAM and the County violated plaintiff's constitutional rights. Thus, plaintiff is unable to state a § 1983 claim upon which relief may be granted against any of these defendants. Consequently, his claim will be dismissed. The court will examine the claims against each defendant in turn.I. Defendants Geise and Agere
Because plaintiff's contention that Geise and Agere are state actors is not persuasive, plaintiff's claim against these defendants will be dismissed.
Plaintiff argues that Geise and Agere became state actors by virtue of Geise's filing an application with SAM for plaintiff's involuntary examination, thereby forging a symbiotic relationship with SAM and the County. He relies on Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), in which the Court held that public and private parties form a symbiotic relationship when a "[s]tate has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [a private actor] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity[.]" Id. at 725.
The Supreme Court has held that "[i]f the challenged conduct of [defendants] constitutes state action as delimited by our prior decisions, then that conduct was also action under color of state law and will support a suit under § 1983." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982).
At oral argument, plaintiff specifically stated that the only basis for his theory of state action is the symbiotic relationship test.
Despite its potentially broad-sweeping application, this symbiotic relationship test for state action has been narrowly interpreted, particularly by our Court of Appeals. In Crissman v. Dover Downs Entertainment, Inc., 289 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc), the Third Circuit examined the Burton decision and noted that
[t]he Supreme Court has had occasion in the more than 40 years since Burton was decided to consider state action in no less than a dozen cases, and while referring to and characterizing the Burton `test' in several opinions, the Supreme Court has never relied upon it again to find state action. Nor, however, has it overruled it.Id. at 241.
Based on this reasoning, the court held that "while Burton remains good law, it was crafted for the unique set of facts presented, and we will not expand its reach beyond facts that replicate what was before the Court in Burton." Id. at 242.
Plaintiff's case bears strikingly little similarity to the facts presented in Burton. The latter involved a state-owned and operated parking facility, which contained commercial space, part of which the state leased to a restaurant that refused to serve people of color. Id. at 717. The state received $28,700 annually from this restaurant in exchange for which it provided the restaurant with heat, gas, and basic maintenance. Id. at 720. Additionally, "[p]atrons of the state's activity (parking) benefitted from the lessee's activity (restaurant services)." Crissman, 289 F.3d at 240. Moreover, because the restaurant had alleged that serving people of color would hurt its business, the Court reasoned that "profits earned by discrimination not only contribute to, but also are indispensable elements in, the financial success of a governmental agency." Burton, 365 U.S. at 724.
In contrast, plaintiff in the instant action has not alleged any possible benefit the government would receive from illegitimately detaining him. Plaintiff has failed to articulate a single self-serving financial, personal, or political motive that could have informed the government's actions. Moreover, he has not alleged a conspiracy between the government and private defendants to deprive him of his constitutional rights by committing him without cause. Additionally, as plaintiff conceded at oral argument, in the instant action, the private individuals — Geise and Agere — insinuated themselves into a legitimate government procedure as opposed to the government insinuating itself into the illegitimate actions of private entities, as was the case in Burton.
This fact also distinguishes this case from Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970), cited by plaintiff in his brief, but not argued, in which the Court held that state action may be based on a conspiracy between the state and private actors. Id. at 152.
In short, plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that Geise and Agere had a symbiotic relationship with the state. Consequently, there is no basis upon which this court could hold that these defendants are state actors by virtue of a symbiotic relationship with the state. For this reason, plaintiff's claims against Geise and Agere will be dismissed. II. Defendant SAM A. Procedural Due Process
Additionally, even if I were to hold that Geise and Agere are state actors, because plaintiff has failed to allege any basis for Agere's liability other than respondeat superior, his claim against the company would nonetheless still be dismissed.
In Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court held that, absent certain exceptions — none of which are relevant to or raised in the instant action — municipalities could not be held vicariously liable for constitutional violations committed by their employees. Id. at 691. Many appellate and district courts have held that this rule applies with equal force to private employers who have been deemed state actors. See Lux v. Hansen, 886 F.2d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir. 1989); Iskander v. Village of Forest Park, 690 F.2d 126, 128 (7th Cir. 1982); Powell v. Shopco Laurel Co., 678 F.2d 504, 506 (4th Cir. 1982); Jones v. Preuit Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 489 U.S. 1002 (1989); Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1129-30 (11th Cir. 1992); Doby v. Decrescenzo, 1996 WL 510095 at * 19 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 1996) (Rendell, J.); Covell v. Smith, 1996 WL 750033 at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1996); Eaton v. University of Delaware, 2001 WL 863441 at *5 n. 9 (D. Del. July 31, 2001).
Thus, Agere could not be vicariously liable for the allegedly unconstitutional actions of its employee. Hence, even if the company could be considered a state actor, plaintiff's federal claim against it would nonetheless be dismissed.
At oral argument, the county admitted that its liability — or lack thereof — is predicated on SAM's liability. The only argument to the contrary appears in the County's brief where it states that it signed an indemnification agreement with SAM, pursuant to which SAM agreed "to indemnify the County and the Department of Public Welfare and hold them harmless from any and all loss, claim, cost of damage resulting from any action taken by SAM in the provision of services under this Agreement." Def. Mot. to Dismiss, Exh. B at 4. At oral argument, however, the County agreed that this provision has no bearing on its direct liability to plaintiff for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. In addition, plaintiff agreed that if the claim against SAM is dismissed, so too must the claim against the County.
Plaintiff alleges that SAM violated his procedural due process rights by failing to investigate Geise's averments prior to issuing a warrant for his involuntary examination. Because our Court of Appeals has held that SAM was under no constitutional obligation to so do, plaintiff's claim will be dismissed.
Section 7302 of the MHPA states that "[u]pon written application by a physician or other responsible party setting forth facts constituting reasonable grounds to believe a person is severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, the county administrator may issue a warrant requiring . . . any peace officer to take such person to the facility specified in the warrant." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7302(a)(1) (West 2003). Section 7301 of the act provides that an individual is severely mentally disabled "when, as a result of mental illness, . . . he poses a clear and present danger of harm to . . . himself." Id. at 7301(b)(1). That section further states that one poses a clear and present danger to one's self if, within the past 30 days, one "has made threats to commit suicide and has committed acts which are in furtherance of the threat to commit suicide." Id. at 7301(b)(2)(ii).
In the instant case, plaintiff conceded at oral argument that no court has held that the Due Process Clause requires state actors to investigate the veracity of averments that an individual is mentally ill and dangerous prior to detaining that individual for purposes of a medical evaluation. More importantly, the Third Circuit has specifically held that the Due Process Clause does not so require. In Doby v. DeCrescenzo, 171 F.3d 858 (3d Cir. 1999), the court addressed whether "permitting individuals other than mental health professionals to petition for a section 7302 warrant [absent investigation or notice and hearing] violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 869. The plaintiffs in that case raised the concern that "permitting `anyone' to petition for such a warrant, particularly when the petitioner's statements are not investigated independently, will lead to arbitrary deprivations of liberty as the petitioner may have improper motives for seeking the involuntary examination." Id. (emphasis added).
In holding that this procedure did not offend due process, the court reasoned that "the procedure was created to allow the counties to handle emergency situations. Courts have stated repeatedly that due process is a flexible notion and that what kind of process is due depends on the individual and state interests at stake." Id. at 870 (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990)). Consequently, "[i]t may be reasonable . . . for a state to omit a provision for notice and a hearing in a statute created to deal with emergencies, particularly where the deprivation at issue, in this case detention for a maximum of several hours to permit an examination, continues for only a short period of time." Id. (citing Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 (1978)).
Section 7320 states that "[a] person taken to a facility shall be examined by a physician within two hours of arrival in order to determine if the person is severely mentally disabled within the meaning of [section 7301] and in need of immediate treatment." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7302(b).
In response to the plaintiff's concerns, the court further stated that "the application procedure itself has [certain] . . . safeguard[s] to prevent ill-motivated individuals from seeking the involuntary examination of others." Id. First, "the petitioners themselves are not making clinical determinations about an individual's mental state; instead, it is the county delegate, a trained mental health professional, who has the duty to decide whether the information provided by the petitioner constitutes grounds for issuing a warrant." Id. Second, "the face of the application includes a clear statement providing that anyone who supplies false information to the county may be prosecuted criminally." Id.
In the instant case, plaintiff's complaint and the attachments thereto indicate that SAM followed a procedure identical to that which was at issue in Doby. First, Aimee Vogel, who was either the county administrator or his or her representative, reviewed the application and concluded that the information contained therein sufficiently evidenced that plaintiff presented a clear and present danger to himself. Compl., Exh. A. Second, the petition that Geise completed for plaintiff's involuntary examination states on its face that "[a]ny person who provides any false information on purpose when he completes this form may be subject to criminal prosecution and may face criminal penalties including conviction of a misdemeanor." Id. Thus, as SAM allegedly followed the same procedure which the Doby court held satisfied the strictures of procedural due process, it would appear that plaintiff received all of the process to which he was due. Hence, his claim that SAM and the County violated his procedural due process rights will be dismissed.
See Compl., Exh. A (providing a copy of the warrant wherein Vogel's signature appears above a line which indicates that only the "county administrator or his/her representative" should sign).
Because 1) the warrant states on its face that the county administrator issues the warrant "[b]ased on representations made . . . by [the applicant]," Compl., Exh. A, 2) Vogel signed the warrant, id., and 3) plaintiff has not alleged that Vogel did not rely on Geise's representations when so doing, the court finds that Vogel reviewed the verified statement in the application.
B. Substantive Due Process
Plaintiff claims that SAM violated his substantive due process rights by issuing a warrant for his involuntary examination based on an affidavit that did not include allegations sufficient to satisfy the dangerousness standard that the Due Process Clause requires be met before a state may constitutionally commit a mentally ill person against his will. Specifically, he argues that Geise's affidavit did not contain facts demonstrating that plaintiff had threatened to harm himself and had taken actions in furtherance of that threat. Moreover, he claims issuing this deficient warrant was so grossly negligent that SAM violated substantive due process. Because 1) the affidavit on its face did sufficiently evidence plaintiff's dangerousness so as to comport with due process and 2) SAM's actions, as alleged in plaintiff's complaint, do not "shock the conscience," his claim will be dismissed.
It is well-established that "involuntary commitment to a mental hospital, like involuntary confinement of an individual for any reason, is a deprivation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish without due process of law." O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (describing involuntary civil commitment as a "massive curtailment of liberty"); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-266 (1979) (citing, inter alia, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) and stating that "[t]his Court repeatedly has recognized that civil commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection"); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490-91 (1980) (same). It is, however, equally clear that "[t]he state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves[.]" Addington, 441 U.S. at 426. Balancing these interests, the Court has held that, in order to comport with due process, a state must be presented with clear and convincing evidence that an individual suffers from mental illness and poses a danger either to himself or others before involuntarily committing that individual to a mental health facility. Id. at 426-27; Donaldson, 422 U.S. at 576; Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
While the court recognizes that neither the Supreme Court nor our Court of Appeals has applied this dangerousness standard to temporary involuntary detentions for examination rather than commitment, it is axiomatic that if SAM's actions were sufficient to comport with the substantive due process standards for actual commitment, they would suffice for the far less intrusive act of detaining plaintiff for no more than two hours.
Beyond stating that the "loss of liberty [incurred because of involuntary civil commitment] calls for a showing that the individual suffers from something more serious than is demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior[,]" Addington, 441 U.S. at 427, the Supreme Court has not yet specifically defined the dangerousness element of the above-delineated substantive due process standard. Those courts that have articulated a definition have largely held that a threat to harm one's self is sufficient to establish dangerousness. See Matthew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp. 707, 712 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (holding that a statute, which did not require a finding of an overt act, was not unconstitutionally vague); Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439, 451 (S.D. Iowa, 1976) (holding that substantive due requires proof of dangerousness as evidenced by a recent overt act, attempt, or threat); Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509, 514-15 (Neb. 1975) (same); Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (same); Suzuki v. Alba, 438 F. Supp. 1106, 1110 (Haw. 1977), aff'd and rev'd on other grounds in part, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980) (same). Moreover, to the best of this court's understanding, no court has held that due process requires a finding that an individual threatened harm to himself or others and committed an overt act in furtherance of that threat in order to establish dangerousness. Indeed, at least two courts of appeals and one district court within this circuit have held specifically that such a showing is not necessary. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960, 973-74 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[T]he New York State civil commitment scheme . . . meets the minimum due process standards without the addition of an overt act requirement."); United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that an individual, charged with a federal crime, but declared incompetent to stand trial, need not commit an overt act evidencing his dangerousness in order for the government to constitutionally confine him); Covell v. Smith, 1996 WL 750033 at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 1996) ("A finding of `dangerousness' does not require an overt act by the individual."). Thus, the Due Process Clause only requires that, prior to detaining a mentally ill individual for purposes of examination or treatment, the state must be presented with evidence that said individual recently had threatened to harm himself or others.
Thus, it appears that Pennsylvania, by defining a clear and present danger as not only threatening suicide, but also committing "acts which are in furtherance of the threat to commit suicide," id. at 7301(b)(2)(ii), provides greater protection to persons potentially subject to civil commitment than does the Constitution as interpreted by the courts. Hence, while plaintiff's allegations may suffice to present a state statutory claim, such a claim alone cannot form the basis of a § 1983 action. See Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097, 1113 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218 (1991) (stating that both Supreme Court precedent and "[t]he plain language of section 1983 . . . solely supports causes of action based upon violations, under the color of state law, of federal statutory law or constitutional rights. Section 1983 does not provide a cause of action for violations of state statutes, and, . . . a state statute cannot, in and of itself, create a constitutional right.").
In the instant case, Geise's affidavit did convey facts substantiating her allegations that plaintiff threatened suicide. Geise alleged that while discussing his violent memories from his military experience, plaintiff, who only hours before had been physically escorted from his place of employment, stated that "he may be found in a pool of blood." Compl., Exh. A. Examining this statement in the context in which Geise alleged plaintiff to have made it, the court is hard-pressed to interpret it as anything other than a suicide threat. Plaintiff denies ever making these statements or, alternatively, that if he did, they were taken out of context. Such claims, however, are irrelevant as nothing contained within the application should have alerted SAM to Geise's allegedly nefarious motives nor does he allege that SAM had additional information from which it should have questioned the veracity of the affidavit.
Additionally, even if the Due Process Clause does require a finding of an overt act demonstrating plaintiff's dangerousness, Geise's affidavit did sufficiently evidence such an act. The affidavit states that plaintiff "had Klonepin and alcohol in front of him to mix." Compl., Exh. A. Moreover, it states that plaintiff "is a gun collector" and that he had "contracted for 24 hours of safety but his doctor, Dr. Andrew Morris of Bornaman [sic] Psychiatric . . . felt that his promise would not be reliable if alcohol is involved." Id. In this context, plaintiff's act of placing drugs and alcohol before him when he allegedly had guns in his possession is an overt act in furtherance of his threat to harm himself.
Furthermore, based on these facts, SAM's actions were not so grossly negligent as to shock the conscience. In United Artists Threatre Circuit, Inc. v. Township of Warrington, PA, 316 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2003), our Court of Appeals held that the proper standard for evaluating substantive due process claims is not bad faith, but rather whether the state's actions "shocked the conscience." Id. at 399-401. In order to properly allege that a government's action "shocks the conscience," plaintiff must claim more than "the lowest common denominator of customary tort liability." County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 848-849 (1998). In other words, "the Constitution does not guarantee due care on the part of state officials; liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process." Id. at 849. Indeed, "[i]t is . . . behavior at the other end of the culpability spectrum that would most probably support a substantive due process claim; conduct intended to injure in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level." Id. at 849. While it is possible "that some [grossly negligent] official acts may be actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment," such a determination "is a matter for closer calls" and must be made on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 849 850.
In the instant case, SAM's actions do not rise to the level of shocking the conscience. First, as discussed supra, the allegations contained in Geise's affidavit were facially sufficient to evidence that plaintiff posed a danger to his own well-being. Second, SAM was under no statutory or constitutional obligation to investigate Geise's allegations. Thus, SAM's actions, which complied with both procedural due process and the substantive standard for dangerousness, simply cannot be so grossly negligent so as to shock the conscience. Thus, SAM's actions were well within the bounds of the Due Process Clause and were in no way conscience shocking.
In sum, plaintiff has not adequately pled a violation of his substantive due process rights such that this court could grant him relief.
C. Fourth Amendment
Finally, plaintiff alleges that SAM violated his Fourth Amendment rights by causing the police to seize him absent probable cause of his dangerousness or a valid warrant. Because a warrant issued pursuant to section 7302 of the MHPA need not be based on probable cause, and the procedure through which counties issue such warrants are reasonable in light of the potentially life-threatening circumstances facing the individual to be examined, plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim will be dismissed.
Plaintiff claims that the warrant was not valid because SAM issued it based entirely on Geise's unsubstantiated and facially insufficient allegations of plaintiff's dangerousness.
Although the Fourth Amendment generally requires police to proceed with a warrant and probable cause prior to arresting an individual, in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987), the Supreme Court recognized an exception to this rule where a case implicates "special needs." The Court defined a "special need" as a purpose "`beyond the normal need for law enforcement, [which] make[s] the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.'" Doby, 171 F.3d at 871 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873).
In light of this Supreme Court precedent, our Court of Appeals held in Doby that "the temporary involuntary commitment of those deemed dangerous to themselves or others qualifies as a `special need' permitting the state to act without a warrant." Doby, 171 F.3d at 871 (citing McCabe v. Life-Line Ambulance Serv. Inc., 77 F.3d 540, 549 (1st Cir. 1996)). In so holding, the court reasoned that "[r]equiring the county to seek a warrant from a magistrate in a situation where the county delegate has determined that there are reasonable grounds to believe in an individual's `clear and present' dangerousness would entail delays with potentially life-threatening consequences." Id. These life-threatening circumstances are by definition emergencies, and "[s]uch emergency cases present a situation where seeking a warrant is systemically impracticable." Id. Moreover, the court recognized that "a magistrate's authorization is less desirable in cases where non-judicial expertise is involved, . . . [such as] render[ing] the decision of whether an individual requires an emergency involuntary examination." Id. at 872.
The court stated, however, that "[a]lthough . . . the `special need' exception applies to the county's conduct under the MHPA, we nevertheless must examine whether the procedures followed by the county are reasonable under the circumstances." Id. Continuing with that analysis, the court stated that "Fourth Amendment doctrine provides that `the shorter the detention, the less compelling is the evidence of the necessity for it that the authorities need to produce.'" Id. (quoting Villanova v. Abrams, 972 F.2d 792, 796 (7th Cir. 1992)). The court reasoned that because "[t]he MHPA requires that a physician examine a detained individual within two hours of his or her arrival at a hospital[,] . . . that individual's liberty will be curtailed for at most several hours unless a physician independently concludes that the individual is mentally disabled and in need of involuntary treatment." Id. Moreover, the court once again stated that the procedure for issuing a warrant contained numerous devices — such as the warning of criminal prosecution on the face of the application and the requirement that independent, detached county administrators make the ultimate determination — which acted as gatekeepers. Id. In light of this reasoning, the court held that the procedures were reasonable and thus did not offend the Fourth Amendment. Id.
In the instant case, by following a procedure that was identical to that examined in Doby, neither the police officers nor SAM violated the Fourth Amendment. Although plaintiff alleges that issuing the warrant was unreasonable because SAM failed to investigate Geise's facially insufficient allegations of plaintiff's dangerousness, the Third Circuit has held that SAM was under no constitutional obligation to investigate these allegations. Doby, 171 F.3d at 870. Moreover, I have held that the allegations were facially sufficient to demonstrate that plaintiff posed a danger to himself. See supra, Section II.B. Thus, not only did the police officers and SAM follow constitutional procedures for detaining plaintiff, but their actions were manifestly reasonable in lights of the alleged threat to plaintiff's well-being.
Therefore, plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim will be dismissed.
Conclusion
Because plaintiff's complaint does not state a claim for which relief in this court may be granted, defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will be granted. An appropriate order follows.
ORDER
And now, on this ___ day of June, 2003, upon consideration of motions by the County of Berks, Agere Systems, Susan Geise, and Service Access Management, Inc. (Docs. #12, 15, 18, 19, 22) to dismiss plaintiff's complaint (Doc. #1) pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff's opposition thereto (Docs. # 13, 14, 20, 22, 23) and after oral argument, it is hereby ORDERED that defendants' motions are GRANTED and plaintiff's claims against the County of Berks, Agere Systems, Susan Geise, and Service Access Management, Inc. are DISMISSED.
It is further ordered that plaintiff and the remaining defendants, Bornemann Health Corp. t/a Bornemann Psychiatric Assoc. and Andrew Morris, M.D., shall, within 10 days, inform the court by letter of the period of time necessary to complete discovery so the court can issue a scheduling order.