Shaw v. City of N.Y.

32 Citing cases

  1. Brown v. City of New York

    192 A.D.3d 963 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)   Cited 19 times

    The Supreme Court also should have granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the false arrest and false imprisonment causes of action insofar as asserted against the City. The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to a cause of action alleging false arrest and false imprisonment (see Shaw v City of New York, 139 AD3d 698, 699; Paulos v City of New York, 122 AD3d 815, 817), including causes of action asserted pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 to recover damages for the deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights under color of state law (see Paulos v City of New York, 122 AD3d at 817, citing, inter alia, Betts v Shearman, 751 F3d 78, 82 [2d Cir]). Here, the City demonstrated its prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing the probable cause for the plaintiff's arrest, that is, that the plaintiff committed the crimes of menacing a police officer, criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, and attempted assault in the third degree (see Ball v Miller, 164 AD3d 728, 729; Shaw v City of New York, 139 AD3d at 699).

  2. Gill v. City of N.Y.

    146 A.D.3d 939 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)   Cited 8 times

    existence of any material fact, i.e., it makes determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence" (People v. Scarola, 71 N.Y.2d 769, 777, 530 N.Y.S.2d 83, 525 N.E.2d 728 [citation omitted]; see People v. Robinson, 143 A.D.3d 744, 38 N.Y.S.3d 601 ; People v. Pearce, 81 A.D.3d 856, 916 N.Y.S.2d 232 ; see also Ando v. Woodberry, 8 N.Y.2d 165, 167, 203 N.Y.S.2d 74, 168 N.E.2d 520 ; Lemoine v. Steinway Fitness Group, LLC, 106 A.D.3d 960, 965 N.Y.S.2d 371 ). To prevail on a cause of action to recover damages for false arrest or imprisonment, "the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, that the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and that the confinement was not privileged" (De Lourdes Torres v. Jones, 26 N.Y.3d 742, 759, 27 N.Y.S.3d 468, 47 N.E.3d 747 ; see Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310 ; Shaw v. City of New York, 139 A.D.3d 698, 698–699, 31 N.Y.S.3d 155 ). In an action to recover damages for false arrest based on a warrantless arrest, the defendant has the burden of proving legal justification or probable cause as an affirmative defense (see Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d at 458, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310 ; Nolasco v. City of New York, 131 A.D.3d 683, 15 N.Y.S.3d 449 ; Gagliano v. County of Nassau, 31 A.D.3d 375, 817 N.Y.S.2d 651 ).

  3. Segundo v. City of N.Y.

    2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 30562 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018)

    [It] does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed or is being committed by the suspected individual, and probable cause must be judged under the totality of the circumstances." Shaw v City of New York, 139 AD3d 698, 699 (2d Dep't 2016) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

  4. Ballinger v. City of Mount Vernon

    2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 6179 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024)

    False arrest and false imprisonment are two different names for the same common-law tort (see Metwally v City of New York, 215 A.D.3d 820, 822; Wieder v Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 208 A.D.3d 535, 537). To prevail on a cause of action to recover damages for false arrest or false imprisonment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, that the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement, and that the confinement was not privileged (see Crooks v City of New York, 189 A.D.3d 769, 771; Shaw v City of New York, 139 A.D.3d 698, 698). "The elements of the tort of malicious prosecution are: (1) the commencement or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff, (2) the termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (3) the absence of probable cause for the criminal proceeding and (4) actual malice" (De Lourdes Torres v Jones, 26 N.Y.3d 742, 760 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Cantalino v Danner, 96 N.Y.2d 391, 394).

  5. McKay v. Town of Southampton

    220 A.D.3d 59 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023)   Cited 3 times

    Whenever a person unlawfully obstructs or deprives another of his [or her] freedom to choose his [or her] own location, that person will be liable for that interference" ( Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 456, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310 ). "To prevail on a cause of action to recover damages for false arrest or imprisonment, ‘the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant intended to confine the plaintiff, that the plaintiff was conscious of the confinement, that the plaintiff did not consent to the confinement[,] and that the confinement was not privileged’ " ( Shaw v. City of New York, 139 A.D.3d 698, 698, 31 N.Y.S.3d 155, quoting De Lourdes Torres v. Jones, 26 N.Y.3d 742, 759, 27 N.Y.S.3d 468, 47 N.E.3d 747 ). Here, the Supreme Court concluded, in effect, that the plaintiff's confinement was privileged because he never made an application for release pursuant to CPL 180.80.

  6. Larcy v. Kamler

    185 A.D.3d 564 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)   Cited 38 times

    In opposition, the plaintiff alleged, for the first time, a new theory that the procedure performed by the defendant exceeded the scope of her consent in specific respects, a theory that was not referred to when the plaintiff's counsel questioned the defendant at his deposition. The general rule is that " ‘[a] plaintiff cannot, for the first time in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, raise a new or materially different theory of recovery against a party from those pleaded in the complaint and the bill of particulars’ " ( Anonymous v. Gleason, 175 A.D.3d 614, 617, 106 N.Y.S.3d 353, quoting Palka v. Village of Ossining, 120 A.D.3d 641, 643, 992 N.Y.S.2d 273 ; seeHanson v. Sewanhaka Cent. High Sch. Dist., 155 A.D.3d 702, 703, 64 N.Y.S.3d 303 ; Shaw v. City of New York, 139 A.D.3d 698, 699–700, 31 N.Y.S.3d 155 ; Mezger v. Wyndham Homes, Inc., 81 A.D.3d 795, 796, 916 N.Y.S.2d 641 ). If the theory is discernable from the pleadings, it may be considered (seeSchwartzberg v. Huntington Hosp., 163 A.D.3d 736, 738, 81 N.Y.S.3d 118 ; Osipova v. Silverberg, 152 A.D.3d 614, 616, 58 N.Y.S.3d 522 ; Shanoff v. Golyan, 139 A.D.3d 932, 934–935, 34 N.Y.S.3d 78 ), especially if the theory is referred to in the depositions (seeWeiss v. Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., 106 A.D.3d 727, 728, 964 N.Y.S.2d 581 ).

  7. Elie v. City of New York

    183 A.D.3d 867 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)   Cited 3 times

    ses of action alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, and this includes causes of action asserted pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 to recover damages for the deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights under color of state law that are the federal-law equivalents of state common-law false arrest and malicious prosecution causes of action" ( Williams v. City of New York, 153 A.D.3d 1301, 1302–1303, 62 N.Y.S.3d 401 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]; seePaulos v. City of New York, 122 A.D.3d 815, 817, 997 N.Y.S.2d 452 ). "Probable cause does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed or is being committed by the suspected individual, and probable cause must be judged under the totality of the circumstances" ( De Lourdes Torres v. Jones, 26 N.Y.3d 742, 759, 27 N.Y.S.3d 468, 47 N.E.3d 747 [internal quotation marks omitted]; seeShaw v. City of New York, 139 A.D.3d 698, 699, 31 N.Y.S.3d 155 ).

  8. Burns v. City of New York

    181 A.D.3d 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020)   Cited 6 times

    After two court appearances, the charges against him were dismissed on July 17, 2014. The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to causes of action alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution (seeGisondi v. Town of Harrison, 72 N.Y.2d 280, 283, 532 N.Y.S.2d 234, 528 N.E.2d 157 ; Williams v. City of New York, 153 A.D.3d 1301, 1302, 62 N.Y.S.3d 401 ; Shaw v. City of New York, 139 A.D.3d 698, 699, 31 N.Y.S.3d 155 ; Batten v. City of New York, 133 A.D.3d 803, 805, 20 N.Y.S.3d 160 ), including causes of action asserted pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 to recover damages for the deprivation of federal constitutional rights under color of state law when they are the federal law equivalents of state common-law false arrest and malicious prosecution causes of action (seeBetts v. Shearman, 751 F.3d 78, 82 [2d Cir.] ; Williams v. City of New York, 153 A.D.3d at 1302–1303, 62 N.Y.S.3d 401 ; Paulos v. City of New York, 122 A.D.3d 815, 817, 997 N.Y.S.2d 452 ). "Probable cause does not require proof sufficient to warrant a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt but merely information sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been [committed] or is being committed by the suspected individual, and probable cause must be judged under the totality of the circumstances" ( De Lourdes Torres v. Jones, 26 N.Y.3d 742, 759, 27 N.Y.S.3d 468, 47 N.E.3d 747 [internal quotation marks omitted]; seePeople v. B

  9. Anonymous v. Gleason

    175 A.D.3d 614 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)   Cited 44 times

    Here, the defendant met his prima facie burden as to proximate cause by submitting the affidavit of an expert in maternal fetal medicine, who opined that any delay in the decedent undergoing an abortion procedure from the second trimester to the third trimester did not cause her to develop AFE. In opposition, the plaintiff did not raise a triable issue of fact as to the defendant's prima facie showing, but rather alleged, for the first time, a new theory of causation, claiming that the decedent died of septic shock, not AFE. "A plaintiff cannot, for the first time in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, raise a new or materially different theory of recovery against a party from those pleaded in the complaint and the bill of particulars" ( Palka v. Village of Ossining, 120 A.D.3d 641, 643, 992 N.Y.S.2d 273 ; seeHanson v. Sewanhaka Cent. High Sch. Dist., 155 A.D.3d 702, 703, 64 N.Y.S.3d 303 ; Shaw v. City of New York, 139 A.D.3d 698, 699–700, 31 N.Y.S.3d 155 ; Garcia v. Richer, 132 A.D.3d 809, 810, 18 N.Y.S.3d 401 ; Mezger v. Wyndham Homes, Inc., 81 A.D.3d 795, 796, 916 N.Y.S.2d 641 ; Dolan v. Halpern, 73 A.D.3d 1117, 1119, 902 N.Y.S.2d 585 ; Abalola v. Flower Hosp., 44 A.D.3d 522, 843 N.Y.S.2d 615 ; Pinn v. Baker's Variety, 32 A.D.3d 463, 464, 820 N.Y.S.2d 129 ). Accordingly, summary judgment should have been granted in favor of the defendant.

  10. Ball v. Miller

    164 A.D.3d 728 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)   Cited 17 times

    We affirm. We agree with the Supreme Court's determination granting those branches of the defendants' motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action sounding in false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution insofar as asserted against them. "The existence of probable cause constitutes a complete defense to causes of action alleging false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution" ( Paulos v. City of New York , 122 A.D.3d 815, 817, 997 N.Y.S.2d 452 ; seeShaw v. City of New York , 139 A.D.3d 698, 699, 31 N.Y.S.3d 155 ; Batten v. City of New York , 133 A.D.3d 803, 805, 20 N.Y.S.3d 160 ), "including causes of action asserted pursuant to 42 USC § 1983 to recover damages for the deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights under color of state law that are the federal-law equivalents of state common-law false arrest and malicious prosecution causes of action" ( Paulos v. City of New York , 122 A.D.3d at 817, 997 N.Y.S.2d 452 ). The defendants established that the information Miller provided to the police furnished them with probable cause to arrest the plaintiff (seeLiotta v. County of Suffolk , 157 A.D.3d 781, 781–782, 66 N.Y.S.3d 899 ; Masciello v. Incorporated Vil. of Lloyd Harbor , 140 A.D.3d 834, 835, 32 N.Y.S.3d 633 ).