Summary
finding eleven month lapse between arrest and trial non-prejudicial
Summary of this case from Rush v. McKuneOpinion
Case No. 02-3437-JAR
December 4, 2003
MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION
This matter is before the Court on a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) seeking federal habeas relief from state convictions, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. After considering the parties' submissions, the Court is prepared to rule. Because Petitioner has failed to show that his Fourth Amendment right of Due Process was violated when the state trial court denied his motion to suppress, and because Petitioner failed to prove neither his statutory nor Constitutional right to a speedy trial were violated, the Petition shall be denied.
Factual Background
Following reports of suspected theft of anhydrous ammonia from the tanks of the LeRoy, Kansas Coop, Coffey County Deputy Sheriff Freddie Strawder began a surveillance of the tanks at about 1:30 a.m. on February 24, 1999. From his vantage point, he was able to observe some, but not all, of the anhydrous ammonia tanks. At about 3:30 a.m., after observing no activity in or around the area during the surveillance, Deputy Strawder decided to drive around all the tanks and then leave the area. As Deputy Strawder approached the tanks, he saw a car turn onto the street behind him and drive the other way. Deputy Strawder turned around, followed the vehicle, and called the tag number into dispatch. The deputy testified at this point in time that he was suspicious some crime had been committed or was about to be committed because (1) the car was in the area of the anhydrous ammonia tanks, (2) he had been observing the area for two hours and had noticed no one traveling, (3) the recent reports of suspected theft of anhydrous ammonia, and (4) the fact that the car bore out-of-county tags. He felt, based on these facts, that he had "spooked" the car out of hiding when he left his surveillance point.
Deputy Strawder followed the vehicle for a short time and testified that he observed it "cross the other line like two or three times." The officer pulled the car over, not for an alleged violation of the traffic laws, but based on the fact the out-of-county car was seen in the early morning hours near the anyhdrous ammonia tanks when he had observed no traffic activity in the previous two hours, leading him to believe the occupants of the car were trying to steal the anhydrous ammonia. The deputy testified he intended to stop the car the moment he first saw it.
As Petitioner located his driver's license and registration, the deputy saw two pairs of gloves, flashlights, and a cooler with plastic tubing coming out the top. The deputy testified that gloves and a flashlight would be necessary to steal the anhydrous ammonia at that time of night. After checking Petitioner's driver's license and registration, Deputy Strawder asked who Petitioner's passenger was and Petitioner replied he was "Eric Roberts." The deputy asked Petitioner if Roberts had identification on him and Petitioner replied that he did not. The deputy then had Petitioner sit in the patrol car while he checked his driver's license.
After receiving no information of interest from the dispatcher with respect to Petitioner's driver's license, the deputy asked Petitioner where he had been. Petitioner replied he had been at Robin Johnson's house, which was near where the deputy had first observed Petitioner. Petitioner also stated he was from Iola, Kansas, and that he did not really know his passenger and that he was giving Eric Roberts a ride back to Iola.
The deputy then asked Petitioner to remain in the patrol car and went to talk to the passenger. Upon questioning, the passenger responded that his name was Frederick Marsh and that he went with his friend, Petitioner, whom he had known for some time, to LeRoy from Iola to Robin's house. The deputy testified he became even more suspicious due to the discrepancy of information given by the two men.
The deputy then went back to the patrol car and informed Petitioner he had a problem because he knew someone was lying to him and first asked if there was anything illegal in the car, to which Petitioner replied, "No." The deputy called for backup and waited until it arrived. After backup arrived, Deputy Strawder called for a canine unit and so informed Petitioner and Marsh. By this time, Marsh was also sitting in the patrol car and informed Deputy Strawder that a marijuana cigarette was in the car. The deputy then escorted Marsh to the car and Marsh reached in and retrieved the marijuana cigarette from underneath the passenger seat. Marsh was then placed under arrest.
A deputy with a drug-sniffing dog arrived about 20 minutes later. While conducting an exterior sniff of the vehicle, the dog alerted on the trunk of the vehicle near the left rear quarter panel area near the lock mechanism. As the dog was led around the side of the car, it jumped in the car without direction from the handler and immediately went into the back seat and alerted where the back rest joins the seat.
Based on the dog's alerts, the deputies felt they had probable cause to search the vehicle. The trunk was opened and inside it the deputies found bottles of HEET, coffee filters, lithium strips, plastic tubing, Mason jars, a wooden spoon, drain cleaner, six small white pills which proved to contain pseudoephedrine, and military gas masks. The presence of these items made the deputies believe that Petitioner and Marsh were attempting to manufacture methamphetamine.
Petitioner was then arrested and charged with attempted manufacture of methamphetamine, conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, and possession of marijuana, later amended to drop the possession of marijuana charge. Petitioner appeals his convictions of those charges.
Procedural Background
Petitioner was convicted in the District Court of Coffey County, Kansas, of one count of attempted manufacture of a controlled substance, in violation of K.S.A. 65-4159(a) and K.S.A. 21-3301, and one count of conspiracy to manufacture a controlled substance in violation of K.S.A. 65-4156(a) and K.S.A. 21-3302. Petitioner was sentenced to a total term of 107 months imprisonment for the two offenses.
On direct appeal, Petitioner claimed (1) that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence and statements obtained in an illegal vehicle stop and (2) that his right to a speedy trial was violated by denial of the motion to dismiss and the prosecution's pretrial delay. The Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction; the Kansas Supreme Court denied review.
Standard of Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a federal court may not grant habeas relief on any claim adjudicated in state court, unless the adjudication:
Because Petitioner filed his petition for habeas relief well after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), the AEDPA applies to his petition. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1523, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding.
A state court's decision is "contrary to" an established federal law if the state court reaches a different result than the Supreme Court would when presented with facts that are . . . materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent" or if the state court "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law" set forth in Supreme Court cases. A decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law if a "state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of [a] prisoner's case." Unreasonable application of facts includes an unreasonable extension of a principle, or an unreasonable refusal to extend a principle to the facts at hand. The courts are to employ an objective standard in determining what is unreasonable.
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 405.
Id. at 413.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 409.
Although unreasonable determinations of fact are a second basis for a writ, a state court's determination of a factual issue shall be presumed to be correct. The petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence.
Discussion
Motion to Suppress
Petitioner contends that the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress was in error and in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. This issue is controlled by Stone v. Powell. "[W]here the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial."
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976).
Id. at 494.
Petitioner was given full and fair litigation on this issue. Prior to trial, a suppression hearing was held where Petitioner was afforded the opportunity to argue his motion to suppress. This motion was denied. At trial, Petitioner again moved to suppress the evidence he alleged was unconstitutionally obtained. The court heard Petitioner's arguments and again denied Petitioner's motion to suppress. Petitioner raised this issue on direct appeal, and the Kansas Court of Appeals denied Petitioner's motion to suppress. Therefore, under Stone v. Powell, Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief on this issue because he was afforded full and fair litigation.
Speedy Trial Violation
Petitioner contends that his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated. On the facts of this case, K.S.A. 22-3402(1) controls the statutory speedy trial issue because Petitioner was unable to make bail. However, this statute only applies when the person charged is held in jail solely on the subject criminal charge. Petitioner was being held for charges in addition to the subject charges, and therefore is not entitled to relief under the state statutory speedy trial provisions.
See State v. Mathenia, 262 Kan. 890, 897, 942 P.2d 624, 628 (1997) (K.S.A. 22-3402(1) does not apply when the person is held in prison on other charges).
The Kansas Supreme Court has adopted the factors set forth in Barker v. Wingo to examine a claim of a constitutional right to a speedy trial violation. Eleven months elapsed between Petitioner's arrest and his trial. In Mathenia, the court held that a delay of 23 months between the arrest and commencement of the trial was not presumptively prejudicial. This holding is consistent with other Kansas Supreme Court cases holding that delays of a little over a year and one year and two days were not presumptively prejudicial. The determination of whether the length of delay is unconstitutional depends on the circumstances of the case, and the facts of this case do not warrant a finding of presumptive prejudice to Petitioner due to an eleven month delay between the arrest and trial. Because there is no presumptive prejudice caused by the length of delay, there is no need to examine the other Barker factors.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).
See Mathenia, 262 Kan. at 894-95 (stating the factors as "length of delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his or her right, and prejudice to the defendant").
Id. at 894-97.
State v. Goss, 245 Kan. 189, 193, 777 P.2d 781, 785 (1989).
State v. Green, 260 Kan. 471, 474, 920 P.2d 414 (1996).
Goss, 245 Kan. at 193.
Conclusion
Petitioner has failed to show that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained in an alleged illegal search. Petitioner was afforded full and fair litigation on this issue and is therefore not entitled to relief on that ground. Petitioner further failed to establish a violation of his statutory or constitutional right to a speedy trial. Clearly established law provides that the statutory speedy trial provisions do not apply to Petitioner. Such law further provides that a delay of eleven months between arrest and trial is not presumptively prejudicial.
IT IS THEREFORE BY THIS COURT ORDERED that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED.