Shaughnesy v. Tax Tribunal

7 Citing cases

  1. State v. Gardner

    315 N.C. 444 (N.C. 1986)   Cited 155 times
    Holding "that a defendant may be tried for, convicted of, and punished separately for the crime of breaking or entering and the crime of felony larceny" arising from one act or occurrence

    When analyzing the precise issue now before us as one of double jeopardy, courts across the nation have often tended to confuse rather than clarify the legal principles involved because of the failure to recognize and differentiate between single prosecution and successive-prosecution situations. In People v. Robideau, 419 Mich. 458, 355 N.W.2d 592, reh'g denied, 420 Mich. 1201, 362 N.W.2d 219 (1984), the Michigan Supreme Court recently spoke to a possible reason for the obvious confusion among various court decisions which address the double jeopardy issue: We . . . come to the conclusion that much of the inconsistency in double jeopardy analysis results from the failure to clearly distinguish between single-prosecution and successive-prosecution cases. . . .

  2. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Wilkes (In re Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n)

    No. 320549 (Mich. Ct. App. Jun. 16, 2015)

    Thus, the circuit court properly concluded that the district court had failed to perform a clear legal duty. Wilkes next argues that the circuit court's exercise of superintending control was precluded by MCR 3.302(D) because an appeal was available to Fannie Mae. While MCR 3.302(D)(2) does provide that a complaint for superintending control must be dismissed if an appeal is available, in Shaughnesy v Mich Tax Tribunal, 420 Mich 246; 362 NW2d 219 (1984), our Supreme Court clarified that "the availability of an appeal is not an absolute bar . . . where an appeal would not be an adequate remedy." Id. at 252-253.

  3. WPW Acquisition Co. v. City of Troy

    250 Mich. App. 287 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 16 times
    Defining ad valorem taxation

    Plaintiffs also cite NeBoShone Ass'n, Inc v State Tax Comm, 58 Mich. App. 324, 342-344, 227 N.W.2d 358 (1975), where a panel of this Court, after considering the language of Const 1963, art 9, § 3 before its amendment in 1994, followed General Motors, supra, and Hoerner-Waldorf, supra, concluding that the plaintiff was entitled to relief if its property assessment of assessed value to true cash value exceeded the average in the taxing district. See also Shaughnesy v Tax Tribunal, 420 Mich. 246, 249; 362 N.W.2d 219 (1984) (noting in dicta that where a taxpayer protests a property valuation before the local board of review, he may only obtain relief from a tentative valuation before equalization if "he can show that his property has been assessed at a different proportion of true cash value than the rest of the property within the same class in the taxing district"); Brittany Park, supra at 88 ("The Supreme Court has recognized a taxpayer's right to complain that his assessment was not made in uniformity with other assessments. If the claim is based on lack of uniformity, the taxpayer must show that the ratio of assessed value to fair market value of his property is greater than the ratio of average assessed value to the average fair market value in the taxing district.") (Citations omitted.)

  4. Great Lakes Division of National Steel Corp. v. City of Ecorse

    227 Mich. App. 379 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 150 times
    Concluding that the application of principles of law involved in valuation did not deprive a petitioner of due process

    Although part of the system of equalization is designed to remedy the potential for unequal assessment levels, the average level of assessment serves a distinct purpose from county or state equalization by addressing unequal assessment levels within a class of property in a single taxing district. Shaughnesy v Tax Tribunal, 420 Mich. 246, 249-250; 362 N.W.2d 219 (1984). The taxpayer may obtain relief only when it is shown that the property was assessed at a different proportion of true cash value than the rest of the property within the same class in the taxing district.

  5. State v. Strohauer

    84 N.C. App. 68 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 12 times

    Where successive prosecutions are involved, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects the individual from being subjected to further expense, embarrassment and a feeling of anxiety that he or she may be tried again for the same offense even though innocent. Gardner at 452, 340 S.E.2d at 707 (citing People v. Robideau, 419 Mich. 458, 355 N.W.2d 592, reh'g denied, 420 Mich. 1201, 362 N.W.2d 219 (1984)). Different interests are involved, however, where the prosecution is for the same offense in a single trial.

  6. Jefferson Schools v. Detroit Edison Co.

    154 Mich. App. 390 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 14 times

    Under MCL 211.20; MSA 7.30, "any person whose property is assessed" is entitled to file a protest before the board of review regarding the assessment of his or her property. See Shaughnesy v Tax Tribunal, 420 Mich. 246; 362 N.W.2d 219 (1984). MCL 211.30; MSA 7.30 makes no provision for protests by persons or entities such as school districts having no ownership interests in the assessed property.

  7. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge

    151 Mich. App. 550 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 4 times

    Pursuant to MCL 600.310; MSA 27A.310 and GCR 1963, 711, now MCR 3.302, this Court is "vested with jurisdiction to issue, to inferior tribunals, orders of superintending control that are in the nature of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari." Shaughnesy v Tax Tribunal, 420 Mich. 246, 252; 362 N.W.2d 219 (1985). Historically, the scope of review pursuant to a writ of certiorari is limited to determining whether the inferior tribunal, upon the record made, had jurisdiction, whether the inferior tribunal exceeded that jurisdiction, and whether the inferior tribunal proceeded according to law.